Taylor v. State
Decision Date | 24 April 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 47009,47009 |
Citation | 508 S.W.2d 393 |
Parties | James Allen TAYLOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Will Gray (On appeal only), Houston, for appellant.
Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., Phyllis Bell and George Karam, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
DALLY, Commissioner.
The conviction is for burglary with intent to commit theft; the punishment, eight years imprisonment.
The first question presented is whether the evidence is sufficient to show want of consent of the alleged owner to the entry and taking of his property. 1
A review of many cases confirms the accuracy of the following quotation from Branch's Penal Code:
4 Branch's Ann.P.C.2d, 865, § 2536.
Some of the more recent cases which are in accord with the cases cited in Branch's in support of the above quoted rules are Wilson v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 420, 328 S.W.2d 305 (1959); Stallworth v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 19, 316 S.W.2d 417 (1958); and Mitchell v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 291, 313 S.W.2d 286 (1958). But see and compare Casarez v. State, 468 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) and Sizemore v. State, 496 S.W.2d 80 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
In this case, although the alleged owner was a witness, he failed to testify that he did not give the appellant consent to enter the premises or to take personal property therefrom. The State candidly suggests that for this reason the evidence is insufficient unless the line of cases represented by those above cited is overruled. It appears this is a rather unique rule that requires lack of consent, one element of the offense of burglary with the intent to commit theft or theft, to be proved by testimonial rather than circumstantial evidence, unless it is shown testimonial evidence is not available.
The earlier cases in this State permitted such proof to be made by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 45 Tex. 76 (1876) and McMahon v. State, 1 Tex.App. 102 (1876).
In Wilson v. State, supra, the defendant was charged with theft of a gelding belonging to Granville Criner. The defendant requested that the jury be instructed the State must prove that Criner did not give him consent to take the gelding by Criner's own testimony or by the confession of the defendant. The trial court refused to do so and charged the jury as follows:
'(T)he want of the owner's consent could be established by evidence of the party from whom the property was taken, or the party who was the owner, or it may be established by facts and circumstances, provided such circumstances so proven are of such nature as to exclude absolutely every reasonable presumption that the owner gave his consent to the taking.'
The Supreme Court held the charge given to be proper.
In McMahon v. State, supra, the alleged owner who testified concerning the theft of a gelding did not testify that he did not give his consent to the taking of the gelding and it was held that such proof could be made circumstantial evidence. The Court in that case said:
However, later in the last century the rule was changed and it has been perpetuated for many years. See e.g., Schultz v. State, 20 Tex.App. 308 (1886) and Good v. State, 30 Tex.App. 276, 17 S.W. 409 (1891).
In Schultz v. State, supra, the Court stated:
'In a trial for theft the want of the owner's consent to the taking of the property by the accused may be shown by circumstances which absolutely exclude every reasonable presumption that the owner gave his consent. (Rains v. The State, 7 Tex.App., 588; Stewart v. The State, 9 Tex.App., 321; Spruill v. The State, 10 Tex.App., 695; Wilson v. The State, 12 Tex.App., 481; Clayton v. The State, 15 Tex.App., 348; Miller v. The State, 18 Tex.App., 34.)
In Good v. State, supra, it was said:
Among the cases requiring direct or testimonial evidence to prove a want of consent to the entry or taking in burglary and theft cases are: Wisdom v. State, 61 S.W. 926 (Tex.Cr.App.1901); Caddell v. State, 42 Tex.Cr.R. 579, 90 S.W. 1013 (1905); Brown v. State, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 336, 125 S.W. 915 (1910); Meredith v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 239, 211 S.W. 227 (1919); Hunt v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 404, 231 S.W. 775 (1921); Herrin v. State, 97 Tex.Cr.R. 494, 262 S.W. 486 (1924); Mitchell v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 78, 38 S.W.2d 331 (1931); Dillard v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 292, 71 S.W.2d 529 (1934).
The reasoning advanced in support of the rule in many of the cases is that circumstantial evidence could not be resorted to where direct evidence was obtainable, because testimonial evidence was the best evidence and that the best evidence obtainable must be adduced. This was an incorrect application of the best evidence rule which relates to documents and written evidence. See and compare Casino v. State, 495 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Overton v. State, 490 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). See also 2 McCormick and Ray, Evidence, § 1561 at pp. 399--400. 2
The facts in the case at bar illustrate that circumstantial evidence has probative value equal to testimonial evidence to show the owner's lack of consent to the entry and taking of his property.
As Mrs. Tallie Devereaux was preparing breakfast around 9:15 a.m. on December 2, 1971, she heard the front door bell ring. She looked through the blinds at a window and saw the appellant, who was wearing a leather jacket, at her door. Mrs. Devereaux recognized appellant as the same man she had seen walking down her street exactly two weeks earlier before another burglary of her home. Because she did not want to 'take any chances' she did not answer the door. Instead, when the door bell ringing persisted, Mrs. Devereaux gathered up her two small children and went to her bedroom. She called her husband as soon as the man stopped ringing the door bell, and told him what had happened. She went to the back bedroom after hanging up the telephone, and through the window she saw 'two guys' wearing leather jackets. They had just come over her back fence and were headed toward the back part of the house. She could not identify either man positively. She ran and called the police at this point, and then telephoned her mother. While talking to her mother, she heard the back window being broken. Her mother told Mrs. Devereaux to 'grab the kids and run into the bathroom and lock it up.' This Mrs. Devereaux did. While in the bathroom she heard footsteps and voices all over the house. The voices were gone in eight to ten minutes, and Mrs. Devereaux opened the bathroom door to find her bedroom ransacked, her purse rifled, and a television and stereo gone.
Tallie Devereaux himself testified that, after receiving the call from his wife, he left work and hurriedly drove home. As he turned onto a street very near his home, he noticed a yellow and black van truck with the hood up and lights flashing. As he reached his driveway he saw two men in his backyard. One of them was handing Devereaux's television to a third man outside the fence, whom Devereaux identified as the appellant. Devereaux heard someone say something, and saw the appellant drop the...
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