Taylor v. Badger
| Decision Date | 06 March 1917 |
| Citation | 226 Mass. 258,115 N.E. 405 |
| Parties | TAYLOR v. BADGER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County, William Cushing Wait, Judge.
Suit by Violet I. Taylor against Charles K. Badger. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
John F. Gadsby, of Boston, for appellant.
J. J. McCarthy, of Boston, for appellee.
This is a bill in equity to remove a cloud upon the title to real estate. The significant facts and dates are that on and before December 10, 1908, James McCarthy was owner of an undivided part of real estate in Chelsea. On that date his interest therein was attached on a writ in favor of Mary Gadsby. On February 19, 1909, in good faith and for valuable consideration he conveyed by deed free from incumbrances his undivided part in this land to William L. Davis. James McCarthy died intestate on March 23, 1909. Administration on his estate was granted on April 22, 1909, by the probate court of the county of Suffolk. The Gadsby writ against James McCarthy was duly entered in court, the defendant was defaulted but there was no judgment until, on September 15, 1914, it was ordered that judgment be entered nunc pro tunc as of March 19, 1909. Execution issued on October 13, 1914, as of March 19, 1909. The form of a levy and sale on this execution was had, although the superior court judge found as a fact that the price alleged to have been paid was not paid. The defendant asserts title through deed from the purchaser at such sale. The plaintiff acquired the title of Davis in 1916.
[1] The attachment of McCarthy's interest in the land made on the Gadsby writ was dissolved by the death of McCarthy before it had been taken or seized on execution and the appointment of an administration of his estate within a year thereafter. R. L. c. 167, § 112.1 The contention that this section does not apply to cases where the land has been sold by the owner subsequent to the attachment but before his death cannot be supported. The words of the statute are plain and unequivocal. They are sweeping and unqualified. Doubtless the main purpose of this statute was, as has been said in many cases, to facilitate the orderly administration of the estates of deceased persons and to permit all his property to come into the control of his personal representative for distribution among all his creditors on the basis of equality without hindrance from lien attachments. There is no inherent equity in favor of the attaching creditor, in instances where real estate has been alienated subsequently by the owner, as compared with instances where there has been no such alienation. If it has been conveyed, presumably the estate of the decedent has received the benefit of the consideration. There is no reason to presume that the Legislature intended an exception to be read into its unambiguous words.
[2] The second sentence of section 112 does not limit the broad and clear declaration of the first sentence. It rather is ancillary in the cases to which it is applicable to the preceding dominant provision.
This conclusion is required beyond question by previous decisions. Bullard v. Dame, 7 Pick. 239, 242;Parsons v. Merrill, 5 Metc. 356;Wilmarth v. Richmond, 11 Cush. 463. See, also, Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gaslight Co., 220 Mass. 1, 6, 107 N. E. 426, wherein it was held that St. 1913, c. 305, would have no effect upon a case like the present where the attachment, alienation and death of grantor occurred before it was enacted.
There is nothing out of harmony with this result in the decision or the reasoning in Rioux v. Cronin, 222 Mass. 131, 138, 109 N. E. 898, and in Dunbar v. Kelly, 189 Mass. 390, 75 N. E. 740. Those cases related to attachments of property subsequently conveyed in fraud of creditors by the owner who later died. What was said in those opinions was direcred to those facts and is not to be distorted into other...
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...Judge v. National Security Bank, 272 Mass. 286, 289, 172 N.E. 76. Compare Pinney v. McGregory, 102 Mass. 186, 189;Taylor v. Badger, 226 Mass. 258, 261-262, 115 N.E. 405. The present rule is a convenient one, upon whatever ground it rests. If a person paying the administrator is protected ag......
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...v. Morse, 208 Mass. 501, 94 N. E. 701, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 982;Allen v. Hunt, 213 Mass. 276, 279, 100 N. E. 552;Taylor v. Badger, 226 Mass. 258, 115 N. E. 405;Joyce v. Thompson, 229 Mass. 106, 118 N. E. 184;Woodard v. Snow, 233 Mass. 267, 124 N. E. 35, 5 A. L. R. 1381;Hanscom v. Malden & Melro......
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Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter
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