Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 01 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 11-21-00233-CR |
| Parties | MICKEY RAY TAYLOR JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 385th District Court Midland County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CR56540
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
The State indicted Appellant, Mickey Ray Taylor Jr., for two felony offenses involving aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Count I alleged that Appellant committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Oneita Poor, his then-fiancée, which caused her serious bodily injury a first-degree felony offense. Count II alleged that, on the same date, Appellant committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Dana Caldwell, his mother, a second-degree felony offense.
The jury found Appellant guilty of both offenses and assessed his punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of fifteen years on Count I and a term of five years on Count II. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the deadly weapon finding in Count II. Second, Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly assessed court-appointed attorney's fees against Appellant, an indigent individual. We modify and affirm.
On the night of April 10, 2021, Appellant, Poor, and Caldwell were in Caldwell's home. Poor testified that Appellant's demeanor "had been a little off" that day. Caldwell testified that Appellant "was agitated" that night and that his agitation escalated when the alarm on her cell phone rang to prompt her to begin getting ready for work.
Caldwell testified that, when Caldwell's alarm rang, Appellant "flew across the room at [Caldwell]" with kitchen scissors, "wrapped his arm around" her, and put the scissors "right at [Caldwell's] throat," stating, "I can't believe it was my own mother" that "did it." Caldwell testified that Appellant in this highly agitated state,[1]took her cell phone, "stabbed [the phone] three times on the front and flipped it over and stabbed it three times on the back, and then hurled it at [the] television as hard as he could." Caldwell testified that Appellant then held Poor and Caldwell in the home for approximately two hours. Appellant then threatened them and said that, "if they took him or killed him, he was going to take one or both of [them] with him when he went."
Caldwell testified that when Poor managed to escape the home and attempted to run away, Appellant jumped up and turned around. As he did so, he hit Caldwell with the scissors, which "stunned [her] for a minute." Appellant's acts against Caldwell left a puncture wound on her cheekbone and scratch marks from the scissors on her throat.
Poor testified that she attempted to escape by going down the front steps but that Appellant "tackled" her from behind. Appellant then stabbed Poor in her ear and on her back, face, and neck while on top of her. Appellant's acts against Poor resulted in numerous stab wounds and cuts that necessitated surgery and stitches. Poor also lost feeling behind her ear and on her hand as a result of Appellant's acts.
During Appellant's assault on Poor, Caldwell escaped the house, hid behind the cars in the driveway, and "crawled across the street to [her] neighbors' house" to ask one of the residents to call 9-1-1. Midland County Sheriff's Deputies Brantley Anderson and Steven Ramirez responded to the call to find Appellant "straddling" Poor with "the blade [of the scissors] pointed out of the back of his [right] hand" toward her. The deputies took Appellant into custody after numerous commands for him to drop the scissors.
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the deadly weapon finding in the aggravated assault against Caldwell. Appellant asks that we reverse his conviction for Count II and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288-89 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd). Under the Jackson standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that we consider all the evidence admitted at trial. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the factfinder's credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to afford such testimony. Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The Jackson standard is deferential and accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant's guilt. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances may be sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
The factfinder may consider a multitude of factors to determine whether the evidence presented sufficiently supports a finding that a particular weapon constitutes a deadly weapon. For example, a factfinder may consider the (1) proximity of the weapon to the victim; (2) nature of any wounds sustained; (3) words spoken by the defendant; (4) weapon's size and shape; (5) weapon's ability to cause serious bodily injury or death; (6) manner in which the defendant used the weapon; and (7) testimony that the victim feared serious bodily injury or death. Babcock v. State, 501 S.W.3d 651, 655 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2016, pet. ref'd); Hopper v. State, 483 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd); see also Brickley v. State, 623 S.W.3d 68, 76 (Tex. App.-Austin 2021, pet. ref'd); Leal v. State, 527 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, no pet.); Romero v. State, 331 S.W.3d 82, 83 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd).
In Count II, the indictment charged Appellant with aggravated assault, alleging that he intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused bodily injury to Caldwell by cutting or striking her about the head or body with a deadly weapon, to wit: scissors. The Texas Penal Code defines "deadly weapon" as "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West 2021). The Penal Code's "plain language" does not require that the actor actually intend to cause death or serious bodily injury. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
As an initial matter, Appellant asserts that the evidence "must be evaluated at the time of the alleged assault against Caldwell," thereby urging that we restrict its review to Appellant's specific acts against Caldwell. In response, the State contends that, during our analysis, we can and should consider the manner in which Appellant used the scissors against Caldwell and Poor because the assaults against both women occurred in the same "criminal episode" or were at least "highly connected." As stated above, we are required to consider all the evidence admitted at trial. See Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 767; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
We are also required to consider the facts of the case and the particular manner in which Appellant used or exhibited the scissors during the commission of the offense. See Penal § 22.02(a)(2) (West Supp. 2022); McCain 22 S.W.3d at 502; Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In McCain, the Court of Criminal Appeals delineated a...
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