Teller v. Apm Terminals Pacific, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 22 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 33663-4-II.,33663-4-II. |
| Citation | 142 P.3d 179,134 Wn. App. 696 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Gordon E. TELLER, Respondent, v. APM TERMINALS PACIFIC, LTD., Appellants, Maersk Line, Limited, a Washington corporation; Maersk, Inc., a Washington corporation; Maersk Equipment Service Company, a Washington corporation; Maersk Customs Services, Inc., a Washington corporation; Maersk Logistics USA, Inc., a Washington corporation; CSX Lines, a Washington company; Jane Doe and John Doe, wife and husband and the marital community composed thereof, Defendants. |
Philip Lempriere, Catharine M. Morisset, Keesal Young & Logan, Seattle, WA, for Petitioners.
William D. Hochberg, Grady B. Martin, Law Office of William D. Hochberg, Edmonds, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 APM Terminals Pacific, Ltd. (APM Terminals) appeals the superior court's reversal of the district court's order of summary judgment of dismissal of Gordon E. Teller's second amended complaint, which was about five months after the statute of limitations expired, and which named APM Terminals as a defendant for the first time. We reverse the superior court and affirm the district court's summary judgment dismissal of Teller's action and remand with directions to dismiss Teller's claims.1
¶ 2 In 1980, Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) hired Gordon Teller to work as a truck driver. In May 1985, Sea-Land moved its terminal operations from Seattle to a Port of Tacoma marine terminal operated by Maersk Pacific, Ltd. at 1675 Lincoln Avenue, Tacoma, Washington. The record indicates that Maersk Pacific, Ltd. has leased and operated the marine terminal since December 1999. Maersk Pacific, Ltd. changed its name to APM Terminals in May 2003.
¶ 3 When Sea-Land moved its marine terminal operations to the Port of Tacoma location, Teller continued his regular employment as a Sea-Land truck driver. The parties do not dispute that Teller worked continuously at the terminal beginning in 1985 through at least 2001.
¶ 4 In his original complaint, dated April 30, 2004,2 Teller alleged that he suffered injuries resulting from an automobile accident with "Jane Doe" on June 1, 2001, at the "Maersk Marine Yard, an affiliate of Maersk Line, Limited." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 107. The parties do not dispute that the Lincoln Avenue property is the relevant marine terminal. Teller further alleged that Maersk Line, Ltd. (Maersk Line) was Doe's employer and that Maersk Line "by and through its employee, Defendant Jane Doe," was also at fault for causing his injuries. Teller named Maersk Line and "JANE DOE AND JOHN DOE, wife and husband, and the marital community composed thereof," as defendants. CP at 106.
¶ 5 But Maersk Line conducted no marine terminal operations at the Port of Tacoma on June 1, 2001. Rather, Maersk Pacific, Ltd. leased and operated the marine terminal on the date of the accident. Because Maersk Line was not Jane Doe's employer, Teller voluntarily dismissed his claim against Maersk Line and filed an amended complaint on August 18, 2004, naming as defendants, Maersk Line, Maersk, Inc., Maersk Equipment Service Company, Inc., Maersk Custom Services, Inc., Maersk Logistics USA, Inc., CSX Lines, and Jane and John Doe, wife and husband, and the marital community composed thereof. Apparently, entering the search term "Maersk" on the Washington Secretary of State's website reveals that the five entities listed in Teller's amended complaint are registered corporations in Washington. But Maersk Pacific, Ltd. is not among them.
¶ 6 On October 8, 2004, all five Maersk defendants notified Teller's attorney that they were not proper defendants. They offered a telephone deposition that would disclose the identity of the proper defendant if Teller would voluntarily dismiss all Maersk defendants named in Teller's amended complaint. Teller's attorney requested that the deposition take place on October 19, 2004, and noted that "[t]he depositions certainly ought to allow us to ascertain whether Defendant Jane Doe was employed by any of Defendants Maersk, and proceed with dismissal of all but Defendant Jane Doe's correct employer." CP at 72. The Maersk defendants, through their attorney, reiterated their offer in a letter dated October 12, 2004. Teller's attorney responded on October 13, 2004, confirmed the deposition on October 19, and agreed to stipulate to dismissal of the Maersk defendants following the Maersk, Inc. deposition, provided none of the named Maersk defendants was shown to be the owner/operator of the Maersk Marine Yard at the time of the motor vehicle incident. In his brief, Teller acknowledges that his attorney agreed to the terms set forth in the Maersk defendants' attorney's October 12, 2004 letter.
¶ 7 On October 19, 2004, the deposition disclosed that APM Terminals, formerly known as Maersk Pacific, Ltd., leased and operated the relevant Port of Tacoma marine terminal. The following day, Teller filed a second amended complaint naming APM Terminals as an additional defendant. By stipulation and order of dismissal dated October 22, 2004, Teller voluntarily dismissed his action against the five Maersk entities listed in his amended complaint, leaving only APM Terminals and Jane and John Doe as defendants.3
¶ 8 In response to Teller's second amended complaint, APM Terminals moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the statute of limitations barred Teller's claim; and (2) Teller's second amended complaint did not relate back to his original timely complaint because Teller's delay in naming APM Terminals resulted from "inexcusable neglect." CP at 167-173.
¶ 9 The district court granted APM Terminals' motion and dismissed Teller's claim, finding that (1) Teller added APM Terminals to his lawsuit after the three-year statute of limitations expired on June 1, 2004; (2) Teller had actual knowledge that Maersk Pacific, Ltd. operated the terminal; (3) APM Terminals' lease and operation of the terminal was a matter of public record; (4) APM Terminals' lease and operation of the terminal was readily apparent; and (5) APM Terminals' lease and operation of the terminal was reasonably ascertainable. The district court concluded that Teller's delay in naming APM Terminals resulted from inexcusable neglect and therefore his second amended complaint did not relate back to the date of his original complaint.
¶ 10 Teller appealed the district court's ruling to the Pierce County Superior Court. The superior court reversed the district court, stating that "there was no inexcusable neglect by Plaintiff and estoppel exists." CP at 50-51.
¶ 11 APM Terminals appeals the superior court's ruling.
¶ 12 When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 139 Wash.2d 546, 551, 988 P.2d 961 (1999); Peterson v. Groves, 111 Wash.App. 306, 310, 44 P.3d 894 (2002). We will affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Groves, 111 Wash.App. at 310, 44 P.3d 894. All facts and reasonable inferences must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Groves, 111 Wash.App. at 310, 44 P.3d 894.
¶ 13 APM Terminals argues that the district court properly determined that Teller's second amended complaint did not relate back to the date of his original complaint and therefore, the three-year statute of limitations bars his action against APM Terminals. It argues that Teller's delay in naming APM Terminals as a defendant resulted from inexcusable neglect, not excusable misidentification. APM Terminals points out that its identity as the lessee and operator of the marine terminal was readily ascertainable through a number of simple investigations and that Teller had actual knowledge that it leased and operated the marine terminal.
¶ 14 Teller responds that his second amended complaint satisfies the requirements of CR 15(c),4 and that "inexcusable neglect" is not an absolute bar to relation back when an amended complaint's purpose is to substitute a correctly-identified defendant for a previously misidentified defendant and not to add a new defendant. Teller further argues that even if "inexcusable neglect" applies, any neglect was excusable because there are so many Maersk entities.
¶ 15 A determination of relation back under CR 15(c) rests within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest abuse of discretion. Foothills Dev. Co. v. Clark County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 46 Wash.App. 369, 374, 730 P.2d 1369 (1986). The burden of proof is on the party seeking to have an amendment relate back to the original action. Foothills, 46 Wash.App. at 375, 730 P.2d 1369. The moving party also has the burden of proving that any mistake in failing to amend in a timely fashion was excusable. Foothills, 46 Wash.App. at 375, 730 P.2d 1369.
¶ 16 Under CR 15(c), an amendment changing a party may relate back to the date of the original complaint if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading; (2) within the applicable statute of limitations, the party to be brought in by the amendment has received notice of the action such that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits; and (3) within the applicable statute of limitations, the party to be brought in knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the proper party. Nepstad v. Beasley, 77 Wash. App. 459, 464, 892 P.2d 110 (1995).
¶ 17 In addition to CR 15(c)'s requirements, an amended complaint...
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