Taylor v. State
Decision Date | 14 February 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 49S04-0410-CR-457.,49S04-0410-CR-457. |
Parties | Marvin TAYLOR, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Defendants below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Marshelle Dawkins Broadwell, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew A. Kobe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER FROM THE INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS, NO. 49A04-0310-CR-528
Defendant Marvin Taylor filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine seized as the result of an inventory search of his car. Concluding the inventory search was impermissible we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Shortly after midnight on August 7, 2001, Indianapolis Police Officer Patrick McPherson observed a car pull into a gated apartment complex. The driver of the car, later identified as Marvin Taylor, did not use his turn signal. To initiate a traffic stop, Officer McPherson activated his emergency lights. After making two quick right-hand turns Taylor pulled his car diagonally against a curb in the complex parking lot. Officer McPherson "jumped out of [his] vehicle" and was joined shortly thereafter by another policeman, an Officer Stevenson. Tr. at 12. After obtaining Taylor's information, Officer McPherson learned through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles that "[Taylor] was driving while suspended infraction on the learner's permit." Tr. at 13.1 At that point Officer McPherson decided to have Taylor's car towed away because "the vehicle was illegally parked[,] he was driving while suspended[, and] [h]e did not reside in the apartment complex . . . ." Id. In the meantime Officer Stevenson proceeded to conduct a purported inventory search of the vehicle and discovered two plastic baggies containing what was later identified as cocaine.
On August 8, 2001, the State charged Taylor with one count of possession of cocaine in an amount greater than three grams, a Class C felony in violation of Ind.Code § 35-48-4-6(b)(1). Thereafter, on April 1, 2003, the State filed an amended information adding an additional count of dealing in cocaine in an amount greater than three grams, a Class A felony in violation of Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1(b)(1). Prior to trial Taylor filed a motion to suppress the cocaine evidence discovered during the inventory search of his car. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Upon Taylor's request the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction. Taylor argued the trial court erred in denying his motion because the search of his car violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Suggesting that Taylor may have waived his Indiana Constitutional claim, the Court of Appeals addressed his Fourth Amendment claim only. See Taylor v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (). Ultimately the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the trial court's judgment.
Taylor contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the evidence seized was the fruit of an illegal search. The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable search and seizure and this protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 464-65 (Ind.1998) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). For a search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Berry, 704 N.E.2d at 465. The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ind. 1993).
A valid inventory search is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431. The underlying rationale for the inventory exception is three-fold: (1) protection of private property in police custody; (2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of police from possible danger. Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 956 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (citation omitted). In determining the propriety of an inventory search, the threshold question is whether the impoundment itself was proper. Woodford v. State, 752 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ind.2001). An impoundment is warranted when it is part of "routine administrative caretaking functions" of the police or when it is authorized by statute. Id. (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092). To prove a valid inventory search under the community caretaking function, the State must demonstrate the following: (1) "the belief that the vehicle posed some threat or harm to the community or was itself imperiled was consistent with objective standards of sound policing," and (2) "the decision to combat that threat by impoundment was in keeping with established departmental routine or regulation." Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 433.
The State makes no claim that impoundment of Taylor's car was authorized by statute. Rather the State presses its claim based on the officers' community caretaking function. In that regard the State first contends that Officer McPherson was justified in towing Taylor's car because it was illegally parked. We initially observe that it is not entirely clear from the record whether Taylor's car was in fact parked illegally. We know that when Taylor pulled his vehicle over he parked "caddy corner" to the curb. Tr. at 12. Apparently vehicles in the parking lot are typically parked perpendicular to the curb. Tr. at 13. And according to Officer McPherson that was not the manner in which Taylor parked his car. Rather, the car was parked slightly at an angle to the curb. Appellant's App. at 100. But Officer McPherson testified during direct examination that parking lines directing drivers which direction to park did not exist in the apartment complex parking area. Tr. at 12. When subsequently questioned by the Court on that same point, Officer McPherson testified: Tr. at 26.
In any event, assuming Taylor's car was parked illegally, it is not true that every vehicle parked illegally must be impounded.2 And that is especially so where the vehicle poses no potential hazard to public safety.3 Here, Officer McPherson testified that there were relatively few cars parked in the parking area, Tr. at 15, that the vehicle's location did not constitute a public nuisance, Tr. at 25, that the vehicle was on the correct side of the parking lot, Tr. at 20-21, and that the vehicle was parked in a permissible parking area for non-residents. Tr. at 27. The record does not establish that Taylor's vehicle constituted a potential hazard to public safety simply because it may have been parked illegally. See Manalansan v. State, 45 Md.App. 667, 415 A.2d 308, 311 (1980) () . Under the facts presented here, this purported reason for impounding Taylor's car must fail.
The State also argues that police impoundment of Taylor's vehicle was justified because Taylor did not live in any apartment within the complex. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 553 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 1990) ( ). Two primary factors are considered in determining whether the conclusion that a parked vehicle constitutes a hazard is reasonable in light of objective standards of policing. Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 434. First is the degree to which the property upon which the vehicle is situated is under the control of the defendant. Id. And second is the length of time the impounding officer perceived that the impounded car would be unattended. This latter factor "helps assess the reasonableness of the officer's conclusion that the vehicle, if left alone, would be exposed to an unacceptable risk of theft or vandalism." Id.
First, there is nothing in the record indicating that Taylor's vehicle was at risk of harm. Second, the record is silent on whether Taylor was a guest of a resident living in the apartment complex. This point is particularly significant because Taylor's car was parked in an area where a guest would ordinarily park in order to visit a resident. Tr. at 27. And absent evidence that the owner of the apartment complex, or someone on its behalf, would seek to have a guest's car towed from this...
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