Taylor v. Wake Cnty.

• Decision Date: 20 February 2018
• Docket Number: No. COA17-99,COA17-99
• Citation: 811 S.E.2d 648,258 N.C.App. 178
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Latonya A. TAYLOR, Individually, and as the Administratrix of the Estates of Sylvester Taylor and Angela Taylor; and as Guardian Ad Litem of J.T., N.H. and A.H., Minor Children, Plaintiff, v. WAKE COUNTY, d/b/a the Division of Social Services, Defendant.

258 N.C.App. 178

811 S.E.2d 648

Latonya A. TAYLOR, Individually, and as the Administratrix of the Estates of Sylvester Taylor and Angela Taylor; and as Guardian Ad Litem of J.T., N.H. and A.H., Minor Children, Plaintiff,

v.WAKE COUNTY, d/b/a the Division of Social Services, Defendant.

No. COA17-99

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: February 20, 2018

Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, by Harvey L. Kennedy, Winston-Salem, and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Office of the Wake County Attorney, by Senior Assistant County Attorney Jennifer Jones and Senior Deputy County Attorney Roger Askew, for Defendant-Appellee.

INMAN, Judge.

This case concerns the scope of a common law doctrine, named for the seminal case Corum v. University of North Carolina , 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276, cert. denied , 506 U.S. 985, 113 S.Ct. 493, 121 L.Ed.2d 431 (1992), which allows a plaintiff to sue the State for a violation the North Carolina Constitution. Such claims, colloquially termed Corum claims, may be asserted when a plaintiff has suffered a violation of her state constitutional rights and otherwise lacks an adequate remedy under state law. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. At issue is whether the adequacy of a remedy depends upon a plaintiff's ability to recover for a particular injury or to recover from a particular defendant. We hold that adequacy depends upon recovery for the plaintiff's injury, without regard to the party from whom recovery may be obtained.

Latonya A. Taylor ("Plaintiff"), individually, and as the administratrix of the estates of Sylvester Taylor and Anglia¹ Taylor, and as the Guardian ad Litem of her three minor children, J.T., N.H., and A.H., appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Wake County Division of Social Services ("Wake County DSS" or "Defendant") on her claims for ordinary negligence, negligent supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death, willful and wanton negligence, and denial of due process under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiff argues the trial court erred when it concluded she had an adequate remedy under state law by bringing a claim in the North Carolina Industrial Commission against the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), thereby precluding her from asserting her direct constitutional claim under Corum against Defendant.

After careful review, we affirm the trial court.

Factual and Procedural History

This case arises from a tragic series of events, which ended in the deaths of Sylvester and Anglia Taylor, Plaintiff's parents, and the attempted murder of Plaintiff in front her minor children. The undisputed facts establish the following:

In January of 2014, Wake County DSS became involved with the affairs of Plaintiff and her children after reports of domestic violence led Plaintiff to obtain a Domestic Violence Protective Order (the "DVPO") against Nathan Lorenzo Holden ("Holden"), Plaintiff's estranged husband.

The DVPO process began on 2 January 2014, when Plaintiff obtained an Ex Parte Domestic Violence Protective Order (the "Ex Parte Order") following a report that Holden threatened to kill Plaintiff and her minor children. The next day, Kathy Sutehall ("Sutehall"), the Wake County DSS caseworker initially assigned to Plaintiff's case, met with Plaintiff at her residence and discussed the allegations. At the time, Plaintiff was residing with her children at her parents' residence. A hearing for the DVPO was scheduled for 9 January 2014, but was continued and the Ex Parte Order remained in place. On 21 January 2014, Holden consented to the DVPO, which prohibited him from having any contact with Plaintiff and ordered that he not threaten any member of Plaintiff's family or household.

On 27 January 2014, Sutehall visited one of Plaintiff's minor children's school. As Sutehall was leaving the school, she learned that Holden was outside the school and she asked the school resource officer to escort her safely to her vehicle.

On 28 January 2014, Sutehall conducted a home visit of Plaintiff's residence, where she found that Plaintiff's father, whom Holden had claimed was dangerous, was not a threat to the minor children. Both of Plaintiff's parents signed a "Safety Assessment" at Sutehall's request, indicating that firearms would not be kept in the home.

Two days later, on 30 January 2014, Holden, through his attorney, alleged that there were firearms present at Plaintiff's parents' house, that Plaintiff's father slapped and pulled a gun on one of the minor children, J.T., and as a result, obtained custody of the minor children following an Emergency Ex Parte hearing before a Wake County District Family Court judge. On 2 February 2014, the Wake County Family Court faxed a copy of the Ex Parte Custody Order (the "Emergency Custody Order") to Sutehall. On 10 February 2014, the Wake County Family Court conducted a hearing concerning the facts alleged in the Emergency Custody Order.

Sometime shortly thereafter, Larna Lea Haddix ("Haddix") took over as Plaintiff's Wake County DSS caseworker. Haddix conducted two home visits with Plaintiff at her residence and one with Holden. Haddix had two additional home visits scheduled with Holden in early April 2014, but Holden was not home when she arrived either time.

On 9 April 2014, Holden went to Plaintiff's residence and shot and killed Plaintiff's parents and shot Plaintiff in front of their children. Holden was later arrested and charged with two counts of murder, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury with the intent to kill, and attempted first degree murder.

On 4 April 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Wake County DSS in superior court for ordinary negligence, negligent supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. At the same time, Plaintiff filed a complaint, pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, against North Carolina DHHS in the North Carolina Industrial Commission, alleging the same facts and damages as asserted in her suit against Wake County DSS. Plaintiff later amended her complaint against Wake County DSS to include a claim for willful and wanton negligence and a claim under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.

On 9 September 2016, Defendant filed its answer, along with a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On 16 September 2016, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Defendant's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, concluding:

3.... [T]hat each of the claims of the Plaintiff, with the exception of the claim asserting deprivation of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights, is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity, and that the Defendant has not waived its immunity, and that therefore, ... each of these claims must be dismissed.

4. With respect to the Plaintiff's claim asserting deprivation of constitutional rights under the North Carolina Constitution, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has an adequate remedy under state law before the Industrial Commission, and that therefore, ... this claim must also be dismissed.

Plaintiff timely appealed.

Analysis

Plaintiff's appeal raises the question of whether an action against DHHS in the North Carolina Industrial Commission pursuant to the Tort Claims Act is an adequate remedy under state law so that Plaintiff is barred from asserting a Corum claim against Wake County DSS in superior court, when both claims arise out of the same facts and seek to recover for the same injuries.² Plaintiff argues that her claim against DHHS is not an adequate remedy because her claim against DHHS does not provide a remedy against Wake County DSS , and, even if she were to recover in the Industrial Commission, her recovery is limited because damages in that forum are capped at one million dollars per person injured and exclude punitive damages. Plaintiff relies upon the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 489 S.E.2d 880 (1997), which held that a plaintiff may simultaneously bring an action against DHHS in the Industrial Commission and an action against a county DSS agency in superior court.

Because our precedent following Corum defines the adequacy of a remedy as a plaintiff's ability to recover for a particular harm and not as a plaintiff's ability to recover against a particular defendant, and because the Meyer decision did not expand the definition of an adequate remedy, we hold Plaintiff's argument is without merit.

We begin our analysis by examining the principles underlying the recognition of state constitutional claims in Corum and its progeny. In 1992, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its decision in Corum v. University of North Carolina , which permitted a university faculty member to bring a "direct cause of action under the State Constitution against [the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs] in his official capacity for alleged violations of [the] plaintiff's free speech rights." 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290. The Court reasoned that, because freedom of speech is a guaranteed right under the State Constitution, "the common law, which provides a remedy for every wrong, will furnish the appropriate action for the adequate redress of a violation of that right" when no other remedy exists. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. This direct cause of action, the Court held, may not be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because "when there is a clash between these constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the constitutional rights must prevail." Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 292. In reaching the conclusion that "in the absence of an adequate state remedy, one whose state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim against the State under the Constitution[,]" id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289, the Court relied...