Taylor v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Docket Number: AC 44665
• Parties: David TAYLOR v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

216 Conn.App. 570

286 A.3d 449

David TAYLOR

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 44665

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 10, 2022

Officially Released November 22, 2022

Alexander T. Taubes, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Zenobia G. Graham-Days, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (respondent).

Prescott, Suarez and Bishop, Js.

BISHOP, J.

The petitioner, David Taylor,¹ appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2) and (5).² On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court incorrectly dismissed his claims that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, violated his constitutional rights to (1) procedural due process, (2) equal protection of the law, and (3) freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree that the court improperly dismissed the petitioner's first claim. We agree, however, that the court improperly dismissed his second and third claims. We therefore affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The following procedural history and facts, as alleged in the petitioner's second amended petition (operative petition),³ or as otherwise undisputed in the record, are relevant to this appeal.⁴ The petitioner, a citizen of the United Kingdom, is currently incarcerated at the Osborn Correctional Institution (Osborn) in Somers, serving a term of twenty-five years of incarceration for the crime of murder. In his operative petition, the petitioner asserts, in essence, three claims.

The first claim asserts that the respondent violated the petitioner's right to procedural due process. According to the petition, the respondent assigned the petitioner an overall risk score of three and a detainer score of three.⁵ The respondent also labeled the petitioner "a public safety risk." An Immigration and Naturalization Service and Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer⁶ was issued against the petitioner in 2010. As a result of this detainer, the petitioner faces deportation upon the completion of his sentence. The petitioner alleges that, by classifying him as "a public safety risk" and improperly assigning him a detainer score of three, the respondent has violated his right to procedural due process. Specifically, the petitioner contends that those classifications are false, stigmatizing, and result in punishment that is qualitatively different from that characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a crime. According to the petitioner, because he has been improperly classified, he has been denied rehabilitative programs, and his reputation has been, and will continued to be, injured.

The petitioner's second claim asserts an equal protection violation.⁷ The petitioner claims that he is being denied equal protection of the laws because the respondent has limited his access to rehabilitative programs that are available to all inmates pursuant to General Statutes §§ 18-81w,⁸ 18-81x⁹ and 18-81z¹⁰ —including reentry and discharge planning, and community release—because he is a British citizen.

The petitioner's third claim asserts that the respondent has violated his right under the eighth amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The petitioner, who is almost sixty-seven years old, alleges that the COVID-19 virus poses a sufficiently and objectively serious risk to his life because the virus has been particularly deadly for institutionalized populations and because he has numerous preexisting medical conditions. The petitioner further alleges that the respondent has acted with deliberate indifference toward him by failing to follow Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines—specifically, by failing to enforce mask wearing and social distancing.¹¹

In his prayer for relief, the petitioner "ask[ed] the court to order the commissioner to:

"(1) Reduce [his] detainer score to a 1 and [his] overall score to a 2, which would make [him] eligible for community release and other relevant programs.

"(2) Grant [him], as a low risk offender, and future deportee with over 85 [percent] of [his] sentence served, with a positive institutional record, community release here or in the [United Kingdom] under [General Statutes] § 18-91a, because of [his] deteriorating health, age, and high risk for COVID-19 with complications.

"(3) [Afford him] [a]ny other relief the court deems just and proper under the circumstances."

On September 14, 2020, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (1), (2) and (5).¹² In his memorandum of law in support of the motion, the respondent claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because the petitioner did not have a protected liberty interest in a certain classification and because the petition failed to state a claim on which habeas relief could be granted.¹³ On October 16, 2020, the petitioner filed an objection to the respondent's motion to dismiss in which he argued that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over his petition because he sufficiently had alleged that the respondent had violated his rights to procedural due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. On December 8, 2020, a virtual hearing on the respondent's motion to dismiss was held.

On January 19, 2021, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it dismissed, pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2) and (5), the entirety of the operative petition.¹⁴ On January 27, 2021, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the court granted. On February 16, 2021, the petitioner filed a motion to reargue, which the court denied on February 17, 2021. This appeal followed.¹⁵

Before turning to the petitioner's claims, we first set forth the relevant standard of review and legal principles that guide our analysis. "The principal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness. ... In order to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction in a habeas action, a petitioner must allege that he is illegally confined or has been deprived of his liberty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Byrd v. Commissioner of Correction , 177 Conn. App. 71, 82, 171 A.3d 1103 (2017).

"[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party. ... However, [t]he petition for a writ of habeas corpus is essentially a pleading and, as such, it should conform generally to a complaint in a civil action. ... The principle that a plaintiff may rely only upon what he has alleged is basic. ... It is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint. ... While the habeas court has considerable discretion to frame a remedy that is commensurate with the scope of the established constitutional violations ... it does not have the discretion to look beyond the pleadings ... to decide claims not raised." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vitale v. Commissioner of Correction , 178 Conn. App. 844, 850–51, 178 A.3d 418 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 923, 181 A.3d 566 (2018).

To the extent the respondent claims that the petition is legally insufficient, our review requires us to interpret the pleadings. The interpretation of pleadings involves an assessment of whether they are legally sufficient, and, therefore, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Woods v. Commissioner of Correction , 197 Conn. App. 597, 607, 232 A.3d 63 (2020) ("[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court .... Our review of the [habeas] court's interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary. ... [T]he modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. ... [T]he [petition] must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. ... As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the [petition] is insufficient to allow recovery." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), appeal dismissed, 341 Conn. 506, 267 A.3d 193 (2021).

Practice Book § 23-29, which governs motions to dismiss habeas petitions, "serves, roughly speaking, as the analog to Practice Book §§ 10-30 and 10-39, which, respectively, govern motions to dismiss and motions to strike in civil actions."

Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 548, 561, 223 A.3d 368 (2020). "[A]s it would do in evaluating the allegations in a civil complaint, in evaluating the legal sufficiency of allegations in a habeas petition, a court must view the allegations in the light most favorable to the petitioner, which includes all facts necessarily implied from the allegations." Finney v. Commissioner of Correction , 207 Conn. App. 133, 142, 261 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 339 Conn. 915, 262 A.3d 134 (2021).

"Whether a habeas court properly dismissed [the operative petition] for a writ of habeas corpus presents a question of law over which our review is plenary." Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 334 Conn. at 553, 223 A.3d 368. We therefore must "decide whether the court's conclusions are legally and logically correct and supported by the facts in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boria v. Commissioner of Correction , 186...