Los Angeles County-U.S.C. Medical Center v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 07 May 1984
• Docket Number: COUNTY-U
• Citation: 155 Cal.App.3d 454,202 Cal.Rptr. 222
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: LOS ANGELESS.C. MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Respondent, Lucy PEDREGON and Henry Pedregon, Real Parties in Interest. B003383.

Page 222

202 Cal.Rptr. 222

155 Cal.App.3d 454

LOS ANGELES COUNTY-U.S.C. MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Respondent Lucy PEDREGON and Henry Pedregon, Real Parties in Interest.

B003383.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

May 7, 1984.

Hearing Denied June 28, 1984.

The Law Offices of Edwin B. Warren and John H. Bauer and Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland and Irving H. Greines and Kent L. Richland, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

The Law Offices of Stone & Lerner and Marc Lerner, Beverly Hills, for real parties in interest.

KLEIN, Presiding Justice.

Los Angeles County-U.S.C. Medical Center (County Medical Center) and the Los Angeles County Mental Health Services Evaluation Unit at Norwalk (CEU) petitioned the court for a writ of mandate seeking relief from a denial of its motion for summary judgment against real parties in interest Lucy Pedregon and Henry Pedregon (the Pedregons).

Because we conclude there was no material dispute of fact, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the County Medical Center's motion for a summary judgment, and we therefore grant the petition for writ of mandate.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¹

On January 24, 1980, Lucy Pedregon (Lucy) was brought to CEU. At that time Dr. Thomas Reed, a physician on the psychiatric staff of CEU, examined Lucy and recorded her complaints and symptoms.

Based on the symptoms and past history of mental illness, Dr. Reed determined there was probable cause to believe Lucy was a danger to herself and gravely disabled. Dr. Reed then completed an "Application for 72-Hour Detention for Evaluation and Treatment" which authorizes a member of the attending staff of an evaluation facility to take a gravely disabled, mentally disordered person into custody and place the person in an approved facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.

That same evening while still on the 72-hour hold, Lucy was transferred from CEU to the County Medical Center for a medical workup including X-rays and an electrocardiogram. CEU did not have the equipment to perform the necessary tests. Upon arrival at County Medical Center, Lucy had a physical examination and was awaiting X-rays and the electrocardiogram. At approximately 8:00 p.m., it was determined that Lucy was missing. Shortly after midnight, Lucy was found and returned to the Medical Center after having jumped from a nearby freeway overpass.

On or about July 15, 1981, the Pedregons filed a second amended complaint against the County Medical Center and the CEU alleging that the CEU had diagnosed Lucy as suffering from mental illness and that thereafter, "without releasing plaintiff Lucy Pedregon from confinement," she was negligently placed "in an unrestrained environment" at County Medical Center and as result of this alleged negligence, she suffered personal injuries and pain and suffering.

The County Medical Center filed an answer, engaged in discovery, and filed a motion for summary judgment in September 12, 1983, on the ground that Government Code section 856.2 (section 856.2) immunizes public entities from injuries to escaped persons confined for mental illness.

The motion for summary judgment was heard and denied on December 7, 1983, with the holding that there was a "triable issue of material fact whether plaintiff was confined when she left the County facility." (Emphasis added.)

The County Medical Center petitioned this court, which on February 6, 1984 issued an alternative writ directing the trial court either to vacate its December 7, 1983 order or to show cause why it should not do so. The trial court declined to vacate its order.

DISCUSSION

1. When summary judgment proper.

Summary judgment is proper when affidavits in support of the moving party would be sufficient to sustain a judgment in that party's favor and the opponent does not by affidavits show facts that may be deemed sufficient to present a triable issue. (Nicewarner v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 31, 35, 191 Cal.Rptr. 522.) Although the court makes the determination concerning triable issues by examining the papers in support of and in opposition to the motion, it may also draw reasonable inferences from the facts before it. ( Saatzer v. Smith (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 512, 517, 176 Cal.Rptr. 68.)

A defendant, such as County Medical Center, when moving for summary judgment "must conclusively negate a necessary element of the plaintiff's case or establish a complete defense and thereby demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material factual issue which requires the process of a trial." (Ibid.) The party opposing the summary judgment, which is supported by declarations or affidavits sufficient to sustain the motion, has the burden of showing that triable issues of fact do exist. (Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 873, 127 Cal.Rptr. 110, 544 P.2d 1310.) If that burden is not sustained, summary judgment is proper. (Saatzer v. Smith, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d at p. 517, 176 Cal.Rptr. 68.)

2. A writ of mandate is a proper remedy to correct an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a motion for summary judgment.

While the granting of a motion for summary judgment followed by the entry of the judgment in favor of the moving party is appealable, an order denying summary judgment is a nonappealable order. (4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, §§ 195, 196, p. 2842; Bank of America v. Superior Court (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 435, 440-441, 84 Cal.Rptr. 421.)

A writ of mandate is the proper remedy to compel a trial court to grant a motion for a summary judgment when a petitioner alleges that no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law is available, and that the denial was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. ( Bank of America v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d at pp. 441-442, 84 Cal.Rptr. 421.)

On such a showing, this court, in its discretion, may properly grant the petition for the writ of mandate. (Sierra Breeze v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 102, 104, fn. 2, 149 Cal.Rptr. 914.)

3. Lucy was on a 72-hour hold at the time of her arrival at the County Medical Center.

Lucy was properly detained at the CEU on a 72-hour hold pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. ² When it was determined that Lucy needed sophisticated The Pedregons concede in their complaint that Lucy was "confined" by the CEU and by the County Medical Center and allege that "without releasing Lucy Pedregon from confinement, [the County Medical Center] negligently placed plaintiff Lucy Pedregon in an unrestrained environment at defendant Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center." Any admissions found in the pleadings may be considered by the court and are binding on the plaintiff. (Thierfeldt v. Marin Hosp. Dist. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 186, 193, 110 Cal.Rptr. 791.)

medical tests that the CEU could not provide, she was temporarily transferred to the County Medical Center for this purpose.

Here, there is no factual dispute that Lucy was still on the 72-hour psychiatric hold while she was at the County Medical Center.

4. Lucy's detention on a 72-hour hold constituted "confinement" within the meaning of section 856.2.

Section 856.2 states in pertinent part: "(a) Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: [p] .... [p] (2) An injury to, or the wrongful death of, an escaping or escaped person who has been confined for mental illness or addiction." (Emphasis added.)

In 1970, section 856.2 was amended in a manner of particular significance here. The Law Revision Commission Comment on the 1970 Amendment immediately following section 856.2 states: "Formerly, Section 856.2 covered only persons who had been 'committed' for mental illness or addiction. The substitution of 'confined' for 'committed' makes clear that the immunity covers all persons who are confined for mental illness or addiction, whether or not they are 'committed.' " Therefore, the substitution of the word "confined" enlarged the scope of the immunity to include a person voluntarily admitted or temporarily detained. (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) § 4.51, p. 406; Forde v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 477, 479-480, 134 Cal.Rptr. 549.)

Government Code section 854.5 (section 854.5) was added in 1970 and states: "As used in this chapter, 'confine' includes admit, commit, place, detain, or hold in custody." (Emphasis added.) The Law Revision Commission Comment immediately following explained: "Section 854.5 has been added to make clear that sections 856 and 856.2 apply to all cases within the rationale of those Sections."

The Pedregons contend that whether Lucy was "confined" pursaunt to the immunity statute is a disputed issue of fact because a person to be "confined" within the meaning of section 856.2 must invariably have been "in custody which the plaintiffs contend to be in some sort of physical restraint." We disagree.

The Pedregons are interpreting the statute to define confinement as "held in custody." They purport to rely on the "rule of statutory construction that where several words are followed by a phrase that is applicable as much to the first and other words as to be last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all." They argue that clearly the first few words in section 854.5 are modified by "in custody."

The Pedregons' questionable interpretation of "in custody" can be disregarded by relying on the general rule that "modifying phrases are to be applied to the words immediately preceding them and are not to be construed as extending to more remote phrases." (People v. Corey (1978) 21 Cal.3d 738, 742, 147 Cal.Rptr. 639, 581 P.2d 644.) However, a more basic rule is applicable.

Section 854.5 defines "confine" in the disjunctive--"admit, commit,...