Temple v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 31 October 2019
• Docket Number: C/A No.: 8:18-03258-JFA-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Dennis Maurice Temple, Petitioner, v. Warden Scott Lewis, Respondent.

Dennis Maurice Temple, Petitioner, v. Warden Scott Lewis, Respondent.

C/A No.: 8:18-03258-JFA-JDA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

October 31, 2019

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Dennis Maurice Temple ("Petitioner"), is currently incarcerated in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to an order of commitment of the Oconee County Clerk of Court. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). On April 1, 2019, Warden Scott Lewis ("Respondent") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with a return to the Petition and memorandum of law in support. (ECF Nos. 24 & 25). On April 2, 2019, the court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond via an order issued pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975). (ECF No. 26). Petitioner filed a response on April 25, 2019, to which Respondent filed a reply on May 2, 2019. (ECF Nos. 31 & 33). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge.

The Magistrate Judge assigned to this action¹ prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation ("Report") and opines that this court should grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss the petition because (1) Grounds One and Two of the petition fail to state a claim for relief; and (2) Ground Three is not a cognizable issue in a federal habeas action. (ECF No. 34). The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.

The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate, this court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the court must only review those portions of theReport to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).

"An objection is specific if it 'enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'" Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate's Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must "direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

"Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object." Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court reviews portions "not objected to—including those portions to which only 'general and conclusory' objections have been made—for clear error." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47).

Petitioner was advised of his right to object to the Report, which was entered on the docket on June 20, 2019. (ECF No. 34). Petitioner filed objections to the Report on July 19, 2019, and later filed amended objections on August 26, 2019 (together the"Objections"). (ECF Nos. 41 & 48). Respondent replied to the original objections on July 24, 2019, and again to the amended objections on September 9, 2019. (ECF Nos. 43 & 50). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). All inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but he "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner's habeas petition raises the following three issues:

GROUND ONE: The trial judge erred by what was in effect coercing appellant to appear pro se at trial because although appellant waived his right to counsel prior to trial, ultimately, he rescinded that waiver after the jury was selected and re-asserted his right to counsel by requesting the representation of appointed counsel for his trial.

GROUND TWO: The PCR court erred in granting summary judgment to the state on the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether probable cause was established at a pre-trial hearing and where the transcript from that hearing was not included in the record on appeal.

GROUND THREE: Did the General Sessions Court have jurisdiction to hear appellant's criminal case when the magistrate court never established it had probable cause to detain appellant on the arrest warrants.

(ECF No. 1-1).

Initially, the Magistrate Judge stated that Ground Three is not a cognizable claim under § 2254 because federal habeas actions provide for review of solely federal law claims and subject matter jurisdiction of a state court is a state law issue not cognizable here. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67068 (1991); Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1991); Wills v. Egeler, 532 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that a "[d]etermination of whether a state court is vested with jurisdiction under state law is a function of the state courts, not the federal judiciary."). Petitioner's objections on this issue fail to address this court's inability to adjudicate this claim as it is a state law claim and merely rehash his original arguments. A specific objection to the Magistrate's Report requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the Complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). Accordingly, there is no error in the Report.

Even if this claim was cognizable, Petitioner's arguments would still fail because any jurisdictional challenge based on an alleged lack of probable cause was cured by the indictment returned by the grand jury in Petitioner's original criminal action. Thompson v. State, 251 S.C. 593, 596, 164 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1968).

Additionally, Petitioner seems to assert within his Objections that he was subject to an unlawful search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 48 p. 29-37). These assertions have no bearing on the Magistrate Judge's above conclusion and therefore fail to identify any error in the Report.

As to Grounds One and Two, the Magistrate Judge opines that:

Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the underlying state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before the court, id. § 2254(d)(2).

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[A] decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent unless applicable Supreme Court precedent exists; without applicable Supreme Court precedent, there is no habeas relief for petitioners. Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 716 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Lockhart v. Chandler, 446 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 2006)); see Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2008).

(ECF No. 34 p. 17-18).

Specifically, with regards to Ground One, the Report states:

Petitioner concedes that he waived his right to counsel before trial; however, Petitioner contends that he subsequently rescinded that waiver and re-asserted his right to counsel after the jury had been selected. [Doc. 1-1 at 5-12.] The United States Supreme Court "has never explicitly addressed a criminal defendant's ability to reassert his right to counsel once he has validly waived it." Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 62 (2013) (internalquotation marks omitted). Because the Supreme

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