Taylor v. United States

• Decision Date: 30 November 1977
• Docket Number: No. 10963.,10963.
• Citation: 380 A.2d 989
• Parties: David Leon TAYLOR, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 989

380 A.2d 989

David Leon TAYLOR, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 10963.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted October 11, 1977.

Decided November 30, 1977.

Joseph J. Bernard, Washington, D. C., appointed by this court, for appellant.

Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom John A. Terry, William D. Pease, Tobey W. Kaczensky and Neil I. Levy, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before KERN, GALLAGHER and MACK, Associate Judges.

KERN, Associate Judge:

A jury found appellant guilty of assault with intent to kill while armed (D.C.Code 1973, §§ 22-501, -3202), assault with intent to commit robbery while armed (D.C.Code 1973, §§ 22-501, -3202), and two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-502).¹ On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred (a) in denying his motion to suppress a written incriminatory statement taken following the arrest, and (b) in declining to give a defense-requested instruction to the jury on "defense of another." We disagree and affirm the convictions.

I

This case arose from the attempted robbery of two employees of the Safeway Store in the Waterside Mall shopping complex at Fourth and M Streets, S.W., on the evening of June 16, 1975, as the men were taking the store's daily proceeds to an after-hours depository at a nearby bank. Appellant, who was seventeen years old, testified that he and a companion, Gerald Edwards, went to the mall with the intent of robbing these men. However, contrary to the store's normal procedure, on this night the two Safeway employees were joined by Michael Worthy, a uniformed security guard for the mall. Accordingly to appellant's testimony, when he saw the guard, he decided against the venture and told Edwards:

Let's not do it because they got a guard with them. One of us might get hurt real bad, or get killed.

Appellant Taylor then walked past the Safeway employees and the guard, proceeding in the direction of his home. Edwards, however, lagged behind and told the men, "This is a stick-up." Although there was conflicting testimony concerning subsequent events, it is clear that there was an exchange of gunfire between Edwards and the security guard and at some point during this exchange, Edwards was shot by the guard.² Appellant then began firing at the guard, who was shot as he ran from the area.

After the gun battle ended, appellant assisted Edwards to leave the area and drove him to the emergency room of the Howard University Hospital. All hospitals were checked by the police for gunshot victims, and appellant was confronted and questioned by Detective James Pawlik. The detective first explained to Taylor that although he was not at that time under arrest, he was suspected of being implicated in a robbery, and therefore he had the right to remain silent.³ Appellant denied any involvement in the robbery, stating that he had been flagged down by the injured man, whom he did not know. Subsequently, appellant was questioned by Detective Willie Jefferson, Jr., from the Robbery Branch, and he repeated the same story that he had told Pawlik.

Soon thereafter, based on a show-up identification at the hospital by the two Safeway employees who had been with the guard and a third Safeway employee who had been a possible witness to the escape of the suspects from the scene of the crime, appellant was placed under arrest. At this time he was again given his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Appellant was then transported to the Robbery Branch office, where he was handcuffed to the desk in a large room with approximately 45 desks in it and left alone for 25 to 45 minutes while Detective Jefferson interviewed witnesses.

At about 1:30 a.m. Officer Jefferson returned to appellant, confronted him with the fact that the witnesses had incriminated him, and asked if he wanted to talk about the offense. There is some conflict in Detective Jefferson's testimony concerning whether he once again read appellant his rights before he took any statement from him, or whether he asked some questions before he repeated the Miranda warnings. In any event, the only answers appellant gave prior to the warnings were that he did not do it. At whatever point in time the warnings were given, Detective Jackson testified that he advised appellant of his rights and then told him:

. . . he didn't have to say nothing to me. I said that part on the rights card about, `We'll get you a lawyer,' it's a farce, because we cannot get you a lawyer tonight. The best thing we can do is charge you and send you to the Cell Block. You don't have to say nothing.

Jefferson asked appellant if he understood what he had been told about his rights, and appellant responded "Yeah." Taylor then began to give a statement, which the officer took down in longhand.

Near the end of the interrogation, appellant's mother and Juvenile Officer Robert Blankenship arrived a the Robbery Squad office.⁴ Officer Blankenship advised appellant Taylor of his Miranda rights and presented him with a police department card on which they were printed. With his mother's encouragement, appellant this time responded "No" to the questions: "Do you wish to answer any questions?" and "Are you willing to answer questions without having an attorney present?" Taylor's mother, who knew Detective Jefferson from a prior contact with her daughter, told appellant: "You don't have to answer no questions from nobody but Jeff, Detective Jeff [sic]."

After appellant's mother left, the typed statement was completed. Although Detective Jefferson was aware of appellant's response to Officer Blankenship, he asked Taylor if he wanted to talk some more and presented him with the typed statement. The statement was on a standard police form which contains the Miranda rights in printed form on the top of the first page. Appellant read the statement and signed it. Detective Jefferson had no discussion with him concerning his previous response to Officer Blankenship that he did not want to answer questions without an attorney present.

Following a pretrial hearing, the court denied appellant's motion to suppress the statement. In a written order the judge found that:

At no time did Taylor ask for a lawyer or verbally refuse to answer questions.

a. Taylor understood his Miranda rights and freely and voluntarily made his written statement.

1) Taylor was told of his rights three or four times. He stated that he understood his rights and had the assistance of a Youth Aid Officer and his mother in understanding these rights.

2) Taylor's statement was not the product of overreaching by the police or of any emotional impairment of his own capacities due to his concern for his friend.

b. Taylor's indication that he did not want to answer questions reflected his mother's advice not his voluntary act.

A motion for reconsideration of this order was heard immediately before trial and denied.

II

As this factual background indicates, appellant was a juvenile who had received full Miranda warnings on at least four occasion.⁵ Nevertheless, appellant argues that his statement should have been suppressed because it was not freely and voluntarily made. In support of this contention, he points to two events: Detective Jefferson's comment during interrogation that an attorney could not be immediately provided when questioning occurred during the middle of the night; and the fact that appellant signed the confession for Detective Jefferson after his response to Officer Blankenship that he did not wish to answer questions without an attorney present.

Initially it should be noted that the trial court's conclusion that the statement was voluntarily made will not be overturned unless it was without substantial support in the evidence. See United States v. Lyon, D.C.App., 348 A.2d 297, 299 (1975); United States v. McNeil, 140 U.S. App.D.C. 3, 6, 433 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1969). We conclude that the record in this case amply supports denial of appellant's suppression motion.⁶

Under the circumstances of the instant case, we do not find Detective Jefferson's remark — that because an attorney was not immediately available in the middle of the night appellant must choose between talking to him or spending the night in the cell block — to have diluted the voluntariness of appellant's confession. We note that the Supreme Court in Miranda explicitly, rejected the suggestion "that each police station must have a `station house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners." 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. All that is required is that authorities provide counsel within a "reasonable period of time." Id. Although Detective Jefferson told appellant that a lawyer was not available that night, he twice emphasized that the suspect did not have to talk to him. The implication was clear that if appellant wished to wait until morning to talk, an attorney would be provided then. Because the police thus would have provided counsel within a reasonable period of time. Jefferson's explanation was not coercive; instead, it merely presented appellant with the realistic alternatives which he faced in the situation.

In analyzing appellant's refusal to answer questions for Officer Blankenship without an attorney present and his subsequent willingness to sign a statement for Detective Jefferson, appellant invites this court to "recognize an absolute ban on police initiated interrogation after an accused's assertion of his right to counsel" regardless of the voluntariness of a subsequent statement. (Appellant's Brief at 13.) For us to take such a position would be unsupported by controlling case law and unwise on the facts of the instant case.

The Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), rejected the proposition that Miranda had "create[d] a per se proscription of any further interrogation...