Teevan v. Office of Attorney General, Natural Resources Div., State of Idaho, 22912
Decision Date | 30 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 22912,22912 |
Citation | 936 P.2d 1321,130 Idaho 79 |
Parties | Teresa E. TEEVAN, Claimant-Appellant, v. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION, STATE OF IDAHO, Defendants-Respondents, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Defendant. Boise, January 1997 Term |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Teresa E. Teevan, Boise, pro se, for appellant.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Leslie L. Goddard, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a decision and order of the Industrial Commission (Commission) finding claimant Teresa Teevan ineligible for unemployment benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause connected with her employment.
Teevan began work as a paralegal in the Natural Resources Division of the Attorney General's Office (AG's Office or employer) on December 2, 1991, when Larry EchoHawk was Attorney General. Clive Strong was the chief of the Division and Teevan's supervisor. Teevan claims that, during EchoHawk's campaign for governor, she uncovered evidence that Strong was working to undermine EchoHawk's campaign. She brought this to the attention of EchoHawk, who found no merit in her accusations. Teevan claims that, following this event, Strong embarked on a campaign to manufacture discontent with her work among the attorneys within the Division and to create an unpleasant working environment. She attempted to resign in February of 1995, but she and Strong decided to try and work things out. She then claims that Strong continuously refused to provide her with a letter of reference and "blacklisted" her in the legal community in Boise. On April 21, 1995, Teevan resigned. At no point did she express her dissatisfaction with the working environment in the office, nor did she indicate that Strong had harassed her. After leaving her job with the AG's Office, she moved to Colorado and attempted to find work. When this proved unsuccessful, she returned to Idaho and filed for unemployment benefits.
On August 9, 1995, Teevan filed for unemployment benefits, claiming that she had resigned from her job with the AG's Office due to a pattern of harassment created by Strong. On August 30, 1995, the Department of Employment (Department) made an initial determination that Teevan was not eligible for unemployment benefits because she had not exhausted all reasonable alternatives Teevan protested this determination, and on September 27, 1995, a Department appeals examiner conducted a telephone hearing in which both Teevan and the AG's Office participated. On October 2, 1995, the appeals examiner ruled that Teevan was ineligible for benefits, finding that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause in connection with her employment.
prior to quitting and because she had not established that she resigned for good cause connected with her employment.
Teevan appealed this decision to the Commission and requested an "expedited hearing." The Commission viewed her request as a motion for a supplemental hearing, which it denied. On March 12, 1996, the Commission issued a Decision and Order adopting the appeals examiner's findings of fact and ruling that Teevan is ineligible for benefits because she made no attempt to address her problems through the employer's dispute resolution process and because she had not met her burden of establishing that she left her employment for good cause. The Commission concluded that she voluntarily quit for personal reasons.
On appeal, Teevan raised a number of issues and requested a variety of remedies not properly before the Industrial Commission or this Court on appeal. Accordingly, we will only address those issues properly before us, namely: (1) whether the Commission abused its discretion in denying Teevan's request for a supplemental hearing, (2) whether substantial and competent evidence in the record supports the Commission's decision finding Teevan ineligible for unemployment benefits, and (3) whether the AG's Office is entitled to attorney's fees under I.A.R. 41 and 11.1.
REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL HEARING
Idaho Code § 72-1368(g) provides in part:
The record before the commission shall consist of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner, unless it appears to the commission that the interests of justice require that the interested parties be permitted to present additional evidence. In that event, the commission may, in its sole discretion, conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence....
(emphasis added). This Court thus reviews the Commission's decisions regarding supplemental hearings under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Harris v. Beco Corp., 110 Idaho 28, 713 P.2d 1387 (1986). This statute does not require the Commission to consider additional evidence. Instead, it allows the Commission to receive new evidence that was unavailable at the time of the hearing before the appeals examiner: "This section is not carte blanche allowing ... [a party] the unbridled right to present a substantially new case, absent some showing as to why the evidence had been unavailable earlier." Rogers v. Trim House, 99 Idaho 746, 750, 588 P.2d 945, 949 (1979) (quoting White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 785 n. 1, 572 P.2d 887, 888 n. 1 (1977)).
COMMISSION'S FINDING OF INELIGIBILITY
In appeals from the Industrial Commission, we are limited to reviewing questions of law. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Welch v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 127 Idaho 361, 363, 900 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1995) (citing Hart v. Deary High Sch., 126 Idaho 550, 552, 887 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1994)). We will disturb the Commission's findings of fact only where they are not supported by substantial and competent, even if conflicting, evidence. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Welch, 127 Idaho at 363, 900 P.2d at 1374 (citing Hart, 126 Idaho at 552, 887 P.2d at 1059); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 278, 787 P.2d 263, 264 (1990) (citing Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 270, 707 P.2d 378, 381 (1985)). We have defined substantial and competent evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Welch, 127 Idaho at 365, 900 P.2d at 1376 (citing Laundry v. Franciscan Health Care Ctr., 125 Idaho 279, 282, 869 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1994)). The substantial and competent evidence standard is also equivalent to the "clearly erroneous" standard of I.R.C.P. 52(a). Hart, 126 Idaho at 552, 887 P.2d at 1059 (citing Mulch v. Mulch, 125 Idaho 93, 98, 867 P.2d 967, 972 (1994); Barber v. Honorof, 116 Idaho 767, 770, 780 P.2d 89, 92 (1989)). Although we will set aside the Commission's order if it is not supported by the record, we will not overrule the Commission's findings solely on the ground that we might have reached a different conclusion. Welch, 127 Idaho at 363, 900 P.2d at 1374 (citing Spruell, 117 Idaho at 279, 787 P.2d at 265).
The question of whether a claimant voluntarily quit her job for good cause in connection with employment is a question of fact, and we will uphold the Commission's determination of this issue if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Hart, 126 Idaho at 552, 887 P.2d at 1059 (citing Ullrich v. Thorpe Elec., 109 Idaho 820, 823, 712 P.2d 521, 524 (1985)). Although the Commission labeled the bulk of its Decision and Order "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW," the Commission actually made findings of fact with regard to whether Teevan voluntarily quit her employment for good cause in connection with her employment, and we will review these findings as such. The Commission's sole conclusion of law was the determination that, because Teevan voluntarily left her job without good cause, she is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
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