Taylor v. Union Pac. R. Corp.
Decision Date | 13 May 1976 |
Citation | 549 P.2d. 855,16 Cal.3d 893,130 Cal.Rptr. 23 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 549 P.2d 855 Lynn TAYLOR, a minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 30531. |
Berman, Hanover & Schneider, Encino, Schermer & Rand, Sherman Oaks, and Martin M. Berman, Encino, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Merrill K. Albert, Kirtland & Packard, Jacques E. Soiret and Robert E. Moore, Jr., Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.
In this personal injury action appeal, we consider whether plaintiffs were improperly denied their right to a trial by jury. As will appear, we have concluded that, under the particular facts in this case, plaintiffs waived their right to a jury trial. (See Code Civ.Proc., § 631, subd. 8.)
Plaintiff minors, through their guardians ad litem, brought this action against defendants (three railroad corporations and the City of Los Angeles) to recover for personal injuries sustained when a train collided with the car in which plaintiffs were riding. Plaintiffs, in an appropriate manner, demanded a jury, deposited the required fees (see Code Civ.Proc., § 631, subd. 5), and the trial commenced on July 25, 1972, as a jury trial. On August 2, 1972, plaintiffs notified the clerk that they no longer wished a jury and the defendants thereupon paid the jury fees with the trial continuing before a jury until Monday, August 7, 1972, at which time defendants also waived a jury, they having previously paid the fees for August 7, and on that day the jury was discharged. The trial continued before the court which ultimately entered its own findings against plaintiffs and ruled that they take nothing on their complaint.
Plaintiffs filed their appeal and, in addition to the jury trial issue discussed below, raised numerous other issues, including the failure of the evidence to support the findings, inconsistencies in the findings of fact, and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial.
The Court of Appeal disposed of the appeal by ruling that plaintiffs were improperly denied a jury trial, thereby finding it unnecessary to reach the additional issues raised by plaintiffs regarding the merits of their cause of action. We granted a hearing in the matter for the sole purpose of considering the jury trial issue. As will be developed, we have concluded that plaintiffs waived their right to a jury trial, and that reversal of the trial court's judgment cannot be based upon this ground. Accordingly, we will retransfer the cause to the Court of Appeal for consideration of the merits of plaintiffs' appeal. (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 12; Cal.Rules of Court, rule 20.) We consider such a procedure appropriate to assure that complex and substantial issues raised on appeal are initially considered by the Court of Appeal before their presentation to us, thereby providing the parties a more complete form of appellate review.
We turn to the critical point in the trial on August 7, 1972, when, plaintiffs having previously waived a jury on August 2, the defendants then also expressly waived their right to jury. The court met with counsel in the absence of the jury to review the status of the jury as trier of fact and the following colloquy occurred:
Following the foregoing discussion, one of defendants' counsel apologized to the court for wasting the jurors' time, and offered to post jury fees if the court felt that any undue pressure upon the court had been created by defendants' belated decision to forego a jury. The court refused the offer, stating that it was willing to accept the responsibility of trying the case. Plaintiffs' counsel made a similar offer to 'split' the jury fees with defendants, but the court likewise declined that offer.
Subsequently, the following exchange took place between the court and plaintiffs' counsel:
Preliminarily, we note trial court error in its assumption that plaintiffs having initially waived a jury on August 2 necessarily did so 'for all time' or 'forever.' (See Code Civ.Proc., § 631, subd. 8.)
Resolution of the issue involves an interpretation of section 631 of the Code of Civil Procedure which describes those acts which constitute a waiver of a jury trial. Subdivision 7 provides that a waiver occurs 'By failing to deposit with the clerk or judge, at the beginning of the second and each succeeding day's session a sum equal to one day's fees of the jury, . . .' Since it is undisputed that plaintiffs failed to deposit jury fees after their express waiver on August 2, 1972, they waived their right to a jury trial.
Plaintiffs initially assert, however, that, despite their counsel's concession at trial, no true waiver by plaintiffs occurred since defendants never agreed to the waiver, but instead 'picked up' the jury fees, until August 7. Under plaintiffs' present theory, a waiver of jury trial does not occur until both parties have 'simultaneously' waived a jury trial. However, no case authority supports plaintiffs' contention, and we find nothing in the language of section 631 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires a 'joint' or 'simultaneous' waiver. Rather, the statutory pattern thereby created contemplates an alternating process of waiver in which the onus of demand for jury and deposit of jury fees may briefly oscillate back and forth between the parties until final waiver by the last party permitted to assert the right, subject always to trial court discretion to relieve from waiver for just cause.
The question remains, of course, whether plaintiffs' right to jury trial was Reinstated once defendants, having 'picked up' the jury by payment of the required fees, thereafter expressly waived in turn their right to a jury. Plaintiffs argue that once defendants ceased paying the jury fees, plaintiffs' right to jury trial was automatically reinstated. As we will develop, this contention lacks merit for two reasons: (1) Neither the cases nor the statutes provide for revival of a previously waived right to jury trial, except in the court's discretion, and (2) in any event, plaintiffs failed to demand a jury trial, or to object to the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs' prior waiver remained in effect. Under such circumstances plaintiffs may not raise the issue on appeal.
We trace certain relevant history. It has been a general rule in California that once a party has waived right to jury trial that waiver cannot thereafter be withdrawn except in the discretion of the trial court. (Lee v. Giosso (1965) 327 Cal.App.2d 246, 248--249, 46 Cal.Rptr. 803, hg. den., Peters and Tobriner, JJ., to grant; Broadway Fed. etc. Loan Assoc. v. Howard (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 382, 398, 285 P.2d 61; Estate of Miller (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 154, 158--159, 60 P.2d 498, hg. den., Curtis, J., to grant; Harmon v. Hopkins (1931) 116 Cal.App. 184, 188, 2 P.2d 540; see Hernandez v. Wilson (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 615, 617--619...
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