Taylor v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 96-4084
Decision Date | 05 December 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-4084,96-4084 |
Citation | 130 F.3d 1395 |
Parties | 48 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 296, 97 CJ C.A.R. 3249 Deborah TAYLOR, Plaintiff--Appellant, v. COOPER TIRE AND RUBBER CO., a Delaware corporation, Defendant--Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Daniel G. Darger, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
R. Scott Williams (Catherine M. Larson with him on the brief) of Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff, Mrs. Deborah Taylor, was injured when a tire manufactured by Defendant, Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., failed. At issue in this products liability case applying Utah law was the cause of the tire failure. Plaintiff alleged a manufacturing defect. Defendant asserted a variety of defenses including alternative causes for the tire failure other than a manufacturing defect. The district court held that Plaintiff's proposed expert witness was not qualified to testify to any alleged defect in the tire and granted Defendant's Motion in Limine to exclude this testimony. The court then held that Plaintiff's claim could not be sustained absent expert witness testimony that the tire was defective and dismissed the case.
Plaintiff challenges the district court's ruling, contending that (1) her witness was qualified to testify as an expert about the reason for the tire's failure; (2) the lack of expert testimony is not fatal to her case; and (3) the court made procedural errors. We affirm the trial court's decision that the witness was not qualified as an expert pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, but reject the court's conclusion that Utah law requires expert testimony to establish a viable cause of action in product liability.
Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in finding that her witness was not qualified to testify as an expert. In the course of Plaintiff's case, she attempted to proffer the testimony of an expert to support her manufacturing defect theory. The court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the expert was qualified pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The evidence at the hearing showed that the witness was qualified generally in materials failure, particularly metals. The central focus of the inquiry, however was whether the witness was qualified to testify that the tire failure in this case was the result of a manufacturing defect.
The district courts have broad discretion to determine the admission of expert testimony. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1517-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996). This court reviews such decisions only for an abuse of discretion. Orth v. Emerson Elec. Co., White-Rodgers Div., 980 F.2d 632, 637 (10th Cir.1992). To illustrate the court's handling of this matter, we note some of the proposed expert's testimony:
....
....
Q And you admitted today in fact that you are not an expert in the manufacturing of tires?
A Correct.
....
App. to Appellant's Br., Vol. II at 326-27, 329, 345-46.
Our review of the hearing testimony leads us to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found the expert was not sufficiently qualified to testify on the critical issue in this case. See Meyerhoff v. Michelin Tire Corp., 70 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir.1995); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d 33, 37-38 (10th Cir.1975), on remand, 411 F.Supp. 705 (W.D.Okla.), rev'd, 561 F.2d 202 (10th Cir.1977). Although under existing authority the disqualification of the plaintiff's proposed expert is not reversible error, it is also clear that a decision to allow the witness to testify as an expert would also not have been reversible.
Plaintiff also asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her claim for lack of expert testimony. Immediately after excluding Plaintiff's expert, the court stated that it would entertain a motion to dismiss the case. Defendant moved to dismiss the case, and the court granted this motion. Our review of the record reveals the court believed that to recover for manufacturing defect under Utah law, a plaintiff is required to prove the element of product defect with expert testimony. 1 On its face the order is one to dismiss as a matter of law for failure to have an expert witness to support the manufacturing defect theory. 2 We review de novo the district court's determination of state law. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1220, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991); Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1528 (10th Cir.1997).
Our reading of Utah law persuades us that no such rule has been established in Utah and that the general trend in the law is that plaintiffs may prove product defect through circumstantial evidence. In Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[A product's failure], standing as an isolated fact, would be an insufficient factual basis for an inference that the wheel was defective at the time it was assembled.... However, when viewed in relation to other evidentiary facts--... expert testimony ... the age of the truck; ... the fact that it had no record of prior damage; the description of the mishap by plaintiff ... then the fact of [product failure] may have provided the requisite force to tip the scales in favor of plaintiff. Certainly, reasonable men from the cumulative factual total could infer ... that the wheel was defective at the time of assembly.
Id. at 551-52. Additionally, in Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955), the Utah Supreme Court stated that Id. at 472. The court further discusses how evidence that negates other inferences of liability, i.e., plaintiff's own negligence or the interference of a third party, would be relevant. Id. at 474.
Utah law requires a plaintiff to prove that "at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer ... there was a defect or defective condition in the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1). One Utah case has dealt with the argument that a manufacturing defect can be supported solely by expert testimony. See Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993) ( ). No Utah court has expressly rejected the claim that a manufacturing defect must be supported by expert testimony. However, Utah courts have not addressed a situation where plaintiff presented evidence of defect without offering expert testimony. In each Utah case where plaintiff did not produce expert testimony, plaintiff also did not offer any other evidence. See Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah App.1994) ( ); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah App.1993) (, )cert. denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
The developing law in other jurisdictions does not suggest an irresistible trend in the other direction which would lead Utah to change its position. It is clear that in many states circumstantial evidence, whether expert or not, may support a manufacturing...
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