Taylor v. State, 59895

Decision Date25 February 1981
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 59895,59895,1
Citation612 S.W.2d 566
PartiesSteve H. TAYLOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

Stan Brown, Abilene, for appellant.

Lynn R. Ingalsbe, Dist. Atty., Abilene, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before ONION, P. J., and ROBERTS and ODOM, JJ.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

This appeal is taken from four judgments of conviction for delivery of marihuana, in which the trials on the four indictments were consolidated upon appellant's motion. Also consolidated and jointly tried was a delivery of marihuana case against Darcy Taylor, appellant's wife, which cause is not in issue in this appeal. The jury assessed punishment in each of appellant's cases at ten (10) years' confinement. The same issues are raised in all four cases.

The record reflects that Roger Cox, an officer with the Abilene Police Department, was working in an undercover capacity from February to August of 1977, attempting to infiltrate the illegal drug trade in the Abilene area. Cox testified that he worked with an informant who would introduce him to drug users and dealers. The informant was not to participate in any actual drug transactions. Cox was introduced to appellant and his wife on April 6, 1977, by the informant, under the guise of being the informant's cousin. At the time of this first meeting with the Taylors at their mobile home, Cox observed several bags of marihuana on a table. Appellant asked if Cox and the informant would like to smoke some and Cox said yes. Cox sat with the other three and he and the informant simulated smoking marihuana. As Cox and the informant were getting up to leave, appellant asked if Cox would like to buy a bag of marihuana. Cox declined, believing that the $25.00 asking price was too high, and also because he did not have that much money with him. He further testified that he had not wanted to buy marihuana with the informant present.

Cox and the informant then left, but Cox returned alone to appellant's trailer later that night. He was asked inside by appellant, who asked if Cox wanted to buy some marihuana now. Cox again said the price was too high, but after a simulated test smoking, finally bought one bag for $25.00. Later that night Cox turned the marihuana over to another officer to be analyzed.

Cox testified to having bought marihuana from appellant on three other occasions in April 1977 under similar circumstances. These purchases took place on April 16, 17, and 25. On each occasion, Cox went alone to appellant's trailer, and appellant each time began the conversation by asking if Cox was there to buy marihuana. Cox would say yes, and the sale would be made. After receiving the marihuana and paying for it, Cox would arrange to turn it over to another officer the same day. On cross-examination, Cox denied ever having first brought up the question of buying marihuana, on any of the four occasions. He also denied that appellant was ever reluctant to sell marihuana to him, and denied that appellant only did so because Cox continually begged and harassed him.

Outside the presence of the jury, Cox testified that the name of the informant who had introduced him to the Taylors was Johnny Sams. Sams had been introduced to Cox on April 4, 1977, by Abilene narcotics officer Wayne Bailey. Sams was 15 or 16 years old at the time. Cox denied ever turning over to Sams any of the marihuana he had bought from appellant. The trial court refused to allow defense counsel to question Cox in the presence of the jury about the informant Sams.

The State then called the officer to whom Cox had turned over his marihuana purchases, in order to complete the chain of custody. This connected the exhibits to the testimony of the State's chemist, whose opinion was that each contained in excess of one-quarter ounce of marihuana. One of the officers, Wayne Bailey, further testified outside the presence of the jury that he had introduced Cox to Sams shortly before Cox made his first purchase from appellant. Sams had been 16 at the time, and had voluntarily agreed to help the police make undercover "buys" from Abilene area drug dealers in exchange for dismissal of a pending marihuana charge against him. Bailey admitted loaning Sams some money, which was never repaid, and making arrangements with Cox to pay for Sams' meals and other unspecified expenses. Bailey denied, however, that Sams was actually paid for his assistance. Appellant's request to allow the jury to hear this testimony was also denied. Also testifying outside the jury's presence as to the relationship between Sams and the police department was Sergeant Larry Faulks, supervisor of vice and narcotics operations of the Abilene Police Department. Faulks was aware of Sams' juvenile status and pending case, and stated that he had approved the use of Sams in facilitating the setting up of drug "buys." As in the two previous instances, appellant's offer to have this testimony proven up before the jury was denied.

After the State rested, appellant called several witnesses in an apparent attempt to set up an entrapment defense. James Stotts testified that he had been present during the April 6th and 16th transactions between Cox and appellant. He stated that on both occasions Cox had initiated the discussions about appellant selling marihuana to him, and that appellant had been very reluctant to do so. Finally, after Cox's allegedly repeated requests and pleadings, appellant sold him marihuana on both occasions. Appellant's brother, Ed Taylor, gave similar testimony as to the April 16th and 25th transactions which he had witnessed.

Appellant and his wife, Darcy Taylor, both testified that Cox had pleaded with and harassed appellant on each of the four occasions. They stated that but for this, appellant never would have sold marihuana to Cox. They also testified that as to the transactions of April 6th and 16th, the "informant," apparently referring to Sams, had been with Cox when the purchases were made. This was in direct conflict with Cox's testimony that he had been alone during all of his purchases from appellant.

Appellant's first ground of error alleges that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to grant appellant's first motion for continuance, and in denying his motion for new trial based on this ground. The State in its brief contends that the ground of error is not in compliance with Article 40.09, § 9, V.A.C.C.P., because it complains both of the refusal of the motion for continuance and the overruling of the motion for new trial. This conclusion is mistaken. The only means of preserving error in the overruling of a motion for continuance due to an absent witness is a motion for new trial. Baker v. State, 467 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). Thus, appellant's grievance under this ground of error is that the trial court erred in denying him a continuance, and wrongly refused to correct the error in that the motion for new trial also was overruled. The ground of error is not multifarious, or as the State would have it, "duplicitous."

The continuance motion, bearing a file mark of January 11, 1978, the first day of trial, requested a continuance based on the absence of Johnny Sams, who was not in court despite allegedly having been served with a subpoena on December 13, 1977 to appear on January 9, 1978. The record does not contain a copy of any such subpoena, nor the officer's return thereon. The motion itself appears to be in compliance with Article 29.06, V.A.C.C.P., and alleges that the appellant expected to prove by Sams' testimony that Sams had been compelled to work for officer Cox, that Cox had given Sams marihuana for his services, and that Cox had induced appellant to sell marihuana to him "by continually begging and harassing" appellant. The copy of the docket sheet which appears in the record states that a hearing was held on the motion on January 11, 1978, as well as on appellant's application for attachment of Sams, which had been filed the same day. The docket entry further states that these motions were denied "as more fully set out in record." The second page of the motion for continuance shows that the word "Granted" has been marked through, leaving the words, "Refused, to which the defendant excepts," below which appears the trial court's signature. At the bottom of the application for attachment appears the handwritten notation, "1/11/78 Application for attachment denied for the reasons more fully set out in the record on a hearing this date" with the trial court's signature below. Thorough examination of the transcription of the court reporter's notes, however, fails to unearth any record of any such "hearing."

The allegations in a motion for continuance, though they must be sworn, are not self-proving. Rollins v. State, 488 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The docket entries and endorsements on the relevant documents indicate that a hearing was held thereon and evidence presented. Determination of such a motion is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review for abuse of such discretion. Corley v. State, 582 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 238, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). Appellant in essence asks us to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's action, when he has not provided us with a bill of exception or a record of the hearing which led to the ruling. We decline to review his contention. Article 40.09, § 5, V.A.C.C.P.

Similarly, with regard to the motion for new trial, the issue simply is not preserved for review. After the return on January 12, 1978 of the verdicts finding appellant guilty in all four cases, and those returned on January 13 assessing punishment, the record shows that leave was granted appellant for the filing of an out-of-time motion for new trial, which was made applicable to all four causes. This motion was filed on March 15, 1978. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
69 cases
  • Ex parte Renier
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • July 1, 1987
    ...vacated pursuant to Art. 42.12, Sec. 7, V.A.C.C.P., is likewise ineligible for probation in subsequent prosecutions. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Plainly, two different notions of "conviction" and "finality" are at work here.28 The original "Suspended Sentence Law" was......
  • Alexander v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • October 7, 1987
    ...be too remote. Stephens v. State, 417 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Garcia v. State, 454 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Where the prior conviction meets the requirements above it may be used for the purpose of impeaching a defendant when he ......
  • Huffman v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • February 3, 1988
    ...treated in every respect as any other witness except when there are overriding constitutional and statutory provisions. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Williams v. State, 607 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Sensabaugh v. Stat......
  • Cuellar v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • February 13, 2002
    ...35 S.W.3d 136 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no writ). 59. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2), (f) (Vernon Supp.2001). 60. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex. Crim.App.1981). 61. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(b)(1)(A) (Vernon 62. Walker v. State, 645 S.W.2d 294, 295 (Tex. Crim.App.1......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
13 books & journal articles
  • Punishment phase
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • May 5, 2022
    ...Crim. App. 2006). A discharge of probation and restoration of civil rights does not reestablish probation eligibility. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Smiley v. State, 129 S.W.3d 690 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. ). Under the entire statutory scheme gov......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Forms. Volume II - 2014 Contents
    • August 12, 2014
    ...42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), §11:11; Form 11-6 Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d ), §12:41 Taylor v. State , 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981), §15:82 Taylor v. State, 671 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no pet .), §11:01 Taylor v. State , 920 S.W.......
  • Punishment Phase
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 2 - 2014 Contents
    • August 17, 2014
    ...Crim. App. 2006). A discharge of probation and restoration of civil rights does not reestablish probation eligibility. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Smiley v. State, 129 S.W.3d 690 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. ). Under the entire statutory scheme go......
  • Trial Motions
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Forms. Volume II - 2014 Contents
    • August 12, 2014
    ...470 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995). Allegations in a motion for continuance, though they must be sworn, are not self-proving. Taylor v. State , 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981). It is not enough merely to file a sworn motion for continuance or new trial based on an absent witness; there must be some s......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT