Taylor v. Fields

• Decision Date: 11 March 1986
• Citation: 178 Cal.App.3d 653,224 Cal.Rptr. 186
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Flossie TAYLOR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jean B. FIELDS, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. B009873.

Page 186

224 Cal.Rptr. 186

178 Cal.App.3d 653

Flossie TAYLOR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jean B. FIELDS, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. B009873.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

March 11, 1986.

Review Denied May 29, 1986.

[178 Cal.App.3d 656]

Law Offices of Marvin M. Mitchelson, Marvin M. Mitchelson, Sat Karam Kaur Khalsa and Phillip I. Bronson, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant

Ervin, Cohen & Jessup and Horace N. Freedman, Beverly Hills, for defendant and respondent.

KLEIN, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff and appellant Flossie Taylor (Taylor) appeals from the granting of a summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Jean B. Fields (Jean).

The papers in the summary judgment motion disclosed Leo D. Fields (Leo), a married man, and Taylor never lived together, and had a meretricious relationship. No existing case law supports a contract theory of recovery based on such a fact situation. Therefore, the summary judgment is affirmed.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¹

Leo and Jean were married on April 20, 1930, in Alameda County, California. They lived together as husband and wife for more than 50 years, until Leo's death in September 1980.

[178 Cal.App.3d 657] Taylor met Leo in 1938 in connection with a job application, and went to work for him. They became lovers, and began what turned out to be a 42 year relationship. During the first 20 years, Taylor was married to and lived with her husband, Jack, and they had two children.

After her divorce from Jack, Taylor continued her relationship with Leo, but never lived with him. Taylor alleged in 1969 or 1970 Leo asked her to marry him and she accepted. However, Leo did not end his marriage to Jean, and instead, told Taylor that if she would continue their relationship, he would take care of her financially and see to it that she would live comfortably for the rest of her life. As part of this agreement, Taylor promised Leo that during the period of their relationship, she would not marry anyone else.

Taylor also claimed Leo promised to provide for her by giving her $3,000 a month starting in 1973. She never received any such payments, and instead, received only the sums of $200 or $500 occasionally. Leo allegedly gave Taylor approximately $10,000 worth of water bonds and deposited $20,000 in a joint checking account with Taylor.

In September 1981, after Leo's death, Taylor filed a complaint against Jean as the sole defendant for breach of contract arising out of the alleged intimate and "fiduciary" relationship of 42 years between herself and Leo.

The complaint alleged in three causes of action an oral contract, an implied contract, and breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent transfer, and prayed for damages and a constructive trust. These causes of action were based on Leo's alleged promise to take care of Taylor financially, thus enabling her to live in comfort the rest of her life, in exchange for Taylor's continuing to be Leo's companion and confidante and devoting herself to his care, comfort and happiness.

Jean answered the complaint and discovery commenced.

On June 15, 1984, Jean filed a motion for summary judgment on the following grounds: no triable issues of material fact existed; the alleged contract was unlawful and against public policy; the action was barred by the statutes of frauds and limitations; and the complaint failed to name the trustee of the decedent's trust as an indispensable party. In support of this motion Jean filed a statement of undisputed facts.

Taylor filed an opposition motion and a statement of disputed facts, to which Jean filed a reply.

[178 Cal.App.3d 658] On August 27, 1984, the trial court heard and granted Jean's motion for summary judgment. In its minute order, the trial court stated the case did not come within Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106, and to apply Marvin to these facts would require a "quantum leap." The trial court also held the contract which contemplated, inter alia, Taylor would not remarry until and unless she could marry Leo, was void as being in restraint of marriage and therefore against public policy.

Taylor appealed.

CONTENTIONS

Taylor contends the granting of the summary judgment was in error because there are triable issues of fact as to the existence of a valid oral and/or implied contract between Taylor and Leo.

Jean counters the summary judgment was proper because: the alleged contracts are illegal; Taylor's causes of action are barred by the statutes of frauds and limitations; and an indispensable party was not joined.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

Taylor boldly asserts Marvin enables her causes of action based on her relationship with Leo. However, neither Marvin nor any other case to date has allowed recovery to an unmarried partner without a showing of a stable and significant relationship evolving out of cohabitation. A further requirement is a showing the agreement relied upon does not rest on illicit meretricious ² consideration.

Here, admittedly Taylor and Leo never lived together, but were "intimate lovers." Taylor's deposition testimony clearly discloses sex formed an inseparable part of the consideration for any alleged agreement between them. Unfortunately for Taylor as the woman involved herein, her relationship with Leo was nothing more than that of a legally married man and his mistress, albeit a long term one.

The existing law does not afford any relief to Taylor in her fact situation, and even though she challenges us to do so, this court does not intend to carve out a cause of action for her based thereon.

[178 Cal.App.3d 659]

DISCUSSION

1. Summary judgment rules.

Summary judgment is properly granted only if no material fact exists or where the record establishes as a matter of law that a cause of action asserted against a party cannot prevail. (Avila v. Standard Oil Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 441, 446, 213 Cal.Rptr. 314.) The affidavits and declarations of the moving party are strictly construed while those of the opposition are liberally construed. (Gray v. Reeves (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 567, 573, 142 Cal.Rptr. 716.)

The trial court must decide whether a triable issue of fact exists (Axley v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d 1, 8, 151 Cal.Rptr. 570), and when the sole remaining question is one of law, it is the duty of the trial court to determine the issue of law. (Coast-United Advertising, Inc. v. City of Long Beach (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 766, 769, 124 Cal.Rptr. 487.)

It is settled under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c summary judgment procedure that the trial court is not limited to a search for facts on a particular issue, but may draw inferences regarding that issue from the relevant facts set forth in the affidavits. (C.L. Smith Co. v. Roger Ducharme, Inc. (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 735, 742, 135 Cal.Rptr. 483.) Hence, the trial court is to consider all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence (Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 185,

163 Cal.Rptr. 912), and the lack of a triable issue of fact may be established by inference where the inference is the only reasonable one that can be drawn from the evidence for and against the motion. (Hirsch v. Blish (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 163, 166, 142 Cal.Rptr. 646.)

A defendant " 'must conclusively negate a necessary element of the plaintiff's case or establish a complete defense and thereby demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material factual issue which requires the process of a trial.' [Saatzer v. Smith (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 512, 517, 176 Cal.Rptr. 68.] The party opposing the summary judgment, which is supported by declarations or affidavits sufficient to sustain the motion, has the burden of showing that triable issues of fact do exist. (Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 873 [127 Cal.Rptr. 110, 544 P.2d 1310].) If that burden is not sustained, summary judgment is proper. (Saatzer v. Smith, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 517 [176 Cal.Rptr. 68].)" (Los Angeles County-U.S.C. Medical Center v. Superior Court (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 454, 459, 202 Cal.Rptr. 222.)

[178 Cal.App.3d 660] Because the determination of the trial court is one of law based upon the papers submitted, the appellate court must make its own independent determination of their construction and effect. (Larsen v. Johannes (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 491, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 744.) However, a motion for summary judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, so that absent a clear showing of abuse, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. (Leo F. Piazza Paving Co. v. Foundation Constructors, Inc. (1981) 128 Cal.App.3d 583, 589, 177 Cal.Rptr. 286.)

In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court is not confined to the sufficiency of the stated reasons. Instead, the validity of the ruling is reviewable, irrespective of the reasons stated. (Durbin v. Fletcher (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 334, 341, 211 Cal.Rptr. 483.)

These rules govern our review of this case.

2. Marvin negates recovery here.

Taylor contends her relationship is somehow sanctioned by the holding in Marvin; we find it is not.

In Marvin, Michelle brought an action against Lee with whom she had lived for over six years to enforce an alleged oral contract under which she was entitled to half the property acquired during that period in Lee's name, and to support payments. (Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106.)

Michelle alleged the agreement provided: the two, while living together, would combine their efforts and earnings and share equally in any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts, whether individual or combined; they would hold themselves out as husband and wife; Michelle would give up her career as an entertainer and singer in order to devote her full time to Lee as his companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook; and Lee would provide for her financial support for the rest of her life....