Tempel v. S. Carolina State Election Comm'n

• Decision Date: 20 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 27172.,27172.
• Citation: 400 S.C. 374,735 S.E.2d 453
• Parties: George TEMPEL, Appellant/Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION (Marci Andino, as Executive Director, and Chris Whitmire, as Director of Public Information and Training); South Carolina Republican Party (Matt Moore, as Executive Director, and Chad Connolly, as Chairman); Charleston County Republican Party (Lin Bennett, as Chairman); Charleston County Board of Elections and Voter Registration (Joseph L. Debney, as Director, and Dan Martin, as Chairman); Dorchester County Republican Party (Carroll S. Duncan, Chairman); Dorchester County Board of Elections (Joshua Dickard, as Executive Director); and Paul Thurmond, Defendants, of whom South Carolina Republican Party (Matt Moore, as Executive Director, and Chad Connolly, as Chairman); Charleston County Republican Party (Lin Bennett, as Chairman); Charleston County Board of Elections and Voter Registration (Joseph L. Debney, as Director, and Dan Martin, as Chairman); Dorchester County Republican Party (Carroll S. Duncan, Chairman) are Respondents, and South Carolina State Election Commission (Marci Andino, as Executive Director, and Chris Whitmire, as Director of Public Information and Training), and Paul Thurmond, are Respondents/Appellants. Appellate Case No.2012–212729.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

400 S.C. 374

735 S.E.2d 453

George TEMPEL, Appellant/Respondent,

v.SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION (Marci Andino, as Executive Director, and Chris Whitmire, as Director of Public Information and Training); South Carolina Republican Party (Matt Moore, as Executive Director, and Chad Connolly, as Chairman); Charleston County Republican Party (Lin Bennett, as Chairman); Charleston County Board of Elections and Voter Registration (Joseph L. Debney, as Director, and Dan Martin, as Chairman); Dorchester County Republican Party (Carroll S. Duncan, Chairman); Dorchester County Board of Elections (Joshua Dickard, as Executive Director); and Paul Thurmond, Defendants,of whom South Carolina Republican Party (Matt Moore, as Executive Director, and Chad Connolly, as Chairman); Charleston County Republican Party (Lin Bennett, as Chairman); Charleston County Board of Elections and Voter Registration (Joseph L. Debney, as Director, and Dan Martin, as Chairman); Dorchester County Republican Party (Carroll S. Duncan, Chairman) are Respondents,andSouth Carolina State Election Commission (Marci Andino, as Executive Director, and Chris Whitmire, as Director of Public Information and Training), and Paul Thurmond, are Respondents/Appellants.

Appellate Case No.2012–212729.

No. 27172.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted Sept. 17, 2012.

Decided Sept. 20, 2012.

James Emerson Smith, Jr., of Columbia, for Appellant/Respondent.

Mary Elizabeth Crum, Ariail Burnside Kirk, and Amber B. Martella, all of McNair Law Firm, of Columbia, for Respondent/Appellant South Carolina State Election Commission; Michael A. Timbes and Matthew Evert Yelverton, both of Thurmond Kirchner Timbes & Yelverton, of Charleston, and Tanya Amber Gee, of Nexsen Pruet, of Columbia, for Respondent/Appellant Paul Thurmond; Samuel W. Howell, IV, of Howell Linkous & Nettles, of Charleston, for Respondent Charleston County Board of Elections and Voter Registration; and J. Robert Bolchoz, of Columbia and Karl Smith Bowers, Jr., and Matthew Todd Carroll, both of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, of Columbia, for Respondent South Carolina Republican Party.

Chief Justice TOAL.

Appellant/Respondent and Respondents/Appellants appeal an order of the circuit court concerning the candidacy of Respondent/Appellant Paul Thurmond for Senate District 41. The circuit court found Thurmond was not exempt from the filing requirement of section 8–13–1356(B) of the South Carolina Code. S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1356(B) (Supp.2011). Thus, Thurmond was disqualified as the Republican nominee for the District 41 seat. The judge, therefore, ordered the Republican Party to conduct a special primary election pursuant to section 7–11–55. S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–55 (Supp.2011). We affirm the order of the circuit court.

FACTS

On March 29, 2012, Thurmond electronically filed a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI). Thirty minutes later, he filed his Statement of Intention of Candidacy (SIC) for the Republican Party primary for Senate District 41. However, he did not file a paper copy of his SEI along with his SIC as required by section 8–13–1356(B), and interpreted by this Court in Anderson v. South Carolina Election Commission, 397 S.C. 551, 725 S.E.2d 704 (2012), and Florence County Democratic Party v. Florence County Republican Party, 398 S.C. 124, 727 S.E.2d 418 (2012). All of the other Republican contenders for the Senate District 41 seat were decertified for failing to comply with section 8–13–1356(B). However, Thurmond's name remained on the ballot, and he received over 1,700 votes. He was subsequently declared the Republican candidate for the seat.

Thurmond is a part-time prosecutor for the City of North Charleston. Thurmond admits he did not file his SEI simultaneously with his SIC for Senate Seat 41; he has never filed an SEI as a municipal prosecutor; and the SEI, which he filed electronically on March 28, 2012, was not filed in connection with his position as a municipal prosecutor.

I. EXEMPTION

Section 8–13–1356(B) requires a non-exempt candidate to file an SEI for the preceding calendar year at the same time and with the same official with whom the candidate files an SIC. Anderson v. S.C. Election Comm'n, 397 S.C. 551, 558, 725 S.E.2d 704, 707–08 (2012). This requirement does not apply to “a public official who has a current disclosure statement on file with the appropriate supervisory office pursuant to Sections 8–13–1110 or 8–13–1140.” S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1356(A) (Supp.2011). Public officials are required, under section 8–13–1110(B), to file an SEI with the appropriate supervisory office prior to taking office. Section 8–13–1140 requires annual updates to SEIs no later than April 15th. S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1140 (Supp.2011). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011). The statutory language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute. Id. This Court will not construe a statute in a way which leads to an absurd result or renders it meaningless. See Lancaster Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Defense, 380 S.C. 219, 222, 670 S.E.2d 371, 373 (2008) (“In construing a statute, this Court will reject an interpretation which leads to an absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”).

Assuming, without deciding, that a part-time municipal prosecutor is a public official who is required to file an SEI, we hold Thurmond was not exempt from the simultaneous filing requirement of section 8–13–1356(B). The logical construction of section 8–13–1356(A) requires the SEI on file to be the one filed by the public official for the office currently held by that official. Construing section 8–131356(A) as Thurmond requests would reward an official for not complying with the requirement of section 8–13–1110 of filing an SEI prior to taking office while also allowing the official to circumvent the simultaneous filing requirement of section 8–13–1356(B). This construction does not serve the legislative intent behind these statutes.

Thurmond admits his SEI was not filed in relation to his position as a municipal prosecutor. Therefore, his SEI was not a current SEI of a public official on file under section 8–13–1110, and he is not exempt under section 8–13–1356(A) from the requirement of filing his SEI along with his SIC.

II. SPECIAL PRIMARY

Appellant/Respondent George Tempel and Respondent/Appellant the South Carolina State Election Commission (the State Commission) contend the circuit court erred in ordering a special primary election under section 7–11–55 of the South Carolina Code. We disagree.

Section 7–11–55 provides, “If a party nominee dies, becomes disqualified after his nomination, or resigns his candidacy for a legitimate nonpolitical reason ... and was selected through a party primary election, the vacancy must be filled in a special primary election.” S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–55 (Supp.2011). Tempel and the State Commission argue the circuit court erroneously ordered a special primary election because Thurmond was not “disqualified.” Tempel further contends section 7–11–55 is inapplicable because Thurmond was not selected by party primary. In addition, the State Commission argues Thurmond was not the “party nominee” because he was improperly certified.

a. Selection through Party Primary

Pursuant to section 7–11–10, nominations for candidates may be made by political party primary, political party convention, or by petition. S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–10 (Supp.2011). Although Thurmond may have been declared the Republican candidate under sections 7–11–90 and 7–17–620 because he was unopposed in the primary election, this does not alter the fact that the Republican Party used a primary election as the method for selecting its candidate for the Senate District 41 seat. SeeS.C.Code Ann. §§ 7–11–90 and 7–17–620 (1976). Accordingly, Thurmond was selected through a party primary election.

b. Party Nominee

Thurmond was certified as the party nominee for Senate Seat 41. The fact that the Republican Party in good faith, albeit erroneously, believed Thurmond was exempt from the filing requirement of section 8–13–1356(B) does not negate his status as the party nominee. We, therefore, reject the State Commission's argument that section 7–11–55 is inapplicable because Thurmond was not the party nominee.

c. Disqualified After Nomination

The central issue in the instant case is the interpretation of the term “disqualified” as used in section 7–11–55. In South Carolina Green Party v. South Carolina State Election Commission, 612 F.3d 752 (4th Cir.2010), the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief against South Carolina's application of various election law statutes. In that case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the term “disqualified” was not defined in the statute. However, the court relied on the statutory construction rules of this Court in interpreting the statute. Id. at 757–58 (“Because South Carolina law does not define the term ‘disqualified’ for purposes of this statute, we rely on the statutory construction rules applied by South Carolina's highest court in the interpretation of statutes.” (citing in rE DNA eX posT facTO issues, 561 F.3d 294, 300 (4tH cir.2009))).

Because this Court held that words in a statute must be construed in context, and the meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with them in the statute, the Fourth Circuit concluded the plain language of the provision “addresse[d] the circumstances in which a ‘party nominee’ could be ‘disqualified’ from representing a ‘party’ after a ‘nomination.’ ” Id. at 758 (citing Hill v. York Cnty. Natural Gas Auth., 384 S.C. 483, 682 S.E.2d 809, 811–12 (2009) (“The language must also be read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general...