Tellier-Wolfe v. Viacom Broadcasting Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 November 1987
• Docket Number: WHEC-TV,TELLIER-WOLFE and R
• Citation: 521 N.Y.S.2d 597,134 A.D.2d 860
• Parties: , 14 Media L. Rep. 2079 Vivienneichardson's Canal House Inn, Inc., Respondents, v. VIACOM BROADCASTING, INC., d/b/a"Channel 10", Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 597

521 N.Y.S.2d 597

134 A.D.2d 860, 14 Media L. Rep. 2079

Vivienne TELLIER-WOLFE and Richardson's Canal House Inn Inc., Respondents, v. VIACOM BROADCASTING, INC., d/b/a WHEC-TV "Channel 10", Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Fourth Department.

Nov. 10, 1987.

Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle by David Schraver, Rochester, for appellant.

Harris, Beach, Wilcox, Rubin & Levey by Lonny Dolin, Rochester, for respondents.

Before DILLON, P.J., and DENMAN, BALIO, LAWTON, and DAVIS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Special Term incorrectly treated defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7] ) as one for summary judgment (CPLR 3212). While CPLR 3211(c) permits the court to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, it may only do so by first giving adequate notice to the parties. Absent such notice, there can be no such conversion by the court (see, Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, "[t]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law, a motion for dismissal will fail" (Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, supra, p. 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17). Moreover, we must accept the facts alleged as true (Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 484, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154).

In a defamation action it is for the court in the first instance to determine whether the [spoken] words are susceptible to the particular defamatory meaning ascribed to them by plaintiff (see, Aronson v. Wiersma, 65 N.Y.2d 592, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 483 N.E.2d 1138; Pritchard v. Herald Co., 120 A.D.2d 956, 503 N.Y.S.2d 460; DiBernardo v. Tonawanda Pub. Corp., 117 A.D.2d 1009, 499 N.Y.S.2d 553). The words must be considered in the context of the entire statement or publication as a whole (Aronson v. Wiersma, supra, 65 N.Y.2d p. 594, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 483 N.E.2d 1138) for the court will not pick out and isolate particular phrases (James v. Gannett, 40 N.Y.2d 415, 419, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 353 N.E.2d 834, rearg. denied 40 N.Y.2d 990, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 359 N.E.2d 440), and the publication will be tested by its effect on the average reader (Aronson v. Wiersma, supra, 65 N.Y.2d p. 594, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 483 N.E.2d 1138). The language will be given a fair reading (James v. Gannett Co., supra, 40 N.Y.2d p. 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 353 N.E.2d 834) and the words will be given their ordinary meaning (DiBernado v. Tonawanda Pub. Co., supra, 117 A.D.2d p. 1010, 499 N.Y.S.2d 553). The court will not strain to give either a libelous or nonlibelous construction to them (Aronson v. Wiersma, supra, 65 N.Y.2d p. 594, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 483 N.E.2d 1138). Moreover, if the words expressed are not susceptible of a defamatory meaning, then "innuendo cannot enlarge upon their plain meaning to convey an import that was not expressed" (Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 134, 136, 182 N.Y.S.2d...