Taylor v. Roosevelt Irr. Dist.

• Decision Date: 22 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. 5209,5209
• Citation: 232 P.2d 107,72 Ariz. 160
• Parties: TAYLOR v. ROOSEVELT IRR. DIST.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 107

232 P.2d 107

72 Ariz. 160

TAYLOR v. ROOSEVELT IRR. DIST.

No. 5209.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Decided May 22, 1951.

Shute & Elsing, Phoenix, for appellant.

Kramer, Morrison, Roche & Perry and Burr Sutter, Phoenix, and Harry W. Bagnall, Jr., Coolidge, of counsel, for appellee.

Jennings Strouss, Salmon & Trask, Charles L. Strouss, Phoenix, for Salt River Agricultural and Power Dist., amici curiae.

Campbell, Rolle & Jones, James B. Rolle, Jr., Yuma, for Yuma Irr. Dist., amici curiae.

Westover & Mansfield, J. D. Mansfield, Yuma, for Unit B--Irrigation & Drainage Dist. and North Gila Valley Irr. Dist., amici curiae.

Reed & Wood, Charles H. Reed, Coolidge, for San Carlos Irr. Dist., amici curiae.

Guy Anderson, Safford, for Gila Valley Irr. Dist., amicus curiae.

A. Van Wagenen, Jr., Phoenix, for Electrical Dist. No. 2, Pinal County, and Electrical Dist. No. 5, Pinal County, amicus curiae.

Louis B. Whitney, Phoenix, for Electrical Dist. No. Four, Pinal County, amicus curiae.

Fred A. Ironside, Jr., Phoenix, for Roosevelt Water Conservation Dist., amicus curiae.

STANFORD, Justice.

After the court handed down its written opinion in this case, reported in 71 Ariz. 254, 226 P.2d 154, a motion for a rehearing was granted. At this time various political subdivisions of the state filed a petition for leave to file briefs amici curiae, which petition was duly granted. Brief of amici curiae was filed in support of appellee's motion for rehearing.

On reconsideration of the case from the various contentions set forth, we are of the opinion that our former opinion correctly disposed of the case. We adhere to the rule announced therein that the Roosevelt Irrigation District was a political subdivision of the state, acting in its proprietary capacity, and while acting in such capacity is liable for its negligence.

As pointed out in our former opinion, the constitutional amendment, Section 7, Article 13, was adopted for the purpose of granting tax immunity to irrigation, power, electrical, agricultural improvement, drainage, and flood control districts, and tax levying public improvement districts. The true character of such districts was analyzed by this court in Day v. Buckeye Water, etc. Dist., 1925, 28 Ariz. 466, 237 P. 636, 638, as follows:

'Counties, cities, towns, and municipalities all belong to a class of subdivisions of the state primarily established for what are commonly called political and governmental, as aside from business purposes. Any exercise of the latter function is merely incidental to their existence and in no way necessary for it. And in the past, and particularly when it took one of the forms prohibited by the section in question (sec. 7, art. 9, Const.), such exercise has generally resulted so disastrously to the public that the wisdom and purpose of the constitutional provision as applied to such subdivisions is plain. On the other hand, irrigation districts and similar public corporations, while in some senses subdivisions of the state, are in a very different class. Their function is purely business and economic, and not political and governmental. They are formed in each case by the direct act of those whose business and property will be affected, and for the express purpose of engaging in some form of business, and not of government. The power of incurring obligations of any nature is ultimately left in the hands of those whose property is affected thereby.'

'Districts of the kind involved in this proceeding therefore belong to that class of organizations, once rare but becoming more and more common, established for the pecuniary profit of the inhabitants of a certain territorial subdivision of the state, but having no political or governmental purposes or functions. In some respects these organizations are municipal in their nature, for they exercise the taxing power, the greatest attribute of sovereignty, and can compel the inclusion of unwilling landholders within their bounds. In other ways they resemble private corporations, for they are liable for the torts of their servants in the same manner and to the same extent, and indeed generally have the same rights and responsibilities. Probably the best definition we can give then is to say that they are corporations having a public purpose, which may be vested with so much of the attributes of sovereignty as are necessary to carry out that purpose, and which are subject only to such constitutional limitations and responsibilities as are appropriate thereto.' Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. La Prade, 45 Ariz. 61, 40 P.2d 94, 100.

The actual operation and functioning of the district after the adoption of the constitutional amendment, supra, was in the same factual manner as at the time of the Day case. The adoption of the constitutional amendment in no sense altered the inherent characteristics of the district. With this observation in mind, we desire to point out that this amendment only attempted to vest such districts with all of the rights, privileges, benefits, immunities, and exemptions granted municipal and political subdivisions under the Constitution or any law of the state or the United States. There are no constitutional or statutory provisions exempting municipalities or political subdivisions from tort liability when committed in the prosecution of either governmental or proprietary activities. By court decisions political subdivisions, as distinguished from municipalities, have been vested with immunity from their acts of negligence arising out of purely governmental activities. The state, State v. Sharp, 21 Ariz. 424, 189 P. 631; State v. Dart, 23 Ariz. 145, 202 P. 237; school districts, School Dist. 48 of Maricopa County v. Rivera, 30 Ariz. 1, 243 P. 609, 45 A.L.R. 762; and counties, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 19 P.2d 328. But in this jurisdiction immunity from tort liability is denied to municipalities even though arising out of the governmental activity in the construction or repair of streets and sidewalks. Such has been the 'law' (court made) both before the constitutional amendment under consideration, Schultz v. City of Phoenix, 1916, 18 Ariz. 35, 156 P. 75; Dillow v. City of Yuma, 1940, 55 Ariz. 6, 97 P.2d 535; and since the constitutional amendment--City of Phoenix...