Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 26 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2009-KA-01846-COA,2009-KA-01846-COA |
| Parties | SHIRLEY CUMBERLAND TAYLOR APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: CONO A. CARANNA II
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL-FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF FELONY DRIVING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE CAUSING DEATH AND SENTENCED TO EIGHTEEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED-04/26/2011
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A jury sitting before the Harrison County Circuit Court found Shirley Cumberland Taylor guilty of felony driving under the influence causing death or disfigurement in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-11-30(5) (Supp. 2010). The circuit courtsentenced Taylor to eighteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved, Taylor appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. At approximately 7:30 p.m. on January 8, 2008, William and Gail Kelly, who had been married for twenty-six years, were walking for exercise along Mark West Road in Harrison County, Mississippi. To make themselves more visible to drivers, Gail carried a flashlight, and William wore a vest with reflective material sewn into it. ¶3. As William and Gail walked south on Mark West Road, they saw headlights approaching in the opposite direction. According to Gail, she and William moved onto a private road that intersects Mark West Road. In so doing, William and Gail put a lane of traffic between themselves and the oncoming vehicle. Unfortunately, Taylor drove her 2007 GMC Sierra pickup truck across the oncoming lane of traffic and continued off of Mark West Road, where she hit William with the front of her pickup truck. At trial, Gail described that moment as follows:
¶4. Taylor carried William approximately 125 feet before William was thrown off of her hood. William did not survive. Gary Hargrove, the Harrison County Coroner, later testified that the cause of William's death was "massive blunt force trauma to the head, neck, trunk[,] and the extremities." Taylor stopped her car approximately 275 feet away from the place where William came to rest.
¶5. Gail first ran to the area where William came to rest. William was unresponsive. Gailthen ran down the road to Taylor's pickup truck. Gail asked Taylor whether she had a cell phone and, if she did, whether she would let Gail use it to call 911. According to Gail, Taylor said, Gail immediately ran home and called 911. She then drove back to the scene of the collision.
¶6. Deputy Ashley Megan Burge of the Harrison County Sheriff's Department was one of the first responders at the scene. Deputy Burge later testified that Taylor had alcohol on her breath; her eyes were red and "glassy"; she swayed when she was standing still; and her speech was slurred. Deputy Burge advised Taylor of her Miranda1rights. Taylor waived her right to remain silent and told Deputy Burge that she had consumed twelve beers that evening. Taylor also told Deputy Burge that she had been "driving down the road, [when] somebody flashed a light in her eyes and oops, there they were." Deputy Burge administered a field sobriety test. Taylor performed poorly.
¶7. Deputy Burge placed Taylor into custody and obtained a search warrant to collect a blood sample from Taylor. According to Deputy Burge, while Taylor's blood was being drawn, Taylor said, "she hoped that she had killed that man." Wendy Hathcock, a forensic scientist employed by the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, later testified that her analysis of Taylor's blood sample revealed that Taylor's blood-alcohol content was.22 percent on the night that Taylor killed William.
¶8. Authorities subsequently obtained a warrant to search Taylor's pickup truck. Deputy Glenn Roe of the Harrison County Sheriff's Department recovered the "system diagnosticmodule," colloquially known as a "black box," from underneath the carpet on the driver's side floorboard of Taylor's pickup truck. According to the information stored on the black box, Taylor was driving fifty-seven miles per hour approximately one second before she hit William. The posted speed limit on Mark West Road was thirty miles per hour. The black box also indicated that Taylor did not hit her brakes before she killed William. ¶9. Taylor was indicted for "felony driving under [the] influence causing death or disfigurement." Taylor waived arraignment and pled not guilty. On July 8, 2010, Taylor went to trial. The events that transpired during the trial will be examined in greater detail as necessary in the analysis portion of this opinion. To summarize, the prosecution called numerous witnesses, including Gail, Deputy Burge, Deputy Roe, and Hathcock. After the prosecution rested, Taylor chose to testify. According to Taylor, contrary to her statement to Deputy Burge that she had consumed twelve beers on the evening that she killed William, she actually had six beers. Taylor presented a receipt from the Two Miles North Lounge to corroborate her testimony. Taylor had the following explanation for hitting William: Taylor also testified that she was going around a pothole before she hit William.
¶10. Additionally, Taylor called numerous witnesses who testified that Mark West Road was in disrepair and that it lacked painted lane-divider lines. Taylor also called witnesses who testified that they had seen William and Gail walking down the center of Mark West Road, although none of those witnesses testified that William and Gail were walking down the center of the road on the night that Taylor killed William. During the prosecution'srebuttal, Investigator Bill Haden of the Harrison County Sheriff's Department testified that the pothole nearest to the place where Taylor hit William was 528 feet away.
¶11. After deliberating for approximately one hour, the jury found Taylor guilty. The circuit court sentenced Taylor to eighteen years in the custody of the MDOC. Aggrieved, Taylor appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶12. Taylor claims the circuit court erred when it denied her pretrial motion styled as a "motion to dismiss, quash or demur to the indictment." Within that motion, Taylor claimed that the indictment did not sufficiently charge her with the essential elements of the charge. The circuit court heard Taylor's motion on July 2, 2009.
¶13. During the hearing, Taylor argued that the indictment was defective because it did not contain any allegation as to the manner in which she was negligent. According to Taylor, the indictment alleged that she was negligent only in that she was intoxicated at the time she hit and killed William. Taylor further argued that an indictment for DUI causing death or disfigurement must include an allegation as to the manner in which the accused was negligent, and negligence may not be based simply on the fact that the accused was intoxicated.
¶14. The circuit court denied Taylor's motion. Specifically, the circuit court stated as follows:
The purpose of the indictment is to adequately inform the defendant of the charge against him or her in this case and to give notice of the specific charge that the [S]tate is going to proceed on. After reviewing these cases presentedto the Court this morning, I am of the opinion that the indictment is legally sufficient to place the defendant on notice, especially in light of the fact of the District Attorney's policy of full disclosure of its case and file in discovery. And I feel that the indictment is sufficient and has passed muster at the Supreme Court in the past. So I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss, quash or demurrer to the indictment.
On appeal, Taylor reiterates her claim that the indictment was insufficient. Because the legal sufficiency of an indictment is a question of law, we conduct a de novo review. Tran v. State, 962 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (¶12) (Miss. 2007)(citing Peterson v. State, 671 So. 2d 647, 652 (Miss. 1996) (superceded by statute)).
¶15. The purpose of an indictment is to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a "defendant be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26. See also URCCC. 7.06 ()). Therefore, in order for an indictment to be sufficient, "it must contain the essential elements of the crime charged." Peterson, 671 So. 2d at 652-53 (citing May v. State, 209 Miss. 579, 584, 47 So. 2d 887 (1950)). "It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as 'those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.'" Tran, 962 So. 2d at 1241 (¶17). "[T]he language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offence, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and...
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