Taylor v. State, 93-KP-00632-SCT

• Decision Date: 03 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-KP-00632-SCT,93-KP-00632-SCT
• Citation: 682 So.2d 359
• Parties: Eddie Lee TAYLOR, Jr. a/k/a Eddie Taylor a/k/a Eddie L. Taylor, Jr. a/k/a Troy Williams v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 359

682 So.2d 359

Eddie Lee TAYLOR, Jr. a/k/a Eddie Taylor a/k/a Eddie L Taylor, Jr. a/k/a Troy Williams v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 93-KP-00632-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 3, 1996.

Eddie Taylor, Parchman, pro se.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Charles W. Maris, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, Jackson, for appellee.

Before SULLIVAN, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ.

JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., Justice, for the Court:

Eddie Lee Taylor (Taylor) filed in the Circuit Court of Walthall County a "Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief Act [sic]", in which he sought to have the court set aside his February 7, 1992, guilty pleas to the crimes of capital murder, conspiracy to commit capital murder and burglary, as well as the subsequent sentences imposed for the commission of said crimes. The sentences were life for the capital murder, plus twenty years for conspiracy to commit capital murder and five years for the burglary. The court, Honorable Keith Starrett, presiding, denied said petition on May 7, 1993, without an evidentiary hearing. The order was filed on May 11, 1993. Taylor, aggrieved by that ruling, filed his notice of appeal and application for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis on June 1, 1993. Judge Starrett granted Taylor's request to appeal in forma pauperis on July 9, 1993, and the appeal was filed on July 12, 1993.

It is on this appeal that Taylor raises the following issues for this Court:

I. WERE MR. TAYLOR'S PLEAS OF GUILTY INVOLUNTARY, AND UNINTELLIGENTLY ENTERED.

II. WAS MR. TAYLOR DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR [SIC] IN NOT GRANTING MR. TAYLOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR [SIC] IN DENYING MR. TAYLOR HIS RECORDS AND TRANSCRIPTS OF THIS PROCEEDING.

By filing this appeal to set aside the guilty pleas, Taylor subjects himself to a decision by this Court that may require a new trial on the original charges of capital murder, conspiracy to commit capital murder and burglary. Instead of facing a sentence of life plus twenty years to run consecutively and five years to run concurrently, Taylor could be given a death sentence by a jury. Myers v. State, 583 So.2d 174, 178 (Miss.1991). Taylor, claiming that his pleas were involuntary and unintelligently entered, states to this Court that he lied to the circuit judge and thereby committed perjury, for which a separate prosecution may lie. Id.

FACTS

On January 6, 1992, Eddie Lee Taylor was indicted by the Grand Jury of Walthall County for one count of murder of John Duncan, on August 11, 1991, while he, Taylor, was engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery of Duncan. The second count of the indictment contained the charge of conspiracy to commit capital murder. The conspiracy was to have taken place between Taylor and James Gatlin on or before August 11, 1991.

Taylor was arrested in New Orleans and extradited to Walthall County on January 9, 1992, where he was charged with the above stated crimes. He appeared before Judge Starrett on February 7, 1992, and entered his plea of guilty to the crimes of capital murder, conspiracy to commit capital murder, and burglary. Taylor received sentences of life plus twenty years and five years, respectively, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The twenty year sentence was for conspiracy to commit capital murder and was to run consecutively with the life sentence. The five year sentence was for burglary and was to run concurrently with the life sentence. Taylor submitted to the lower court his petition for post-conviction relief, where he alleged that his pleas were involuntarily and unintelligently given, and he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Judge Starrett denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing on May 7, 1993. Both the petition and the order denying said petition were filed on May 11, 1993.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

I. WERE MR. TAYLOR'S PLEAS OF GUILTY INVOLUNTARY, AND UNINTELLIGENTLY ENTERED.

Taylor comes before this Court asserting that his pleas were involuntary and unintelligently made as a result of his counsel failing to inform him adequately as to his rights and the charges against him. He claims that because he does not have a high school diploma or a G.E.D. he did not understand the charges, nor did he understand the trial process. In fact, he goes on to say that had he understood the charges and the trial processes, he would have not entered a plea of guilty. He would have insisted on going to trial.

Here on appeal, Taylor, wishes to present new issues not raised below. Specifically, he contends, without any showing or proof, that he "was placed in fear for his life ..." Further, he proposes that the conspiracy took place in Louisiana, not Mississippi, and since the charges against the co-conspirators were dropped, he could not be guilty of conspiracy. This Court, in Gardner v. State, 531 So.2d 805 (Miss.1988), met the appellant's attempt to plow new ground on appeal on a post-conviction motion with the following response:

The issue regarding the constitutionality vel non of § 97-1-1, Miss.Code Ann. (1972), was not raised in Gardner's motion for post-conviction relief and may not be raised now.

Id. Again, Taylor does not explain who placed him in fear of his life, nor does he show any signs of this supposed fear in his guilty pleas. The transcript of the guilty plea hearing is quite clear as to Taylor's belief as to the endangerment of his life. The court asked, "And has anyone threatened, abused, or mistreated you in any way?" Taylor responded, "No, sir."

The charge of conspiracy against Taylor was answered by his pleading guilty. The question of his actual guilt will not be litigated on appeal. This Court in Jefferson v. State, 556 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.1989), held that, "[a] guilty plea operates to waive the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, the right to a jury trial and the right that the prosecution prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Taylor admitted his guilt after having the charge explained to him by the court.

Taylor claims that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the conspiracy because the agreement allegedly took place in Louisiana, not in Walthall County, Mississippi. There was some conversation between Mr. Lampton, District Attorney, and Judge Starrett that the agreement took place on the way to Mississippi. Even if the agreement was made in Louisiana on the way to Mississippi, the conspiracy continued up until the commission of the crime in Walthall county. This Court in Norman v. State, 381 So.2d 1024, 1029 (Miss.1980), stated that

[o]nce a defendant is established as being a conspirator, he remains a part of the conspiracy until he has extricated himself therefrom by making full disclosure to the law enforcement authorities of his involvement and cessation of activity therein, or by communicating his abandonment thereof in a manner reasonably expected to reach his co-conspirators. The burden establishing his withdrawal rests upon the defendant. Hyde v. U.S., 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114, 1127 (1912); U.S. v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir.1964).

Thus, the crime of conspiracy was committed in whole or in part in Walthall County, Mississippi. However, the record clearly shows by Taylor's own testimony that he and James Gatlin agreed on the porch of the murder victim's home in Walthall County to rob him. Notwithstanding the preclusion from raising a new issue on appeal, the argument that the lower court lacked jurisdiction is without merit.

This Court in Wilson v. State, 577 So.2d 394, 396-97 (Miss.1991), held that "a guilty plea must be made voluntarily in order to satisfy the defendant's constitutional rights." A plea is voluntary if the defendant knows what the elements are in the charge against him, including an understanding of the charge and its relation to him, the effect of the plea, and the possible sentence. Schmitt v. State, 560 So.2d 148, 153 (Miss.1990). Further, a complete record should be made of the plea proceeding to ensure that the defendant's plea was entered voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

The record of the guilty plea proceeding is replete with explanations by the trial judge of the charges and the consequences of those charges to Taylor. All of this was done prior to accepting any guilty pleas by Taylor. This Court holds that Taylor's argument that his pleas were involuntary and unintelligently entered is without merit.

II. WAS MR. TAYLOR DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Strickland standard was adopted by this Court in Gilliard v. State, 462 So.2d 710, 714 (Miss.1985). The test to be applied is (1) whether counsel's overall performance was deficient and (2) whether or not the deficient performance, if any, prejudiced the defense. Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767, 775 (Miss.1995).

The burden is on the defendant to prove both prongs. Id.; citing Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss.1993). The adequacy of counsel's performance, as to its deficiency and prejudicial effect, should be measured by a "totality of the circumstances." Cole, 666 So.2d at 775; citing Frierson v. State, 606 So.2d 604, 608 (Miss.1992). This Court in Cole stated that the level of scrutiny to be applied when measuring the performance of counsel against the deficiency and prejudicial prongs of Strickland is to look at the "over-all" performance. Cole, 666 So.2d at 775; citing Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d 1080, 1086 (Miss.1992). There is a strong, yet rebuttable, presumption that the actions by the defense counsel were reasonable and...