Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers

• Decision Date: 23 February 1954
• Docket Number: MID-CONTINENT,No. 35319,35319
• Citation: 267 P.2d 568,1954 OK 61
• Parties: PIPELINE CO. v. CRAUTHERS.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 568

267 P.2d 568

1954 OK 61

MID-CONTINENT PIPELINE CO. v. CRAUTHERS.

No. 35319.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Feb. 23, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The prohibition imposed by the first clause of 52 O.S.1951 § 296 to the effect that 'No inflammable product from any oil or gas well shall be permitted to run into any tank, pool or stream used for watering stock' is leveled against the owners and operators of oil and gas wells and leases, and not against pipe line companies which merely transport the product from the premises.

2. Where the master is liable to a third party for the tort of his servant solely by reason of the doctrine of respondeat superior, and no independent or concurring act of negligence by the master is shown, a valid release of the servant from liability for the tort operates to release the master.

R. H. Wills, J. H. Crocker, J. P. Greve, J. H. Woodard, Ben Hatcher, and Walter B. Hall, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Doyle Watson, Drumright, Kermit Nash, Hobbs, New Mexico, for defendant in error.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

Parties will be designated as in the trial court.

Plaintiff sued defendant for damages allegedly resulting from the pollution of a natural watercourse running through plaintiff's land.

Most of the facts were stipulated, substantially as follows: plaintiff owned a certain designated quarter section of land. C. R. Colpitt and T. S. Colpitt owned and operated an oil lease in a section adjoining the section wherein plaintiff's land was located. Defendant Mid-Continent Pipeline Company owned and operated a certain pipe line which was used to transport oil from the lease of the Colpitts. Said Colpitts furnished power which operated the defendant company's pump used to pump the oil produced from said lease and stored in a tank thereon into said pipe line, the pump being located on their lease, and being owned by the defendant company. The pump was operated by an employee of the Colpitts. By virtue of an agreement which had existed between the Colpitts and the company for some time, the gauger of the defendant company customarily gauged the tanks on the Colpitt lease, and when one was ready for delivery, the gauger notified the pumper employed by the Colpitts, who thereupon connected the power to the pipe line pump, and pumped the oil into the pipe line of the defendant. On or about May 18, 1950, the regular pumper was injured, and a substitute pumper was hired by the Colpitts to take his place. He was instructed by the regular pumper in his duties. On that same day, he was advised by the gauger that a tank was ready for delivery; he thereupon connected the power to the pump for the purpose of transferring oil into defendant's pipe line; in so doing, he failed to set the valves properly on the pump, and as a result, oil escaped from the pump into a stream from which it flowed onto plaintiff's land in an amount sufficient to cause damage or death to cattle pasturing on said land, if they drank sufficient quantities of said oil.

It was further stipulated that the Colpitts were the agents and servants of the defendant company in the pumping of said oil into the pipe line; also, that a cow of Aberdeen Angus blood eligible for registration died within 13 days after the oil ran over plaintiff's land; and that she was due to drop a calf within 30 days of her death, and that if the defendant company were liable for the death of the cow, it was also liable for the reasonable value of the unborn calf at the time of its birth, had it been born.

Defendant introduced in evidence as an exhibit attached to its answer, copy of a 'Release and Covenant Not to Sue' executed by plaintiff in favor of the Colpitts. Said instrument recited the payment of $300 to plaintiff by the Colpitts as full settlement of the claim against the Colpitts in connection with the facts herein related; it also, by its terms, expressly reserved a right of action against any other persons who might have caused or assisted in causing any such damage. Execution of said instrument was not denied by plaintiff, and may be taken as having occurred.

At the trial, plaintiff introduced testimony to the effect that the cow above referred to died as a result of drinking water polluted by oil from defendant's pipe line, and to the effect that 17 other cattle in the pasture were injured as a result of drinking polluted water from the same source. In view of our holdings below no further statement of the evidence is necessary.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $650, and the Court rendered judgment thereon. Defendant thereafter perfected its appeal to this court from such judgment and order overruling motion for new trial.

The gist of defendant's argument is as follows: That the liability of defendant company, if any, exists solely because of the master-servant relationship existing between it and the Colpitts, and that when the servant who is the sole tort-feasor, is released (as was done in this case), the liability of the master is extinguished.

Plaintiff contends that the liability of defendant company rests not in the master-servant relationship, but because of a primary (not derivative), non-delegable duty imposed upon defendant company by 52 O.S.1951 § 296, which reads as follows:

'Refuse from wells--Disposition.--No inflammable product from any oil or gas well shall be permitted to run into any tank, pool or stream used for watering stock; and all waste of oil and refuse from tanks or wells shall be drained into proper receptacles at a safe distance from the tanks, wells or buildings, and be immediately burned or transported from the premises, and in no case shall be it permitted to flow over the land. Salt water shall not be allowed to flow over the surface of the land.'

Defendant contends that said statute has no application in this case, since the undisputed evidence is that the oil escaped from a pipe line, not from an oil or gas well.

For reasons set out below, we hold that 52 O.S.1951 § 296 is not applicable in the case at hand.

This section of the statute is highly penal in nature. Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 202 Okl. 687, 217 P.2d 816, 19 A.L.R.2d 1015; Texas Co. v....