Taylor v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 12 July 1932
• Citation: 60 F.2d 165
• Parties: TAYLOR et al. v. LAWSON, Deputy Com'r.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

60 F.2d 165 (1932)

TAYLOR et al. v. LAWSON, Deputy Com'r.

District Court, E. D. South Carolina.

July 12, 1932.

John I. Cosgrove and Paul M. MacMillan, both of Charleston, S. C., for plaintiffs.

Henry E. Davis, U. S. Atty., of Florence, S. C., and Mitchell & Horlbeck, of Charleston, S. C., for defendant.

ERNEST F. COCHRAN, District Judge.

The plaintiffs brought this bill by virtue of section 921, USCA title 33, to review an order of the deputy commissioner made under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, approved March 4, 1927, 44 Stats. 1424, 33 USCA §§ 901-950 (hereinafter referred to as the Compensation Act), and for a mandatory injunction to compel the deputy to proceed to make an award in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant has filed an answer which admits the facts and merely denies the conclusions of law stated in the bill, and the case has been heard upon the bill and answer. The facts, as to which there is no dispute, are substantially as follows:

The Charleston Dry Dock & Machine Company (hereinafter referred to as the Dry Dock Co.) was engaged in the construction of ships, and one Robert A. Taylor was one of its employees. The Dry Dock Co. had a contract with the government for the construction of a lightship. At the time of the accident hereinafter referred to, the lightship had been launched, was afloat and in a dry dock, and had been about 96 or 97 per cent. completed. A master and engineer had been placed on the vessel by the government, and were in charge at the time of the accident; but the vessel had not been delivered to or accepted by the government. Although unfinished, the vessel was capable then of navigation. The accident occurred on February 27, 1930. The contract to build the lightship was not completed until some time after that date, and the ship was not accepted by the government until April, 1930. Taylor, whose duties were those of a driller, was on February 27, 1930, engaged in this employment on the lightship in the dry dock and sustained injuries which resulted in his death. The plaintiffs, who are the father and mother of the deceased, Robert A. Taylor, filed in the office of the deputy commissioner a claim for compensation under the Compensation Act, and this claim was contested by the Dry Dock Co., the employer, and the United States Casualty Company, its insurance carrier, under the said act. The deputy commissioner held that under the facts of the case, it did not come within the provisions of the Compensation Act, and that the United States Employees' Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction.

The defendant contends that the deputy commissioner had no jurisdiction for two reasons:

First. Because the vessel not having been completed and the claim being not for a tort but for a mere injury, admiralty would have no jurisdiction and the Compensation Act would not apply. This ground, however, was not stressed in argument.

Second. Because inasmuch as the vessel had not been completed, Taylor the employee, was therefore not engaged in a maritime employment and the case therefore was not within the terms of the Compensation Act.

It is conceded by the parties that there is no case directly in point upon the specific problem presented. The parties, however, seek to sustain their respective positions from certain general principles of admiralty jurisdiction and the particular terms of the act. Before discussing the specific question presented, it is advisable to consider a few general propositions concerning admiralty jurisdiction, and consider also certain pertinent sections of the Compensation Act.

It is now the settled rule that a contract for the construction of a new vessel is a nonmaritime contract. New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U. S. 96, 42 S. Ct. 243, 66 L. Ed. 482.

The Supreme Court has decided that the rule that contracts for the construction of ships are nonmaritime and not within the admiralty jurisdiction applies to contracts for the work and material necessary to finish a partly constructed vessel which has been launched. Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 41 S. Ct. 65, 65 L. Ed. 245.

The general doctrine is that in contract matters, admiralty jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the transaction; but in tort matters, upon the locality. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 476, 42 S. Ct. 157, 66 L. Ed. 321, 25 A. L. R. 1008, and cases there cited.

The Supreme Court also holds that the general admiralty jurisdiction extends to a proceeding to recover damages resulting from a tort committed on a vessel in process of construction, when lying in navigable waters within a state. In the case just cited, it was held that the admiralty court would have jurisdiction of an action for a tort by a carpenter injured through the employer's negligence while engaged in construction work on a ship nearly completed and launched and lying in the navigable waters of the United States. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, supra, pages 469, 477, 478 of 257 U. S., 42 S. Ct. 157, 66 L. Ed. 321, 25 A. L. R. 1008.

It is not altogether clear just what the defendant means by his first objection; and, as stated, it was not stressed in argument. I assume, however, that what is meant is that although admiralty would have jurisdiction of suits for torts committed upon partially completed vessels lying in navigable waters, nevertheless this proceeding not being a claim for a tort, but simply a claim for an accidental injury, that admiralty would have no jurisdiction. I cannot accede to this proposition. There is no doubt whatever that if Taylor or his representatives were suing for a tort, admiralty would have jurisdiction. There can also be little doubt that Congress would have the power in such cases to change the rules governing tort actions and provide for accidental injuries. Compare L'Hote et al. v. Crowell (C. C. A. 5th) 54 F.(2d) 212, and Nogueira v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 281 U. S. 128, 50 S. Ct. 303, 74 L. Ed. 754; also the recent case of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 41, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598.

The defendant's second objection presents a more difficult problem. The defendant's argument may be stated briefly as follows: The Compensation Act applies only to those employers whose employees are engaged in a maritime employment. The contract for the construction of a new ship is not a maritime contract, and does not become a maritime contract, though the ship may be launched and her construction...