In re Marriage of Crow and Gilmore

Decision Date13 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. SC 84929.,SC 84929.
Citation103 S.W.3d 778
PartiesIn re the MARRIAGE OF: Juanita Marie CROW and Dwight Allen GILMORE.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

James R. Sharp, Springfield, for appellant.

Randy J. Reichard, Springfield, for respondent.

DUANE BENTON, Judge.

Juanita Marie Crow moves to dismiss the appeal by her ex-spouse, Dwight Allen Gilmore, of a judgment holding him in contempt. After opinion by the Court of Appeals, a dissenting judge certified the case to this Court. Mo. Const. art. V. sec. 10. The appeal of the contempt "judgment" is dismissed as premature. The modification of child support is reversed in part, and the case remanded.

I.

In 1992, the circuit court entered a dissolution decree. In 2000, Husband moved to modify, requesting a change in child support. Wife counter-moved to increase support. She also moved to find him in contempt for failing to pay past support and a bank debt — both ordered in the original decree.

In 2001, the trial court — by a "Judgment of Modification and Contempt" — increased Husband's child support, and held him in contempt. The contempt portion says:

4. Respondent, Dwight Allen Gilmore, shall be committed to the custody of the sheriff of Stone County, Missouri, until such time as he purges himself of contempt, or until he is otherwise discharged by law.

5. Execution of this judgment with regard to respondent's incarceration shall be stayed so long as respondent complies with the following provisions by which he may purge himself of contempt:

A. Payment to petitioner of $10,930.71, representing the principal unpaid amount of the People's Bank obligation, plus interest from and after June 20, 1994, the date the obligation was paid by petitioner, plus child support arrearages in the amount of $2,400.00, said payment to be made within sixty (60) days from the date of this judgment.

B. Upon respondent's failure to comply with the purge order set forth above, a warrant for his arrest and order for his commitment to the Stone County sheriff shall issue forthwith without further hearing.

C. This court retains jurisdiction of this contempt action until the contempt has been purged.

The court also ordered Husband to pay Wife's attorney fees "due to his contempt and in consideration that he makes substantially more income than [Wife] does."

Husband appeals, alleging the trial court erred in: 1) holding him in contempt, 2) ordering him to pay attorney fees, and 3) increasing his child support obligation.

Wife moves to dismiss Husband's first and second points, asserting that the contempt "judgment" is not final and appealable.

II.

A civil contempt order is appealable. See State ex rel. Nesser v. Pennoyer, 887 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Mo. banc 1994); Teefey v. Teefey, 533 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Mo. banc 1976). Like other judgments, a civil contempt order must be final before it may be appealed. See section 512.020 RSMo 2000; City of St. Louis v. Hughes, 950 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Mo. banc 1997); Whitworth v. Jones, 41 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Mo. App.2001). If the "Judgment of Modification and Contempt" is not final, this Court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. See City of St. Louis, 950 S.W.2d at 852.

"Civil contempt is intended to benefit a party for whom an order, judgment, or decree was entered. Its purpose is to coerce compliance with the relief granted." State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Mo. banc 1994). In response to a civil contempt order, the contemnor has two options.

First, the contemnor may purge the contempt by complying with the order. The case then becomes moot and unappealable. See Union Hill Homes Ass'n Inc. v. RET Development Corp., 83 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Mo. App.2002); Whitworth, 41 S.W.3d at 629; McGee v. McGee, 25 S.W.3d 489, 490 (Mo. App.2000); In re Marriage of Beaver, 954 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo.App.1997); Clark v. Myers, 945 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Mo.App.1997); Strickland v. Strickland, 941 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Mo.App.1997); Brock v. Brock, 936 S.W.2d 882, 888-89 (Mo.App.1997); Happy v. Happy, 903 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Mo.App. 1995); State ex rel. Watson v. Watson, 858 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Mo.App.1993); Houttuin v. Houttuin, 780 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Mo.App. 1989); City of Florissant v. Lee, 714 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Mo.App.1986); Niehoff v. Forney, 692 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Mo.App. 1985); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 661 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Mo.App.1983). But see Happy v. Happy, 941 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo.App. 1997); Carmack v. Carmack, 947 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Mo.App.1997).

Second, the contemnor may appeal the contempt order. For purposes of appeal, a civil contempt order is not final until "enforced." Union Hill Homes, 83 S.W.3d at 92; Smith v. Smith, 75 S.W.3d 815, 827-28 (Mo.App.2002); Whitworth, 41 S.W.3d at 629; Beaver, 954 S.W.2d at 721; Carmack, 947 S.W.2d at 847; Clark, 945 S.W.2d at 703; Bailey v. Amon, 941 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Mo.App.1997); Strickland, 941 S.W.2d at 867; Brock, 936 S.W.2d at 888-89; Matter of Estate of Keathley, 934 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Mo.App. 1996); C.L. Smith Indus. Co., Inc. v. Matecki, 914 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Mo.App.1996); Crenshaw v. Refuse Service, Inc., 908 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Mo.App.1995); Happy, 903 S.W.2d at 610; Watlow Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Wrob, 878 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo.App.1994); Watson, 858 S.W.2d at 842; Yalem v. Yalem, 811 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Mo.App.1991); City of Pagedale v. Taylor, 790 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo.App.1990); Saeuberlich v. Saeuberlich, 782 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Mo.App. 1989); Houttuin, 780 S.W.2d at 713; Torrence v. Torrence, 774 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Mo.App.1989); City of Florissant, 714 S.W.2d at 873; Creamer v. Banholzer, 694 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Mo.App.1985); Niehoff, 692 S.W.2d at 637; Hamilton, 661 S.W.2d at 83.

When "enforcement" occurs depends on the remedy. Two remedies to coerce compliance are compensatory per diem fines and imprisonment. See Odom v. Langston, 358 Mo. 241, 213 S.W.2d 948, 951-52 (banc 1948); Tashma v. Nucrown, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 248, 251-52 (Mo.App.2000).

When the remedy is a fine, the contempt order is "enforced" when the moving party executes on the fine. See Union Hill Homes, 83 S.W.3d at 92; Bailey, 941 S.W.2d at 658; Keathley, 934 S.W.2d at 614; 21 West, Inc. v. Meadowgreen Trails, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 858, 883 (Mo.App.1996); City of Pagedale, 790 S.W.2d at 518. In this case, the contempt order does not include a fine.

When the remedy is imprisonment, the traditional rule is that the contempt order is "enforced" when there is "actual incarceration pursuant to a warrant [or order] of commitment." Beaver, 954 S.W.2d at 721; Clark, 945 S.W.2d at 703; Strickland, 941 S.W.2d at 867; Watlow Elec., 878 S.W.2d at 65; Watson, 858 S.W.2d at 842; Houttuin, 780 S.W.2d at 713; Torrence, 774 S.W.2d at 881; City of Florissant, 714 S.W.2d at 873; Niehoff, 692 S.W.2d at 637; Hamilton, 661 S.W.2d at 83.

There is some confusion whether actual incarceration is required, or whether an order of commitment is sufficient "enforcement," to make a contempt order final for purposes of appeal. Some cases require actual incarceration. See Watson, 858 S.W.2d at 842; Hamilton, 661 S.W.2d at 83. Others appear to require only an order of commitment. See Watlow Elec., 878 S.W.2d at 65; Houttuin, 780 S.W.2d at 713.

This Court has intimated that an order of commitment is sufficient to "enforce" a contempt order.1 In issuing an order of commitment, the trial court imposes the specific remedy — incarceration. At this point, the contempt order changes from mere threat to "enforcement," and becomes final and appealable. See Rule 81.04(a); section 512.050 RSMo 2000.

Here, the contempt order was not enforced. By the words of the "judgment," incarceration was conditioned on Husband's failure to purge the contempt within 60 days. If he failed, the court could impose incarceration by issuing an order of commitment. Husband failed to purge the contempt. However, an order of commitment never issued. Until incarceration is ordered, the contempt order is not "enforced," and remains interlocutory and unappealable. See Boemler Chevrolet Co. v. Combs, 764 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Mo.App. 1988); Hamilton, 661 S.W.2d at 83; see also Appealability of Contempt Adjudication or Conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448, 570-73 (1970, Supp.2002).

After the 60-day purging period passed, the trial court approved a supersedeas appeal bond by Husband "to cover the amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest and damages for delay." Husband claims that this bond — like a bond after incarceration — stays the contempt order, sufficiently enforcing it for purposes of appeal.

Posting a supersedeas appeal bond does not enforce a contempt order. Rather, as Husband admits, it stays enforcement of a judgment while an appeal is pending. See Rule 81.09(a); section 512.080 RSMo 2000; Roussin v. Roussin, 792 S.W.2d 894, 898 (Mo.App.1990). Here, the contempt order is not yet appealable. A bond staying an unappealable contempt order has no effect. See Seiter v. Tinsley, 503 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Mo.App.1973).

True, an incarcerated contemnor is entitled to release on bond pending appeal. Teefey, 533 S.W.2d at 566. However, by the time the contemnor is incarcerated, the contempt order is beyond the point when it is enforced and appealable — that is, when the order of commitment is issued. "It is manifest that [the statutory parallel to Rule 81.09] contemplates that for an appeal bond to be applicable and enforceable, there must be an appeal from an appealable judgment." Seiter, 503 S.W.2d at 39.

Because the contempt order was not enforced, it is not final and appealable. The motion to dismiss Husband's first point — which attempts to appeal the contempt ",judgment" — is sustained, and the appeal is dismissed as premature.

III.

Husband next appeals the award of attorney fees. Wife again moves to dismiss, claiming the award is part of an unappealable contempt order.

While awarding attorney's fees in civil contempt cases is within the discretion of the trial court, such an award is to compensate the...

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