Teefey v. Teefey

• Decision Date: 08 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 59278,59278
• Citation: 533 S.W.2d 563
• Parties: Shirley Dee TEEFEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John J. TEEFEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 563

533 S.W.2d 563

Shirley Dee TEEFEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John J. TEEFEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 59278.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

March 8, 1976.

John J. Teefey, pro se.

Robert Frager, John R. Caslavka, Kansas City, for respondent.

HOLMAN, Judge.

The plaintiff in this action obtained a decree of dissolution of marriage in April, 1974, and appellant (hereinafter referred to as defendant) was ordered to pay the sum of $300 per month as support and maintenance for plaintiff and their minor children. In October, 1974, the prosecuting attorney at the request of plaintiff instituted proceedings under Section 452.345 ¹ to cite defendant for contempt because of his failure to pay $1,250 of said maintenance. On February 5, 1975, the court sustained a motion to modify ad the monthly payments were reduced to $250.

Section 452.345 relates to payment of maintenance and provides, in part, as follows:

'4. If a party fails to make required payment, the circuit clerk shall send by registered or certified mail notice of the arrearage to the obligor. If payment of the sum due is not made to the circuit clerk within ten days after sending notice, the circuit clerk shall certify the amount due to the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney shall, with the consent of the obligee, promptly initiate contempt proceedings against the obligor.

'5. The prosecuting attorney shall assist the court on behalf of a person entitled to receive maintenance or support in all proceedings initiated under this section to enforce compliance with the order.'

On October 7, 1975, the contempt application was heard with defendant appearing without counsel (as he has in this court) and he was found guilty of indirect criminal contempt. Under the authority of Section 476.120 the court sentenced defendant to 90 days imprisonment in jail with the proviso that, 'After serving 6 days, he is to be released from custody on probation for one (1) year, under the supervision of the Prosecuting Attorney, on condition he make future payments regularly, and make up arrearage in accordance with a schedule provided by the Prosecuting Attorney. If employed he may be given work release privileges.' Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Plaintiff's counsel promptly filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the contention that no appeal may be taken from a conviction of criminal contempt. We ordered that motion taken with the case and it is now our duty to decide it.

If is well settled in this stated that a conviction for criminal contempt may not be reviewed by appeal. Ex Parte Howell, 273 Mo. 96, 200 S.W. 65 (1918). It is equally clear that in this state and elsewhere a party may appeal from a conviction for civil contempt. See Anno. 33 A.L.R.2d 448, 508, State ex rel. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co., v. Bland, 189 Mo. 197, 88 S.W. 28 (1905), Oliver v. Orrick, 220 Mo.App. 614, 288 S.W. 966 (Mo.1926), Threlkel v. Miles, 320 Mo. 1140, 10 S.W.2d 953(7) (1928), and Republic Engineering and Mfg. Co. v. Moskovitz, 393 S.W.2d 78 (Mo.App.1965).

It accordingly appears that the decision on the motion to dismiss depends upon a determination of whether the instant contempt may be said to be civil or criminal. In that connection we think that the fact that the trial court designated this as criminal contempt does not necessarily make it such.

We are mindful of the provisions of Section 476.110 which are, in part, as follows:

'Every court of record shall have power to punish as for criminal contempt persons guilty of . . .

'(3) Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it; . . .' If this provision is construed literally it would likely apply to all contempts and would have resulted in abolishing civil contempt in this state. We do not think that this statute was intended by the legislature to apply to the failure to obey every type of order made by a court. We have accordingly concluded that the type of contempt here involved should be determined by general rules and the decision law in this state.

'Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. They are punitive in nature, and the government, courts, and people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. . . .

'A criminal contempt proceeding is generally held to be independent of the cause out of which the alleged contempt arose, although it is dependent for its foundation on the proceedings in such cause, . . .

'Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party, and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. . . .' 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 62(5)(6), pp. 154 to 158 inclusive.

We approve of the statement that, '. . . Contempts fall into two categories, civil and criminal. Although at times the line is hard to draw, the essential difference lies in who is sought to be protected by the contempt proceeding. Civil contempt is for the protection of a party to the litigation, the party for whose benefit the order, judgment or decree was entered. Its function is to provide a coercive means to compel the other party to the litigation to comply with relief granted to his adversary. The civil contemnor has at all times the power to terminate his punishment by compliance with the order of the court--i.e.: purging. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, l.c. 441 et seq., 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797.

'( 2) Criminal contempt on the other hand does not serve the function of aiding a litigant in achieving the relief granted but is for the purpose of protecting the dignity of the court and, more important, to protect the authority of its decrees. The thrust of criminal contempt is the intentional interference with the judicial process and the demonstrated refusal to be bound by judicial determinations. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., supra, In re Reese, 10 Cir., 107 F. 942. The power of criminal contempt springs not from the needs to protect a litigant, but from the inherent power of the courts to protect the judicial system established by the people as the method for solving disputes. Without this power courts are no more than advisory bodies to be heeded or not at the whim of the individual.' Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298, 304, 305 (Mo.App.1970).

Criminal contempts are sometimes referred to as direct while civil contempts are described as constructive or indirect. Some cases clearly have elements of both civil and criminal contempt. While most contempts arising from matters not transpiring in court are considered civil there are some cases involving affirmative defiance of a court order which are properly classified as criminal. See...