Teeny v. Haertl Constructors, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 January 1993 |
| Citation | 314 Or. 688,842 P.2d 788 |
| Parties | Gary W. TEENY and Richard L. Teeny, dba Teeny's Steel and Crane Erection, Plaintiffs, v. HAERTL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., an Oregon corporation, and Manhattan-Rose City Glass, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Defendants-Respondents, Camera World Company, an Oregon corporation, Petitioner on Review, Chung Doo Shin, an individual, Defendant-Respondent, Cross-Appellant, Marshall Company Construction, an assumed business name of John H. Marshall, Defendant-Appellant, Microflect, Inc., an Oregon corporation, dba Grating Specialties Division, and Enterprise Fabricators Co., Inc., an Oregon corporation, Respondents on Review, and Alfred E. Aus and Esther W. Aus, husband and wife; U.S. National Bank of Oregon, a national banking association; Drs. Goodman and Charrier, P.C., a professional corporation; Knez Building Materials Company, an Oregon corporation; Don Earl, Michael Gardner and Michael Satran, dba Western States Sheet Metal, Inc.; Cab, Inc., dba Union Floor Company; Parr Lumber Company, an Oregon corporation; Michael Gardner, dba Sun Roofing; Bachofner Electric, Inc., an Oregon corporation; Landry's Commercial Floor Covering, Inc., an Oregon corporation; Dan E. Ward, dba Willamette Painting Co.; Overhead Door Company of Portland-Vancouver, Inc., an Oregon corporation, dba Overhead Door Company of Portland, Inc.; Asi Heating and Air Conditioning, Incorporated, an Oregon corporation; Modern Plumbing Company, an Oregon corporation; Landco Enterprises, Inc., an Oregon corporation; and James B. Johnston, dba Wood Hollow Cabinets, Defendants. CC 8808-04655; CA A63888; SC S39122. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
William Dickas, of Kell, Alterman & Runstein, Portland, filed the petition and argued the cause, for petitioner on review.
Willam Day, Portland, filed the response and argued the cause, for respondent on review Enterprise Fabricators Co., Inc.
In this lien foreclosure case, several construction subcontractors involved in renovating a commercial building in downtown Portland sought to foreclose construction liens on the property after the general contractor had failed to pay them amounts due under their subcontracts. The property owner contested the liens. The trial court held, among other things, that the liens of two of the subcontractors--Enterprise Fabricators Co., Inc. (Enterprise), and Microflect, Inc. (Microflect)--were invalid, because neither subcontractor had given the property owner a notice of right to a lien pursuant to ORS 87.021, set out infra. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding in part that Enterprise and Microflect were exempt from the notice requirement under ORS 87.021(3)(b). Teeny v. Haertl Constructors, Inc., 111 Or.App. 543, 826 P.2d 1029 (1992). We allowed review and now reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue. 1
In 1987 and 1988, Haertl Constructors, Inc. (Haertl), served as general contractor on a construction project to renovate part of a multi-story retail and office building in downtown Portland. In 1987, Haertl subcontracted with Enterprise to do custom steel fabrication for the project. Almost all of Enterprise's work occurred off-site at its shop, where Enterprise fabricated various items. Enterprise then delivered those items to the construction site for others to install. In addition to approximately 22 delivery trips, Enterprise's president, Mel Haldors, made approximately 19 other trips to the construction site, where he took measurements and met with various people to work out problems related to Enterprise's fabrication tasks.
In May 1988, Microflect provided aluminum grating for the project under a subcontract with Haertl. John Robertson, a general manager at Microflect, spent four hours at the construction site taking measurements for the grating. The grating was then cut to size at Microflect's shop in Salem and delivered to the construction site by an independent trucking company.
In August 1988, Gary and Richard Teeny, who were also subcontractors on the project, filed this action, seeking recovery against Haertl for the amount due on their subcontract and also seeking to foreclose a construction lien on the property. All other subcontractors and the property owner were joined as defendants in the action. By counterclaim and crossclaim, Enterprise and Microflect each sought to recover against Haertl and to foreclose construction liens on the property. 2
In January 1990, the trial court entered judgment in the action, ruling in part that the liens of Enterprise and Microflect were invalid, because neither subcontractor had provided the property owner a notice of right to a lien, as required by ORS 87.021. That statute provides, in part:
Enterprise and Microflect conceded that they had not provided the property owner with notices of right to a lien, and the trial court concluded that neither Enterprise nor Microflect fell within the exception of ORS 87.021(3)(b) for a person who "performs labor upon a commercial improvement or provides labor and material for a commercial improvement." It is this ruling that is at issue before us.
Enterprise and Microflect appealed the trial court judgment, arguing to the Court of Appeals that a person who provides material for a project after performing custom work on that material away from the construction site "provides labor and material for a commercial improvement" within the meaning of ORS 87.021(3)(b). In response, the property owner argued that only a person who labors on-site, either by installing material or by working on material at the construction site, "performs labor upon a commercial improvement or provides labor and material for a commercial improvement" within the statute's meaning. The Court of Appeals rejected the owner's argument, stating: Teeny v. Haertl Constructors, Inc., supra, 111 Or.App. at 548, 826 P.2d 1029. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held in favor of Enterprise and Microflect. We allowed review to determine the proper interpretation of ORS 87.021(3)(b).
In interpreting a statute, this court's duty is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020; Mattiza v. Foster, 311 Or. 1, 4, 803 P.2d 723 (1990). "The inquiry begins with an examination of the language of the statute itself." Id. In this case, that examination is not dispositive. It is not self-evident that the legislature intended the phrase "[a] person who performs labor upon a commercial improvement or provides labor and material for a commercial improvement" to include or to exclude a subcontractor like Enterprise or Microflect who customizes materials for a construction project off-site. Nor is it necessarily true, based on the statutory language alone, that the legislature intended the phrase "performs labor upon" to mean something different than "provides labor and material for." The difference in wording could be intended to describe completely different sets of circumstances, e.g., contrasting situations in which labor alone was provided from those in which labor and material were provided, or, in spite of the difference, the legislature may have had a single set of circumstances in mind. Because the statutory wording does not provide a definitive indication of the legislature's intent in this case, it is appropriate to consider legislative history to determine whether the legislature intended to encompass subcontractors like Enterprise and Microflect within the protective bounds of ORS 87.021(3)(b).
In 1915, the legislature first enacted the provision that eventually became ORS 87.021. Before that year, the statute that provided for construction liens (the precursor to ORS 87.010) stated, in part:
"Every * * * person performing labor upon or furnishing material, or transporting or hauling any material of any kind to be used in the construction, alteration, or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building * * * shall have a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or transportation or material furnished at the instance of the owner of the building * * * or his agent * * *."
Lord's Oregon Laws § 7416 (1910). In 1915, however, ...
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