Rue v. Eagle Picher Lead Co.
Decision Date | 03 April 1931 |
Citation | 38 S.W.2d 487,225 Mo.App. 408 |
Parties | MILAS J. RUE, APPELLANT, v. EAGLE-PICHER LEAD COMPANY, RESPONDENT |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court of Jasper County.--Hon. Harvey Davis Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions).
Judgment reversed and remanded.
Thomas J. Roney for appellant.
(1) The finding of the commission in this case has the force and effect of the verdict of the jury, and should not be set aside if supported by any substantial evidence, although the circuit judge might feel that a different conclusion would have been reached by him if he had been called upon to decide the question in the first instance. Brewer v. Ash Grove Co., 25 S.W.2d 1086; Hager v. Pulitzer Pub Co., 17 S.W.2d 578; Rolens v. Keller Const Co., 24 S.W.2d 1077; Cobb v. Standard Accident Co., 31 S.W.2d 573; Woods v. American Coal Co., 25 S.W.2d 144; Keller v. Commission, 302 Ill. 610, 135 N.E. 98; Mitchell v. Coal Co., 195 Iowa 415, 195 N.W. 145; Stone v. Blackmer Co., 27 S.W.2d 459; Hazard Co. v. Scott, 206 Ky. 759, 268 S.W. 548; Miller v. Morris Co., 162 N.W. 17; Anderson v. Kiene, 174 N.W. 301; Morris v. Coal Co., 266 Pa. 216, 109 A. 914; Shaw v. Piano Co., 44 S.D. 346, 184 N.W. 204; Hackley Co. v. Commission, 173 Wis. 128, 179 N.W. 590. (2) The injury to appellant was by an "accident" as distinguished from an "occupational disease," in that it arises by a definite event, the date of which can be fixed with certainty on June 17, 1928, and a definite time, to-wit: between 5:00 and 8:30 o'clock A. M. of that day. Brewer v. Ash Grove Co., 25 S.W.2d 1086; Peru Plow Co. v. Industrial Com., 311 Ill. 216, 142 N.E. 546; Townsend v. Tagard, 81 Ind.App. 610, 144 N.E. 556; Gilleland v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 104 Kans. 771, 180 P. 793; Gilleland v. Zinc Co., 112 Kans. 39, 209 P. 658; Van Vleet v. Pub. Service Co., 111 Neb. 51, 195 N.W. 467; Tintic Milling Co. v. Ind. Com., 206 P. 278, 23 A. L. R. 325; Roth v. Ind. Com. of Ohio, 7 O. App. 386.
John Campbell, A. E. Spencer and A. E. Spencer Jr., for respondent.
The company was engaged in a work which is declared by the statute to be especially dangerous to the health of employees (section 13253). The disease from which plaintiff claims to be suffering is an occupational disease incidental to such employment. Plaintiff makes it clear that the situation at his place of work that morning was just the same as the situation always there; there was nothing unusual about it and it was just what was to be expected any time any man went there and shoveled the dry lead powder. The dust was produced by the men in handling and working this powder. It therefore seems clear that appellant was the victim of an occupational disease. If there had been a failure to provide a mask, or if an insufficient mask was furnished, this would not change the situation. The disease would still be occupational and therefore excluded from the compensation law, and the liability of the company if any, would be based upon the statutes as an occupational disease. Chop v. Swift & Co., 118 Kan. 35, 233 P. 800; St. Louis M. & S. Co. v. Ind. Co., 113 Okla. 179, 241 P. 170; Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 114 Okla. 3, 242 P. 765; Bamberger Coal Co. v. Com. of Utah, 66 Utah 203, 240 P. 1103; Meade Fibre Corp. v. Starnes, 147 Tenn. 362, 247 S.W. 989; Hoag v. Kans. Ind. Laundry, 113 Kans. 513, 215 P. 295; Taylor v. Swift & Co., 114 Kans. 431, 219 P. 517; Linnane v. Brewing Co., 91 Conn. 158, 98 A. 507; Jenner v. Imperial Furn. Co., 200 Mich. 265, 166 N.W. 943; Depre v. P. Coast Forge Co., 259 P. 720; Echord v. Rush, 261 P. 820; Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334; Milling Co. v. Ind. Com., 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278.
Milas J. Rue, appellant, contracted lead poisoning while in the employ of respondent and filed a claim for compensation under our Workmen's Compensation Statute. The commissioner found in his favor and made an award for him. The respondent appealed to the circuit court, where, upon presentation of the finding of the commission and the evidence on which such finding was based, the court held no case was made by the claimant and reversed and quashed the award of the commission and discharged the defendant. The claimant appealed to this court.
The award of the commission was set aside and quashed because the circuit court was of the opinion that the evidence taken at the hearing before the commission was not sufficient to sustain the award and whether the court was right in that holding is the only question upon which we are required to pass.
It is a familiar rule of law and conceded in this case that the finding of the commission stands upon the same footing as the verdict of a jury and if there is any substantial evidence to sustain it, the court must uphold it. It is also conceded that in determining whether the evidence will sustain the award the claimant must be given the benefit of all the evidence in his favor. There is no conflict in the evidence except some slight difference of opinion between physicians who testified as experts. The facts are substantially as follows: Until this alleged accident, the claimant was in good health; had never had any trouble with his stomach and his physical condition was good in every respect. It was conceded that his work required him to work in a room where lead dust was in the air and it was necessary for him to wear a mask to protect him in breathing in order to prevent breathing the lead dust which was recognized as dangerous to health and these masks were provided for that purpose by the employer. The claimant in detailing what occurred at the time of the alleged accident stated:
Dr. McCormack, a physician, called by claimant, testified: This doctor was asked this question: To which he answered: "I would say it would be due to an excessive amount at one time." Also
This evidence was taken before Commissioner Orin H. Shaw, who made a temporary award to claimant on December 21, 1928. On February 11, 1929, further testimony was heard by Commissioner Shaw. Claimant testified that he was not then able to work and was still under the care of Dr. McCormack. Dr. McCormack then testified that claimant had been under his care since the last hearing and he did not know that he could yet do any work.
Dr Cummings, for defendant, testified...
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