Taylor v. State
| Citation | 233 Ind. 398,120 N.E.2d 165 |
| Decision Date | 15 June 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 29102,29102 |
| Parties | TAYLOR v. STATE. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
L. Aldridge Lewis, Jr., and Howard R. Hooper, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., and Frank E. Spencer, Dep. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was charged in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Division No. 1, with first degree burglary. Trial to the court without the intervention of a jury resulted in a finding and judgment of guilty and sentence of ten to twenty years. He had pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of the fact that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime he was of unsound mind.
Upon appeal, appellant assigns as error that the court erred (1) in overruling his motion for a new trial, (2) in withholding ruling on his motion to be discharged, proceeding with the case while such motion was pending, and never ruling on that motion, (3) in denying him due process of law, and (4) in proceeding without jurisdiction of the subject-matter involved or the jurisdiction of the person of appellant.
A grand jury indictment was filed on June 12, 1950, charging that on April 16, 1950, appellant committed the alleged offense.
On June 29, 1950, upon suggestion of the prosecuting attorney, the court ordered a hearing for July 8, 1950, to determine whether appellant was insane or without sufficient comprehension to understand the nature of the pending criminal action; such determination to be under the provisions of § 9-1706, Burns' 1942 Replacement, Acts 1913, Chapter 298, Section 6, Page 774. The court also appointed counsel for appellant and two physicians to examine him concerning his sanity. On July 8, 1950, appellant and counsel being present, the court heard evidence, consisting of the testimony of the two physicians heretofore referred to as having been appointed by the court. The result was a finding that appellant was at that time of unsound mind and without sufficient comprehension to understand the pending proceeding against him. Upon that finding the court ordered that he be committed to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals until such time as he should become sane and be placed on trial.
On September 4, 1951, the Criminal Court of Marion County was notified by the Warden of the Indiana State Prison, who had jurisdiction over the Hospital for Insane Criminals, that appellant had regained his sanity. The court thereupon ordered his return to the Marion County Jail to await the court's further order.
On September 21, 1951, appellant appeared in court with his attorney, waived arraignment, and pleaded not guilty. At that time he filed an answer in two paragraphs, (1) denying all material allegations of the indictment, and (2) alleging that at the time of the crime alleged he was a person of unsound mind.
On October 17, 1951, such date having previously been set for trial, appellant with his attorney appeared in court, and the court appointed two physicians to examine appellant as to his sanity on April 16, 1950, the time of the alleged offense. The trial was continued by agreement.
On April 26, 1952, appellant, with counsel and with his mother, appeared in court and waived trial by jury, his mother joining in the request.
On April 28, 1952, appellant, with counsel, appeared in court and the cause was submitted for trial. At the end of the State's evidence, appellant moved for a finding of not guilty and discharge. On that motion the court withheld ruling, and the appellant's evidence was introduced and the trial was continued.
On May 3, 1952, appellant, with his counsel and his mother, appeared in court, the trial was resumed, evidence of the two physicians appointed by the court was heard, rebuttal evidence was heard, the hearing of evidence was concluded, and the cause was taken under advisement.
On July 12, 1952, appellant, with counsel, appeared in court, and the court entered judgment that it continue the matter under advisement so long as appellant remained in the Indiana Epileptic Village and complied with its rules and regulations, and that appellant was of the age of twenty years.
On May 8, 1952, appellant's mother had filed application in the Marion Circuit Court for commitment of appellant to the Indiana Village for Epileptics, and on June 4, 1952, her petition was granted.
On April 8, 1953, the Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County filed in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Division No. 1, an 'Information and Petition for Hearing' to the effect that appellant had on September 17, 1952, escaped from the Indiana Village for Epileptics, was apprehended in the State of Ohio, and was at the time in the Marion County Jail. The prayer was that appellant be brought before the court for further proceedings.
On April 18, 1953, appellant appeared in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Division No. 1, with counsel, and upon hearing the court found that appellant had violated the terms and conditions of its order of July 12, 1952, as hereinabove set forth, that he was guilty as charged, and entered judgment of guilty, and that he be sentenced to ten to twenty years.
On May 8, 1953, appellant filed a motion for a new trial on these grounds:
(1) Refusal to grant appellant's motion for discharge, hereinabove referred to.
(2) Withholding judgment on July 12, 1952, hereinabove referred to.
(3) Permitting the filing of the 'Information and Petition for Hearing,' hereinabove referred to, and sentencing appellant without evidence that appellant had violated the rules of the Indiana Village for Epileptics.
(4) The decision is contrary to law and not supported by sufficient evidence.
(5) The Criminal Court of Marion County, Division No. 1, no longer had jurisdiction of person or subject-matter after the order of July 12, 1952, hereinabove referred to.
We need not speak upon each of the above questions, item by item. It is sufficient to say that this court reaffirms the theory set forth in Warner v. State 1924, 194 Ind. 426, 143 N.E. 288, that a defendant is entitled to have sentence pronounced with reasonable promptness. Unusual delay must be for some recognized legal purpose, and, even then, termination of the delay must be fixed. An American citizen is entitled to live without a Damocles sword dangling over his head.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to enter judgment for appellant.
I concur in the majority opinion of my Brother FLANAGAN, but I think the facts are so unusual that they warrant a concurring opinion. The mental condition of the appellant presented a very difficult problem for the eminent trial judge, and although I believe he was mistaken in the effect of some of the statutes involved, he attempted to handle the situation in an enlightened manner. It is not his fault nor the fault of this court that the statutes leave a gap that should be closed by further remedial legislation. However, courts have no authority to legislate, nor should they ignore the plain mandates of the Constitution in dealing with a hard case, which too often results in the making of bad law.
Appellant was arrested and charged with burglary in the first degree. When he was in the Marion County jail he became violent. It was then suggested to the court that he was a person of unsound mind, and after proper hearing, it was determined by the trial court that he did not have sufficient comprehension 'to understand the proceedings and make his defense,' and he was committed to the Indiana Colony for the Criminal Insane. He was returned for trial upon restoration to sanity, and a special plea of insanity was interposed in his behalf. The court appointed two experienced psychiatrists to examine appellant. Dr. Philip B. Reed testified in substance that appellant may have suffered from epilepsy, that appellant was dangerous to society and not a safe person to be put at liberty.
On April 28, 1952, the cause was submitted to the trial court, without the intervention of a jury, on the indictment and appellant's plea of not guilty and the special plea of insanity. On this day the trial was recessed until further order of the court, and on May 3, 1952, further evidence was heard and concluded, and the court took the matter under advisement. On July 12, 1952, the court continued the matter under advisement 'so long as defendant remains in the Indiana Epileptic Village, New Castle, Indiana, and complies with their rules and regulations, and judgment withheld under the Minor Statute, as said defendant's true age is twenty (20) years.' No finding of guilty was entered.
On June 4, 1952, on a petition filed by one Rose Lee Taylor in the Marion Circuit Court, that court found appellant to be an epileptic and ordered his committed to the Indiana Village for Epileptics. On or about September 17, 1952, appellant escaped from that institution and went to the State of Ohio where he was arrested, and then he was returned to Indianapolis.
On April 18, 1953, the Criminal Court of Marion County, Division No. 1, caused the appellant to be brought before it, entered a finding that defendant was guilty of burglary in the first degree, and sentenced him to the Indiana Reformatory for a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years.
Section 12 of Article 1 of the Indiana Constitution provides that 'Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.' This constitutional mandate is based on the solid foundation of the Magna Charta, which by Clause 39 declares 'to no one will we sell, deny, or delay right or justice.' In Warner v. State, 1924, 194 Ind. 426, 431, 432, 143 N.E. 288, 290, this court held an unreasonable delay in pronouncing judgment upon a plea of guilty made the judgment void for want of jurisdiction, and...
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