Teneyck v. Teneyck
| Docket Number | 02-22-00437-CV |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2023 |
| Parties | Kelly M. Teneyck, Appellant v. Ronald W. Teneyck, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 393rd District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 20-10161-393
Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Elizabeth Kerr Justice In this appeal from the trial court's final divorce decree appellant Kelly M. Teneyck (Kelly) asserts five issues. In three issues, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the parties to equally share possession of their children, awarding $1.3 million in separate property to appellee Ron W. Teneyck (Ron), and finding that Kelly waived her reimbursement claim. In two issues, she contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to file certain findings of fact and conclusions of law. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its possession order and characterization of Ron's separate property, and it did not find that Kelly waived her reimbursement claim. We further conclude that any error in the trial court's failure to file additional findings of fact and conclusions of law was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the final divorce decree.
Kelly and Ron met and began living together in 2012. Two years later, their first child, B.M.T., was born. The family moved to Texas and purchased a house in The Colony a year later. The couple married on May 23, 2016, and their second child, B.O.T., was born in 2017.
Ron filed a petition for divorce in December 2020 in which he also sought joint managing conservatorship of the children and a property division. Kelly answered and filed a counterpetition for divorce.
The trial court held a bench trial at which Kelly and Ron testified. Although Kelly previously had representation, she was pro se at trial. After closing arguments, the trial court announced its ruling that the parties were divorced and that it was ordering a joint managing conservatorship with Kelly's having the right to designate the children's residence and a "50/50" possession schedule, instead of a standard possession order. Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.3101-3171 (standard possession), with id. § 153.133 (). The trial court found that the marital residence, Ron's stock shares, and life-insurance policies were Ron's separate property. The trial court noted that Ron had stipulated to a community property reimbursement for funds spent on the residential mortgage, although Kelly did not plead it, and the trial court awarded a $63,728.81 reimbursement. The trial court issued a written final divorce decree reflecting these rulings.
Kelly timely sought findings of fact and conclusions of law under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296. When the trial court did not file findings and conclusions, Kelly filed a timely notice of past due findings and conclusions. The trial court filed findings and conclusions four days later, and Kelly filed a timely request for additional and amended findings and conclusions under Rule 298. The trial court filed supplemental findings and conclusions, and this appeal followed.
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making decisions on custody, control, possession, and visitation, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); C.W. v. B.W., No. 02-19-00270-CV, 2020 WL 4517325, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). We also review a trial court's alleged property characterization error for an abuse of discretion. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles-that is, if its act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2004). An appellate court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because the appellate court would have ruled differently in the same circumstances. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995); see also Low, 221 S.W.3d at 620.
A trial court also abuses its discretion by ruling without supporting evidence. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. 2012). But it does not abuse its discretion if it decides based on conflicting evidence, so long as some substantive and probative evidence supports its decision. Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009); Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh'g).
In family-law cases, the traditional sufficiency standards of review overlap with the abuse-of-discretion standard of review; therefore, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in our abuse-of-discretion assessment. Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the decision, we must determine (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court erred when it applied that discretion. Id.
In determining the first question, we apply the same standards of review to a trial court's findings of fact that we apply to a jury's answers to questions in the court's charge. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). Evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining legal sufficiency, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge "every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence" in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).
When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the evidence in the record pertinent to that finding, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh'g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).
When the burden of proof at trial is by clear and convincing evidence, as it is for establishing that property is separate from the community, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003(b), we apply a higher standard of legal and factual sufficiency review. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 611. "Clear and convincing evidence" is defined as that "measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 611.
In her third issue,[1] Kelly contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's 50/50 possession order. She also contends that the trial court's possession order is "inherently arbitrary" because it was issued "without the guidance of the required child custody report."
"Suits affecting the parent-child relationship are intensely fact driven, which is why courts have developed best-interest tests that consider and balance numerous factors." Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002). "The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002. "The standard possession order is presumably in the child's best interest, but that presumption is rebuttable." In re E.D., No. 02-20-00208-CV, 2022 WL 60781, at *12 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.252).
The policy is "to encourage frequent contact between a child and each parent for periods of possession that optimize the development of a close and continuing relationship between each parent and child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.251(b). A trial court has discretion to determine the best interest of the child when establishing terms and conditions of conservatorship. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021). "A trial court is 'in the best position to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, and therefore is given great latitude in determining a child's best interests.'" In re E.S., No. 02-20-00407-CV, 2021 WL 2149627, at *7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 27, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Guardianship of C.E.M.-K., 341 S.W.3d 68, 80 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied)). A 50/50 possession schedule may be in a child's best interest. See, e.g., In re S.H., No. 02-15-00360-CV 2017 WL 2871682, at *8 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[W]e cannot say that the...
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