Teague v. Laclede-Christy Clay Products Co.

• Citation: 52 S.W.2d 880
• Decision Date: 03 September 1932
• Docket Number: No. 31045.,31045.
• Parties: ANNA TEAGUE and DOROTHY TEAGUE v. LACLEDE-CHRISTY CLAY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Corporation, and AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

52 S.W.2d 880

ANNA TEAGUE and DOROTHY TEAGUE v. LACLEDE-CHRISTY CLAY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Corporation, and AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellants.

No. 31045.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division 1.

September 3, 1932.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis. — Hon. Granville Hogan, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions).

Wm. R. Schneider and J.J. Cooney for appellants.

(1) The award of the commission was based upon findings of fact adequately supported by the record. Such findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict and are conclusive and binding upon the courts on appeal and no other award or decision could be based thereon than that rendered by the commission and the court erred in setting it aside and remanding the cause. Woods v. American Coal & Ice Co., 25 S.W. (2d) 144; Smith v. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co., 14 S.W. (2d) 470; Hager v. Pulitzer, 17 S.W. (2d) 578; Kinder v. Hannibal Co., 18 S.W. (2d) 91; Waring v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 39 S.W. (2d) 418; Brewer v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 223 Mo. App. 983, 25 S.W. (2d) 1086; DeMoss v. Evens Fire Brick Co., 37 S.W. (2d) 961; Rue v. Eagle Picher Lead Co., 38 S.W. (2d) 487; Harbour v. Gardner, 38 S.W. (2d) 295; Rolens v. Keller Const. Co., 24 S.W. (2d) 1077; Miller v. St. Joseph Transfer Co., 32 S.W. (2d) 449; Bricker v. Gille Mfg. Co., 35 S.W. (2d) 662; Glaze v. Hart, 36 S.W. (2d) 684; Hammack v. West Plains Lumber Co., 30 S.W. (2d) 650; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 40 S.W. (2d) 601. (2) The court on appeal should review only questions of law, while in the case at bar the court reviewed questions of fact and reversed the award of the commission on the court's own finding of fact in direct violation of the terms of the statute and decisions construing the statute. R.S. 1929, sec. 3342; Beecham v. Greenlease Motor Co., 38 S.W. (2d) 537; Glaze v. Hart, 36 S.W. (2d) 688; R.S. 1929, sec. 3442; Woods v. American Coal & Ice Co., 25 S.W. (2d) 144; Bise v. Tarlton, 35 S.W. (2d) 993; Hammack v. West Plains Lumber Co., 30 S.W. (2d) 650; Brewer v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 223 Mo. App. 985, 25 S.W. (2d) 1086; Cotter v. Valentine Coal Co., 222 Mo. App. 1138, 14 S.W. (2d) 660; Bricker v. Gille Mfg. Co., 35 S.W. (2d) 662; Cobb v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 31 S.W. (2d) 573; Wheat v. E.A. Whitney & Son, 34 S.W. (2d) 158; Kinder v. Hannibal Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 18 S.W. (2d) 91; State ex rel. Brewer-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Comm., 320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W. (2d) 897.

Jesse W. Barrett for respondents.

(1) The facts shown by the record entitle claimants to an award. Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp, 29 S.W. (2d) 128; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 40 S.W. (2d) 601; State ex rel. McCarthy Bros. v. Hennepin Co., 140 Minn. 216. (2) The court did not err in any of the particulars assigned as error by appellants, but duly observed all of the requirements of the statutes. (a) The facts found by the commission did not support its denial of award, and it therefore was the court's duty, under the statute, to reverse and remand. R.S. 1929, sec. 3342; Woods v. American Coal & Ice Co., 25 S.W. (2d) 144; Smith v. Levis-Zukoski, 14 S.W. (2d) 470; Brocco v. May Department Stores, 22 S.W. (2d) 832; Schrabauer v. Schneider, 25 S.W. (2d) 529; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 42 S.W. (2d) 945; Betz v. Tel. Co., 24 S.W. (2d) 224; Huelsmann v. Stute & Co., 28 S.W. (2d) 387; Metting v. Lehr Const. Co., 32 S.W. (2d) 121; Brewer v. Cement Co., 223 Mo. App. 983, 25 S.W. (2d) 1086. (b) In ignoring the material facts the commission was guilty either of: (1) Mistake of law; or (2) Fraud, either of which made review and reversal proper and necessary. R.S. 1929, sec. 3342. (3) The Workmen's Compensation Act, and the procedure thereunder, must be liberally construed. R.S. 1929, sec. 3374.

FRANK, J.

This is an appeal by an employer and insurer from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis reversing an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which denied compensation to the dependents of a deceased employee.

Prior to his death the deceased, Cary F. Teague, lived with and maintained his wife and daughter, the claimants, who were totally dependent on him. Teague was in the employ of the Laclede-Christy Clay Products Company as salesman in the States of Minnesota, Iowa and Michigan, having no fixed headquarters, and being free to call upon any customer or prospective customer as he saw fit, occasionally being given specific suggestions by the employer as to calls which should be made. He traveled his territory by automobile, the employer allowing him seven cents per mile expense for automobile trips for business in lieu of railroad fare. His salary was $3,600 per year. On June 17, 1929, he started from Duluth to Mankato, Minnesota, and when about forty miles south of Duluth his automobile overturned and he was instantly killed. The commission found that the accident causing his death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and denied claimants compensation therefor. The findings made by the commission are set out in the findings and judgment of the circuit court. We quote therefrom the findings of the commission as follows:

"This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Missouri by Anna P. Teague, widow, and Dorothy Teague, daughter, for compensation for the death of their husband and father, Cary F. Teague, opposed by the Laclede-Christy Clay Products Company, Employer, and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Insurer. An award of compensation was denied by the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and the widow and daughter took an appeal to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.

"The claim and the answer thereto, filed with the commission, constitute the pleadings in the case. In the claim it is alleged that the death of Cary F. Teague was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. In their answer the employer and insurer admit all other statements in the claim for compensation, but deny that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased.

"The commission, on May 15, 1930, made the following findings, which it called `Statement of Facts and Rulings of Law:'

"Statement of Facts and Rulings of Law.

"On review, award dated March 11, 1930, is affirmed as to result, but the Statement of Facts and Rulings of Law is hereby reversed and set aside with the following findings: The sole question in this case is as to whether employee's death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. On Friday, June 16, 1929, the deceased and one Sullivan came from Duluth to Minneapolis, and a lady by the name of Miss Sponnick accompanied them on this trip. All three of them registered at the Nicollet Hotel in Minneapolis, and on Saturday, June 17, the deceased and Sullivan tended to some business in Minneapolis which they were working together. They finished said business on Saturday and Sullivan intended to go back to his home in Duluth, but Teague asked him to stay over until Sunday morning and go with him to see a prospective customer by the name of Carlson, who lived in St. Paul. The next morning they went to Carlson's in St. Paul, and on the way over they took Miss Sponnick to a party's home by the name of Shores, in St. Paul. They went on out to Carlson's and, according to Sullivan's testimony, they remained there about 2½ hours. Sullivan states that he wanted to take a train from Minneapolis to Duluth, which train left at 4:00 P.M., Sunday afternoon, although he does testify that Teague insisted that he allow him to drive him back. However, Sullivan testifies that they left Carlson's and as Teague wanted to stop at Shores' house they stopped there about 2:30 Sunday afternoon. He testified that Teague said he was going to run in and then he would come down and drive him over to Minneapolis to get his baggage. Then after Teague went into the Shores' house, he called back and Sullivan went into the house. They stayed at Shores' until about 5:00 or 5:30 Sunday afternoon, and then Teague, Sullivan, Miss Sponnick and Mr. and Mrs. Shores went to Minneapolis. Sullivan checked out of the hotel about 11:30 P.M. Sullivan and Miss Sponnick went to their home in Duluth and on the return trip Teague was killed.

"From the testimony as set out above, it appears clear that Sullivan intended to catch the 4 o'clock train from Minneapolis for Duluth. That they arrived at the Shores' about 2:30 and Teague stated he was going to run in and then he would drive Sullivan over to get his baggage at Minneapolis and catch the said 4 o'clock train, and that they had adequate time to do same, but after Teague went into the Shores' he decided to drive to Duluth for the purpose of taking Miss Sponnick. That Sullivan went with them, but said trip was in no way made for the purpose of taking Sullivan to Duluth. Therefore it cannot be said that the accident causing Teague's death arose out of and in the course of his employment, as he took this trip for personal reasons rather than for any reason connected with his employment."

After quoting the findings made by the commission the court proceeded as follows: "It is obvious that the finding of facts made by the Workmen's Compensation Commission relates exclusively to events and circumstances preceding the day of the accident. These findings being immaterial and irrelevant as to the issues here presented, it is unnecessary for this court to either reverse or affirm said findings of fact. This court finds from the evidence the following facts:"

[1] The court then proceeded to make its own finding of facts, including a finding that Teague's death was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and that claimants were entitled to an award of compensation therefor, then reversed and remanded the cause to the commission...