Taylor v. Pate
| Decision Date | 20 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | A,No. 79250,No. 1,I-12,79250,1 |
| Citation | 859 P.2d 1124,1993 OK CIV APP 79 |
| Parties | 1993 OK CIV APP 79, 85 Ed. Law Rep. 1219 Helen TAYLOR, Appellant, v. Gladys PATE, Defendant, and Edmond Public School Districtppellee. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Appeal From the District Court of Oklahoma County; William S. Myers, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Rodney C. Ramsey, Stewart and Elder, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
W. Wayne Mills, Kent R. McGuire, Mills, Whitten, Mills, Mills & Hinkle, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
On February 26, 1990, Gladys Pate (Pate), not a party to this appeal, was driving home when she struck a pedestrian. The pedestrian, Helen T. Taylor (Taylor), sued Pate. She alleged Pate was negligent in the operation of her car. Later, Taylor filed an amended petition. She alleged Pate was acting within the scope and course of her employment with Edmond Public School District I-12 (School), and made School a Defendant.
Pate was an art facilitator for School. Her duties were to obtain visiting artists for School and to handle all transactions necessary to compensate them.
School answered and later moved for summary judgment. School contended that the following facts were undisputed: (1) Pate was employed by School; (2) February 26, 1990, she was on sick leave; (3) that day, prior to the accident, Pate left her home and traveled to the hospital; (4) when she left the hospital she went by the school district special services center and reviewed certain contracts between School and visiting artists; (5) after leaving the special services center, she stopped by her personal post office box; (6) she then proceeded from the post office to the School Superintendent's office; (7) after completing her mission for School, Pate left the Superintendent's office to go home; and, (8) it was while she was driving home from the Superintendent's office that the accident occurred.
Taylor responded to School's motion and claimed the following facts were undisputed: (1) Pate had been employed by School for over nine years; (2) School compensated her on a monthly basis; (3) she was receiving her normal monthly salary, but was on sick leave when the accident occurred; (4) Pate's sole purpose for leaving her home on the date of the accident was to complete forms so that School could issue payment checks to the visiting artists; (5) the visiting artists would not have been paid if she had not completed the forms; (6) Pate was the only person responsible for obtaining visiting artists and seeing that they were paid; (7) the Superintendent was aware that she was furthering the School's business; and, (8) her entire mission was exclusively on behalf of her employer, School.
The trial court sustained School's motion and entered judgment for School against Taylor. The Court found that Pate was within the "going and coming" doctrine which holds that an employer is not responsible for the employee's acts if the employee is traveling to or from work. The judgment did not determine the issues between Pate and Taylor. 1 While the court found that Pate left her home on the day of the accident in furtherance of School's business, she had completely finished that task and was on her way home at the time of the accident.
Ordinarily, as contended by Taylor, issues relating to the existence of Agency or a master-servant relation are questions of fact to be determined by a jury. However where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, as is the case here, and a motion for summary judgment is being considered, the issue becomes one of law for the Court to decide. The Court, in such cases, must decide whether one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, Rule 13, 12 O.S.1991 Ch. 2, App. 1.
Taylor appeals and contends that it was error for the trial court to sustain School's motion for summary judgment because Pate was engaged in an activity that constituted an exception to the "going and coming" rule. 2 She relies on Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co., 695 P.2d 521 (Okl.1985); Anderson Construction Co. v. Franklin, 315 P.2d 785 (Okl.1957); Dill v. Rader, 533 P.2d 650 (Okl.Ct.App.1975); Haco Drilling Co. v. Burchette, 364 P.2d 674 (Okl.1961); Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers, 267 P.2d 568 (Okl.1954); Roring v. Hoggard, 326 P.2d 812 (Okl.1958). These cases show examples of facts constituting exceptions to the rule. Taylor's reliance on Anderson Construction Co. v. Franklin, 315 P.2d 785 (Okl.1957) is misplaced. That case involved workers compensation issues and is inapplicable here. In Elias v. Midwest Marble & Tile Co., 302 P.2d 126 (Okl.1956), the Court quoted with approval from Conversions & Surveys v. Roach, 204 F.2d 499, 501 (1st Cir.1953), as follows:
This is a complete non sequitur. The liability of an employee (sic) to pay workmen's compensation to an injured employee, and the liability of an employer to a third person on the doctrine of respondeat superior, depend upon entirely distinct considerations * *.
Generally a master is not liable for the acts of its servant under the doctrine of respondeat superior unless the servant is acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Wilson & Co. v. Shaw, 157 Okla. 34, 10 P.2d 448 (1932). When an employee is going to or coming from work the employee is not considered to be within the scope of employment. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v. Union Bank & Trust, 149 Okla. 12, 299 P. 159 (1931). However, exceptions exist to the "going and coming" rule. An employer may be liable if the employee was "rendering [a] service for him by the employer's consent, either express or implied." Haco Drilling Co. v. Burchette, 364 P.2d 674, 677 (Okl.1961) quoting Roring v. Hoggard, 326 P.2d 812 (Okl.1958). Exceptions will be made when the trip involves an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to commute trips by ordinary members of the work force. Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co., 695 P.2d 521 (Okl....
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