Taylor v. Hoffman
| Decision Date | 09 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 27777.,27777. |
| Citation | 209 W.Va. 172,544 S.E.2d 387 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Christopher Wayne TAYLOR, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Barbara D. HOFFMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Barry Jordan Hoffman, Deceased, Jennifer Hoffman and Stephanie Hoffman, Defendants Below, Appellees. |
Donald K. Bischoff, Summersville, for the Appellant.
Joseph P. Whittington, Peyton, Parenti & Whittington, Nitro, for the Appellee Barbara Hoffman.
E. William Harvit, Harvit & Schwartz, L.C., Charleston, for the Appellees Jennifer and Stephanie Hoffman.
This is an appeal by Christopher Wayne Taylor (hereinafter "Appellant") from an October 19, 1999, final order of the Circuit Court of Putnam County granting summary judgment to Barbara Hoffman, Administratrix of the Estate of Barry Jordan Hoffman, deceased (hereinafter "Appellee"). The Appellant alleged in that action that he was the biological son of the Appellee's deceased husband, Barry Jordan Hoffman (hereinafter "decedent"), and was consequently entitled to a proportionate share of the assets of the estate of the decedent. Based upon a finding that the Appellant's claim was barred by the limitations of actions for the establishment of paternity set out in West Virginia Code § 48A-6-1 (1993) (Repl.Vol.1999), the court below granted Appellee summary judgment, from which judgment Appellant appeals. The Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding the action time-barred because other provisions of the paternity proceedings statute, particularly West Virginia Code § 48A-6-2(c) (1993) (Repl.Vol.1999), allow his action to proceed. We conclude that the trial court erred in applying the limitations on actions provisions of Article 6, Chapter 48A of the West Virginia Code. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment rendered below and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Appellant was born on June 9,1970, in Fayette County, West Virginia. A paternity warrant was issued by a Nicholas County Justice of the Peace on June 30, 1970, under prior law,1 alleging that the decedent was the Appellant's biological father. The action was settled on September 8, 1970, without an admission of paternity. The settlement required the decedent to pay Appellant's mother Thirty Dollars ($30.00) a month "for the support, maintenance and education" of the Appellant "until said child shall become emancipated or sooner die or until further order of this Court...." The decedent paid child support to the Appellant's mother each month, pursuant to this court order, until the Appellant reached the age of eighteen on June 30, 1988.
The decedent died intestate on October 6, 1994, in Kanawha County, West Virginia. The Appellee was appointed administratrix of the decedent's estate on October 12, 1994. The estate appraisal, filed on April 18, 1995, specifies three heirs of the decedent's estate, including the Appellee, in her individual capacity as the widow of the decedent, and the decedent's two daughters.
On October 5, 1995, the Appellant filed a civil action against the Appellee in the Circuit Court of Putnam County, West Virginia. That action was dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint upon the Appellee within 180 days. On October 9, 1998, the Appellant filed an identical civil action in the Circuit Court of Putnam County. The action alleges that Appellant was the biological son of the decedent and entitled to a share of the decedent's estate. Specifically, the Appellant requested the lower court to "declare that Barry Jordan Hoffman, deceased, is the biological father of the plaintiff," and "declare that the plaintiff is entitled to his proportionate share of the assets of the Estate of the said Barry Jordan Hoffman."
The Appellee moved for judgment on the pleadings based upon the statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 48A-6-1(e)(7) and the equitable doctrine of laches. West Virginia Code § 48A-6-1(c)(7) provides that a paternity proceeding may brought "[b]y the child in his own right at any time after the child's eighteenth birthday but prior to the child's twenty-first birthday." The Appellee emphasized the Appellant's failure to file any claim or law suit concerning the determination of paternity until October 5, 1995, approximately four months after the Appellant's twenty-fifth birthday.
In response, the Appellant asserted that he was statutorily entitled to bring the civil action based upon West Virginia Code § 48A-6-2(c), which provides that "[a] proceeding to establish paternity under the provisions of this article may be brought for any child who was not yet eighteen years of age on the sixteenth day of August, one thousand nine hundred eighty-four, regardless of the current age." The Appellant contends that since he was fourteen years of age on August 16, 1984, he is statutorily entitled to bring the civil action regardless of his current age.
The trial court considered the Appellee's motion as a request for summary judgment and granted the motion, reasoning that West Virginia Code § 48A-6-1(e)(7) required a paternity action to be brought prior to the child's twenty-first birthday and that West Virginia Code § 48A-6-2(c) did not provide an exception which would permit the Appellant's civil action. The Appellant now appeals that order to this Court, contending that his action is permitted by the explicit and unambiguous language of West Virginia Code § 48A-6-2(c).
"Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L. 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). Since resolution of this matter depends upon a determination of the applicability of a statutory pronouncement to this set of facts, we review the lower court's decision de novo.
This case came before us on the claim that Article 6, Chapter 48A of the West Virginia Code, which provides a means of establishing paternity and the duty of child support, controls the outcome of the underlying civil action. An analysis of that statute and its predecessors suggests another conclusion. Article 6 was first enacted in 1983 as Article 8, Chapter 48 of the West Virginia Code, to provide a civil action for the collection of child support, in lieu of the former "quasicriminal" bastardy action, and to establish a ten-year statute of limitations in lieu of the former three-year limitation which this Court found to be invalid in State ex rel. S.M.B v. D.A.P., 168 W.Va. 455, 284 S.E.2d 912 (1981). In 1986, the 1983 act was revised and incorporated as Article 6 in Chapter 48A of the West Virginia Code, entitled "Enforcement of Family Obligations." The legislative motivation underlying the 1986 enactment is expressed in the act as follows:
It is the purpose of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to improve and facilitate support enforcement efforts in this state, with the primary goal being to establish and enforce reasonable child support orders and thereby improve opportunities for children. It is the intent of the Legislature that to the extent practicable, the laws of this state should encourage and require a child's parents to meet the obligation of providing that child with adequate food, shelter, clothing, education, and health and child care.
W. Va.Code § 48A-1-2 (1986) (Repl.Vol. 1992).
We believe that this statement of legislative purpose points to why the Appellant's primary reliance on the limitation of action provisions within Article 6, Chapter 48A, found in sections 1 and 2 of that article, as amended in 1989, is misplaced. The Appellant relies especially on current section 2, subsection (c), added in 1989.
The trial court in the present case ruled that subsection (c) did not permit the institution of the Appellant's civil action, reasoning that it was "simply an attempt by the legislature to remedy any adverse effects from the previous ten year statute of limitations which the Supreme Court of Appeals held unconstitutional in Shelby J.S. v. George L. H., 181 W.Va. 154, 381 S.E.2d 269 (1989)." An examination of the genesis of subsection (c), however, reveals a more complex rationale.
The federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 through 675 (Supp. II 1984) were enacted in response to rulings by the United States Supreme Court indicating that the period for obtaining relief in the form of a paternity action must be sufficiently long to permit a reasonable opportunity to assert paternity claims, and time limitations must be substantially related to a state's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983)
(). The 1984 federal act required states to allow actions pertaining to the establishment of paternity to be filed at least until a child reaches the age of eighteen years. 42 U.S.C. 666(5)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1984).
The federal legislation provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) In order to satisfy section 454(20)(A) [], each State must have in effect laws requiring the use of the following procedures, consistent with this section and with regulations of the Secretary, to increase the effectiveness of the program which the State administers under this part [42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.]:
....
(5)(A)(i) Procedures which permit the establishment of the paternity of any...
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