Taylor v. Dep't of Human Servs. of Mich.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 09-14639,09-14639
• Parties: MACK TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES of the STATE of MICHIGAN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

MACK TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES of the STATE of MICHIGAN, Defendant.

No. 09-14639

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Date: September 30, 2013

Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen

OPINION AND ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES

This is an employment discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. On September 21, 2012, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him a total of $150,000.00 in damages. Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Interest [Doc. #65]. The Motion will be GRANTED under the terms discussed below.

I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Title VII expressly provides that a district court "[i]n its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs [of a Title VII action] ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Supreme Court has held that in Title VII cases, a prevailing plaintiff should normally recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances render such an award inappropriate. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978).

Attorney fees awarded under this section must be reasonable. As the Supreme Court noted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), "[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." (Emphasis added). In Glass v. Secretary of HHS, 822 F.2d 19, 21 (6^thCir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit, citing Coulter v. State of Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 149 (6^thCir. 1986), recognized "that the rate-times-hours method of calculation, also known as the 'lodestar' approach, includes most, if not all, of the factors relevant to determining a reasonable attorney's fee."

"The primary concern in an attorney fee case is that the fee awarded be reasonable, that is, one that is adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers." Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir.1999). See also Coulter v. State of Tennessee, supra, 805 F.2d at 149 ("Legislative history speaks of 'fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls,'..and cautions against allowing the statute to be used as a 'relief fund for lawyers'")(internal citations to Congressional Record omitted). Or, as the Fifth Circuit put it in Johnson, 488 F.2d at 720, "[C]ourts must remember that they do not have a mandate...to make the prevailing counsel rich." The party seeking an award of fees bears the burden of showing that the request is reasonable. See Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6^thCir. 1990).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Hourly Rate

In determining a reasonable hourly rate, "courts should look to the hourly rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Fuhr v. School Dist. of Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753, 762 (6^thcir. 2004). However, the court retains broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate. Id.; Wells v. New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 239 (6^thCir. 1995).

Plaintiff's counsel requests an hourly rate of $300. Both parties cite to the State Bar of Michigan's most recent (2010) Economics of Law Practice Survey. Plaintiff's counsel states that he has 16 years experience in litigation. Because there is an insufficient basis to find that he would approach the 75^thor 95^thpercentile in terms of billing, the mean values for applicable categories will suffice to determine a reasonable hourly rate. According to the survey, the mean for all sole practitioners with an office outside the home is $214; for attorneys with 16 years in practice, the mean is $255; and for attorneys who practice plaintiff-side employment litigation, the mean is $256.¹ Taking an average of the mean values results in an hourly rate of $241. Defendant suggests that an appropriate hourly rate would be $250. I agree. Plaintiff's counsel will becompensated at the rate of $250 per hour.

B. Hours Expended

The Defendant argues that the number of hours claimed by Plaintiff is excessive in part because he did not prevail on every claim, and that "[t]he hours related to the unsuccessful claims should be deducted from the whole case." Defendant's Brief in Response [Doc. #66], at 4. The fact that a plaintiff did not prevail on all of his claims does not necessarily preclude compensation for work performed on the whole case. The more important consideration is the scope of the results that were obtained. In this regard, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 435, stated:

"In these circumstances the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing the fee. The result is what matters." (citation and footnote omitted).

Similarly, in Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1169 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit held:

"However, a court should not reduce attorney fees based on a simple ratio of successful claims to claims raised. When claims are based on a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, for the purpose of calculating attorney fees they should not be treated as distinct claims, and the cost of litigating the related claims should not be reduced." (Internal citations omitted).

See also Deja Vu v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,Tennessee, 421 F.3d 417, 423 (6^thCir. 2005) ("[W]e have repeatedly rejected mechanical reductions in fees based on the number of issues on which a plaintiff has prevailed.").

In this case, counsel obtained significant relief for his client in the form of a substantial money judgment. Because this result "cannot fairly be labeled as anything short of excellent, [Plaintiff] is entitled to a fully compensatory fee." Id. at 424. Thus, I am not inclined to reduce or apportion fees according to which claims bore fruit and which claims did not.

In determining the reasonableness of the "full compensatory fee" to which Plaintiff is entitled, the Court must assess whether the total number of hours claimed is reasonable. While I decline to apportion fees according to which claims were successful and which were not, counsel's claim for 245.48 total hours seems excessive given that this was a relatively straightforward Title VII case. I do not doubt that counsel actually expended the time claimed, and it is not my intention to dissect his fee petition with the gimlet eye of a tax accountant. However, the court "is not required to set forth an hour-by-hour analysis of the fee request" in reducing the fees. Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 562 (1st Cir.1987). See also In re 'Agent Orange' Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir.1987) ("no item-by-item accounting of the hours disallowed is necessary or desirable"); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 657-58 (7th Cir.1985). Rather, "the district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure as apractical means of trimming the fat from a fee application." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9^thCir.1992)(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that "the court has discretion simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed 'as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.'") (internal citations omitted); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1202 -1204 (10^thCir. 1986) (affirming a reduction in claimed fees by 77%, the court states, "There is no requirement, either in this court or elsewhere, that district courts identify and justify each disallowed hour.").

While this is not an exact science, I find, in my discretion, that it would be appropriate to reduce Plaintiff's request by 20%, resulting in 196.38 hours. At $250 per hour, this gives Plaintiff a total attorney fee of $49, 095.00.

C. Prejudgment Interest

Because this case is based on federal question jurisdiction, the award of prejudgment interest is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. E.E.O.C. v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Assoc., 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6^thCir. 1984); Bricklayers' Pension Trust Fund v. Taiariol, 671 F.2d 988, 990 (6^thCir. 1982). In Stroh Container Corp. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 752 (8^thCir. 1986), the court stated that "prejudgment interest should ordinarily be granted unless exceptional orunusual circumstances exist making the award of interest inequitable."²

Prejudgment interest in a federal case is also awarded to further the remedial goals of the particular federal statute under which the case is brought. See Bricklayers' Pension Trust Fund, supra, 671 F.2d at 989 ("[T]he Supreme Court...[has] directed [in Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947)] that the decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest should hinge on whether to do so would further the congressional purposes underlying the obligations imposed by the statute in question.").

Title VII is, of course, remedial in nature. An award of prejudgment interest in this case would further the remedial goals of the statute.

The rate of prejudgment interest is also discretionary with the court. Endico Potatoes, Inc. v. CIT Group/Factoring, Inc., 67 F.3d 1063, 1071-72 (2^ndCir. 1995). The federal rate of interest set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1961(a) would be appropriate in this federal question case.³ Estate of Riddle ex.rel. Riddle v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 400, 409 (6^thCir. 2005).

D. Costs

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) provides that "[u]nless a...