Taylor v. Sanderson

Decision Date09 December 1953
Citation330 Mass. 616,116 N.E.2d 269
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesTAYLOR v. SANDERSON et al.

Bradbury Gilbert, Boston, for plaintiff.

Bennett Sanderson, Boston, for defendants.

Saul L. Kaplan, Boston, for John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, SPALDING, and WILLIAMS, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of a Probate Court dismissing the petition of the administrator of the estate of Fred H. Shaw to establish the alleged interest of his estate in the refund proceeds from two annuity contracts entered into by an insurance company and Sarah E. Houghton which after her death were paid by the insurance company to the respondent Bennett Sanderson, the executor under her will.

Fred H. Shaw predeceased the annuitant, Sarah E. Houghton, as did others designated as beneficiaries in these contracts. In each instance the insurance company paid to Mr. Sanderson the amounts which the beneficiaries would have received if they had survived the annuitant. The personal representatives of these deceased beneficiaries together with the insurance company were named as respondents. The parties entered into a stipulation that a decision that Mr. Sanderson was liable to pay the estate of Fred H. Shaw would settle his liability to the representatives of the estates of the other designated beneficiaries who died prior to the death of the annuitant.

The question to be determined is whether the shares of the proceeds which the beneficiaries would have taken had they survived the annuitant should be paid to the estates of these beneficiaries who predeceased the annuitant or whether these shares should be paid to the estate of the annuitant.

The annuitant applied for a contract of annuity which would provide that the excess of the single premium paid by her over the total of the annual amounts paid to her should be distributed on her death among her sister and three brothers equally and to the survivors. The application was granted and the insurance company on March 20, 1937, issued the annuity contract. This is the first contract that the company made with the annuitant. One of its provisions was that, upon the death of the annuitant, the company would pay the amount of the excess, if any, to 'the beneficiary Florence Pickard, sister, Charles K. Houghton, Elroy W. Houghton, John H. Houghton, brothers, equally or to the survivors or survivor, if living, or to such other beneficiary as may be finally substituted under the conditions hereof, but if no such beneficiary is then living payment will be made to the executors or administrators of the Annuitant.' The italicized words were in handwriting and the rest were printed.

The annuitant thereafter exercised the power to change the beneficiaries and nominated 'my sister and brothers, Florence Picard, Charles K. Houghton, Elroy W. Houghton, each to receive one fourth. The other fourth to be divided equally between annuitant's nephews and niece, Fred H. Shaw, George H. Shaw, Edward H. Shaw, and Clara L. Shaw to be the beneficiary of said Policy, still reserving to myself the privilege of other changes, subject to all the provisions of said Policy.' The company on receipt of this application made the following indorsement on the back of the policy, 'The Annuitant under date of January 5, 1939 nominates Florence Picard, Charles K. Houghton, Elroy W. Houghton, sister and brothers each to receive one fourth ( 1/4) of the proceeds. The other fourth ( 1/4) to be divided equally among Fred H. Shaw, George H. Shaw, Edward H. Shaw and Clara L. Shaw, nephews and niece to be the beneficiary under this contract, the annuitant still reserving the privilege of other changes, subject to all the provisions of the contract.'

The company entered into a second annuity contract on December 8, 1938, after the annuitant had requested a contract for the benefit of 'Florence Pickard, Charles K. Houghton, Elroy W. Houghton, sister and brothers, each to receive one fourth, the other fourth to be divided equally between annuitant's nephews and niece, Fred H. Shaw, George H. Shaw, Edward H. Shaw and Clara L. Shaw.' This policy provided that upon the death of the annuitant the excess of the amount paid by her for the annuity contract over the amounts annually paid to her should be paid 'to the beneficiary beneficiaries named in the endorsement on page 4 and as provided therein, if living, or to such other beneficiary as may be finally substituted under the conditions hereof, but if no such beneficiary is then living payment will be made to the executors or administrators of the Annuitant.' A line was drawn through the words 'beneficiary' and 'if living,' and the words in italics were typewritten, the remainder of the contract being printed. The indorsement of the beneficiaries on page 4 of the contract is set forth in the footnote. 1

The annuitant died September 17, 1951. Florence Pickard, Edward H. Shaw, and Clara L. Shaw survived her, but Charles K. Houghton, Elroy W. Houghton, George H. Shaw, Fred H. Shaw, and John H. Houghton had predeceased her.

Although we are dealing here with the construction of annuity contracts which differ in some respects from life insurance policies, Gregg v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 315 Mass. 704, 54 N.E.2d 169, 150 A.L.R. 1280, the provisions in these contracts relating to payments to be made to beneficiaries upon the death of the annuitant are similar to provisions in life insurance policies regulating the payments to be made upon the death of the insured. All the parties have deemed the situation in this respect as analogous to one dealing with the distribution of the proceeds of a life insurance policy where some of the beneficiaries have predeceased the insured.

The nature of the interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy where, as in these annuity contracts, the right was reserved to change the beneficiaries has frequently been described as a qualified vested interest which will terminate if the insured changes the beneficiaries. Kochanek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 174, 159 N.E. 520; Resnek v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 305, 190 N.E. 603; Wodell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 320 Mass. 1, 67 N.E.2d 469. It is also true that the interest of a...

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2 cases
  • Frederick v. Frederick
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • December 31, 1996
    ...insurance context. E.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Soluri, 134 F.Supp. 86, 87 (S.D.N.Y.1955); Taylor v. Sanderson, 330 Mass. 616, 116 N.E.2d 269, 271 (1953). Moreover, the trial court apparently did not appreciate that, while an annuitant and the named beneficiary of an annu......
  • Hager v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 20, 1997
    ...will, indicate that she intended each co-beneficiary's interest to pass to his or her respective estate. See Taylor v. Sanderson, 330 Mass. 616, 116 N.E.2d 269, 271 (1953). There appears to be no North Carolina statute or case law to identify the extent of a predeceasing beneficiary's inter......

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