Taylor v. Martin

• Decision Date: 24 June 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. No. C-69 666.
• Citation: 330 F. Supp. 85
• Parties: Elizabeth TAYLOR et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert MARTIN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

330 F. Supp. 85

Elizabeth TAYLOR et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert MARTIN et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. C-69 666.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

June 24, 1971.

Peter E. Sitkin, Ralph Santiago Abascal, Vivian D. Wilson, Sidney M. Wolinsky of San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of Cal., San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

Before HAMLIN, Circuit Judge, and WEIGEL and PECKHAM, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

PER CURIAM.

I

This is a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs are mothers of minor children receiving benefits under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Plaintiffs sue individually and on behalf of their minor dependent children, and also on behalf of all others similarly situated.¹ Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 1343(3), 1343(4), 1331.

The challenge in this action is to a provision of the California Welfare and Institutions Code and its implementing regulations which require the remaining parent of a child receiving AFDC funds to sign a criminal non-support complaint against the absent parent if requested to do so by local law enforcement personnel.² Plaintiffs — who are AFDC recipients whose grants have been denied, reduced, or terminated for refusal to sign the criminal complaints — attack the statute on the grounds of its repugnancy to the equal protection clause of the federal constitution, and to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10), and the regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) promulgated thereunder. More specifically, plaintiffs argue that the California scheme denies them the equal protection of the laws because it is unrelated to the purpose of the AFDC program and is thus without rational basis; because it produces a classification which denied AFDC aid to one group of needy children simply because a parent refuses to sign a criminal complaint; and because it produces a further classification which unjustifiably infringes upon the marital privacy of certain families. Plaintiffs also maintain that the state statute is infirm because it creates an eligibility requirement not authorized by, and in conflict with the Social Security Act, Part A, Subchapter IV, 42 U. S.C. §§ 601-610.

Since the statute was challenged inter alia on constitutional grounds of a not insubstantial nature, and since the remedy sought was an injunction against the enforcement of the statute, this three-judge court was convened. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. Temporary injunctive relief was granted pending the determination herein. We conclude that the state statute is invalid since it is inconsistent with the federal enactment, and thus do not reach the constitutional questions presented.

II

State programs to distribute AFDC benefits must conform to the requirements set forth in the relevant portions of the Social Security Act. There is no question that the federal government "may impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed", King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, fn. 34, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 2141, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), subject, of course, to constitutional limitations. At 42 U.S.C. § 602, the Act provides that

(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must * * *

(10) provide * * * that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals * * *.

The section further recites that the State plan must

(11) * * * provide for prompt notice to appropriate law-enforcement officials of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent children in respect of a child who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent * * *.

This subsection — § 602(a) (11) — set up the so-called "NOLEO" requirement (Notice to Law Enforcement Officials). Its purpose, as correctly pointed out in Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp. 761 (three-judge court; D.Conn.1969), was to secure support from deserting fathers. In the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, this purpose was furthered by new provisions requiring that State plans must

at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (17) provide —

(A) for the development and implementation of a program under which the State agency will undertake —

(i) in the case of a child born out of wedlock who is receiving aid to families with dependent children, to establish the paternity of such child and secure support for him, and

(ii) in the case of any child receiving such aid who has been deserted or abandoned by his parent, to secure support for such child from such parent * * *.

Of this amendment, the Senate Finance Committee reported:

A substantial proportion of the persons receiving aid under the AFDC program are eligible because of the desertion by a parent of the child. Several provisions are already in the law and more are proposed under the bill to provide additional tools to States and to impose further obligations on them to assure the determination of legal responsibility for support and to make efforts to make these collections. The committee believes it is essential to make certain that all legally responsible parents of sufficient means make their appropriate contribution to the support of their children.

Senate Report No. 744, as reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, pp. 2834, 2997.

As these sections — 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (10), and (17) — indicate, the states are charged with the furnishing of aid to all eligible individuals with reasonable promptness while at the same time the states must diligently attempt to secure support from deserting parents. Section 11477 of the Cal.W. & Inst.Code — the section under attack herein — is one of the means by which California has sought to discharge this latter responsibility. One alleged infirmity in this section is that in providing for the termination of AFDC benefits to an otherwise qualified recipient as punishment for the parent's refusal to sign the criminal complaint, the section effectively establishes an eligibility requirement in addition to those specified in the Social Security Act. As such, the section is allegedly inconsistent with the Act and therefore invalid, since Congress did not intend to allow the states to narrow the class of "eligible individuals" and since any state attempts to do so by imposing additional eligibility requirements interferes impermissibly with the mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10).

III

We think plaintiffs' position is well founded, and is amply supported by the developing case law. The basic consideration which molds our inquiry was stated by the Supreme Court: "Congress has determined that * * * protection of dependent children is the paramount goal of AFDC". King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. at 2137; see Damico v. State, of California, three-judge court; (N.D.Cal.1969). When the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act are viewed in this light, any state regulation which cuts off aid to children on the basis of conduct of the parent must bear a heavy burden of justification. In King v. Smith, supra, the Supreme Court concluded that Alabama's "substitute father" regulation — which defined "parent" in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) as including any man who cohabited with the mother of otherwise eligible children — was fatally inconsistent with the AFDC provisions. While Alabama was free to deal with the problems of immorality and illegitimacy by several different methods under the Social Security Act, it was not free to do so by a method which inflicted with the purposes of the Act.³ 392 U.S. at 326-327, 88 S.Ct. 2128.

In King v. Smith, the Supreme Court also construed § 602(a) (10) in conjunction with the definition of "dependent child" in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a),⁴ concluding that the Act requires "participating States to furnish aid to families with children who have a parent absent from the home, if such families are in other respects eligible." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 317, 88 S.Ct. at 2133.

The most fully-reasoned of the pertinent lower federal court cases, Doe v. Shapiro, held a regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department invalid as inconsent with the congressional directive in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (9) (now subsection (a) (10)) that AFDC assistance be promptly furnished to all eligible individuals. 302 F.Supp. at 767-768. The regulation provided for the termination of AFDC payments to illegitimate children in those cases where the mother would not disclose the identity of the father. Taking full account of the 1967 NOLEO amendments, the three-judge Doe court reasoned that Congress has imposed only two eligibility requirements — "need" and "dependence" — and that the state regulation, in providing for termination of payments for failure to comply with its terms, effectively established an additional eligibility requirement which thus interfered with AFDC assistance. See also Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F.Supp. 264 (three-judge court; E.D.Pa.1970) (state regulations compelling reduction of current AFDC grants to exact restitution of alleged duplicate payments held invalid as inconsistent with AFDC provisions of Social Security ACT); Damico v. State of California, supra, and Doe v. Hursh, 328 F.Supp. 1360 (D.Minn.1970) (state regulations setting up irrebuttable presumption that absence of a parent is not "continued absence" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) until three months have elapsed are invalid as inconsistent with AFDC provisions).

Given this case law, it is clear to this court that the statute under attack herein — Cal. W. and Inst. Code, § 11477(b) — is invalid. While it is true that Congress has placed upon the states the duty to adequately secure support from deserting parents, nonetheless the states are not free to withdraw or refuse...