Teffer v. Twin Falls School Dist. No. 411

• Decision Date: 11 May 1981
• Docket Number: No. 13567,13567
• Citation: 631 P.2d 610,102 Idaho 439
• Parties: Russell D. TEFFER, Claimant-Appellant, v. TWIN FALLS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 411, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 610

631 P.2d 610

102 Idaho 439

Russell D. TEFFER, Claimant-Appellant, v. TWIN FALLS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 411, Employer and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 13567.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

May 11, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 17, 1981.

James T. Jones of Seeley, Jones & Fuller, Jerome, for claimant-appellant.

Hollis A. Mercer of firm of Paul Boyd, Boise, for respondents.

BAKES, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission denying appellant Russell Teffer's claim for worker's compensation benefits. The commission held that Teffer's accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, as required by I.C. § 72-102(14)(a).

Teffer began employment as a custodian at Twin Falls High School on March 6, 1978. His work shift began at 2:30 p. m. and ended at 11:00 or 11:30 p. m., depending upon the length of lunch break taken. On April 11, 1978, Teffer completed his work before his shift ended. He and other custodians began playing basketball soon after 10:00 p. m. About twenty or twenty-five minutes later, Teffer injured his knee. Prior to that time, Teffer had used the gym facilities on about two occasions.

At the time he was hired, Teffer's supervisor told him that he could use the gym or weight room "after work." The supervisor testified that to him "after work" meant after hours. Teffer testified that he understood it to mean after he had completed his assigned tasks. According to Teffer's supervisor and the district personnel director, school district policy did not permit employees to use gym facilities during working hours.

Whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact to be resolved by the Industrial Commission under the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404 (1946). We are statutorily and constitutionally compelled to defer to the Industrial Commission's findings of fact where supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Const., Art. 5, § 9; I.C. § 72-732. See, e. g., Sykes v. C. P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761, 605 P.2d 939 (1980).

In denying Teffer's claim, the Industrial Commission and its referee cited the following factors in support of its decision: recreational activities were not authorized by the employer during work hours; the right to use gym facilities was not used as inducement for employment or as compensation to the employees; the employer's policy of allowing employees to use the facilities was for the purpose of employee morale; and the employer received no other substantial benefit from such policy.

The above findings are amply supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission. Costs to respondent.

McFADDEN, DONALDSON and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.

BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.

I cannot agree with the majority that the Industrial Commission was correct in its conclusion that the accident which injured Teffer did not arise out of and in the course of Teffer's employment.

The referee found that "(n)o regular pattern of usage of the gym facilities after working hours by the claimant or other school district employees was established." This finding is contrary to the record. While Teffer personally had used the facilities only two or three times, the unrebutted testimony of Larry Baxter, the personnel director for the school district and a witness for the district, established that employees had permission to, and did in fact, use those facilities on a regular basis. Mr. Baxter testified that:

"(T)he facilities are available to employees prior to or after the normal working shifts. We have many of our certified staff that utilize our gymnasium complex, tracks, etc., prior to starting their work day or after they had completed their work day. This would apply, also, to our classified people that those facilities would be available to them, also, as it is to our certified people that they are available prior to or after their normal work period."

William Ruffell, the maintenance and grounds supervisor for the school where Teffer was employed (and also a witness for the district), testified:

"Q. O.K. To the best of your knowledge, Mr. Ruffell, what did you know about the use of the gym by the night custodians?

"A. I Wasn't aware that they were using it during the working hours, which I figure is eight hours. I knew that they were using it and, I can say, as a custodian when I was out there, I used it on my own time during my lunch hour and after work. As a matter of fact, when I was out there, they done it quite often."

Mr. Ruffell also testified that he gave Teffer specific permission to use the gym facilities after working hours at the time that Teffer was hired. In fact, Teffer passed over an admittedly easier job in order to undertake the custodial duties at the gym because of his desire to take advantage of the availability of the facilities. The district did not introduce any evidence that use of the facilities was sporadic or irregular; to do so would have been contrary to the testimony of the district's own employees. In short, the district never disputed the fact that gym facilities were available to employees after hours and during lunch, and that employees used those facilities, with the district's permission, on a regular basis.

Where the evidence is not in conflict and can produce only one conclusion, a finding that is contrary to that conclusion will be set aside on appeal. See, e. g., I.R.C.P. 52(a); State v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 615 P.2d 116 (1980). As stated in Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953):

"Where there is no dispute in the evidence and it is not reasonably susceptible of more than one inference, whether or not an accident to a workman arose out of and in the course of his employment is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact and may be reviewed by this court." Id. at 351, 252 P.2d at 1050.

Here there were no disputed facts aside from the question of when Teffer was allowed to use the gym facilities. The Court is too quick to defer to the findings of the referee, one of which is clearly erroneous.

This factual error becomes important in light of the referee's decision to treat the accident as if it had occurred after working hours. ¹ While this was admittedly a fiction, it did form the basis for the referee's, and consequently the Commission's decision.

In light of the fact that gym facilities were used by employees after work both regularly and with the approval of the district, and in light of the referee's election to treat the accident as if it had happened after work, only two questions need be answered. First, does the fact that Teffer had only personally used the gym two or three times make a difference in determining whether the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment? If the answer to that question is negative, then we must ask whether the regular use of such facilities after working hours brings those activities within the scope of the employer's workers compensation liability.

The first question is easily disposed of. The determination to be made in this case is what the scope of employment is, not what any particular employee has or has not done. In deciding whether recreational activities are within the scope of employment, courts universally look at the job and the employer's practices, not the individual activities of the claimant. As Larson puts it, the question is when the practice "becomes a fixture of the employment" and "whether the activity has in fact become an incident of the employment ...." 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 22.12 at 5-77 (1979) (emphasis added). See, e. g., Colson v. Steele, supra (practice of carrying guns was usual and customary). To say that an individual employee must engage in a recreational activity a certain number of times prior to being covered by worker's compensation would cause nothing but confusion. Apart from the obvious factual morass which this would create, inconsistent results would follow where there were two identical injuries but one employee had been employed and participated for some time, while the other was newly hired and was engaging in the activity for the first time. I know of no case which focuses the inquiry on how many times the claimant has participated in a given recreational activity, and I do not presume that the Court, in upholding the Commission, is relying on the fact that Teffer had personally engaged in this activity only two or three times.

I turn then to the question of whether the fact that employees regularly used the gymnasium facilities after work brings the activities within the scope of the employer's worker's compensation liability. Two general rules of law provide the...