Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Admin., 71-1676.

• Citation: 464 F.2d 657
• Decision Date: 04 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-1676.,71-1676.
• Parties: TENNESSEAN NEWSPAPERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

464 F.2d 657 (1972)

TENNESSEAN NEWSPAPERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 71-1676.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

May 4, 1972.

Alfred H. Knight, III, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellant; William R. Willis, Jr., Willis, Knight & Barr, Nashville, Tenn., on brief.

Leonard Schaitman, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellees; L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Morton Hollander, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Charles H. Anderson, U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., on brief.

Before EDWARDS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and WILSON,^* Chief District Judge.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

This case presents the first instance in which this court has had to deal with the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S. C. § 552 (1970).

The Committee Report in the House of Representatives sheds this light on the old act and on the background of the legislation we construe:

"Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 1002), though titled `Public Information\' and clearly intended for that purpose, has been used as an authority for withholding, rather than disclosing, information. Such a 180° turn was easy to accomplish given the broad language of 5 U.S.C. 1002." H.R.Rep.No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 10 (1966), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1966, pp. 2418, 2421. (Emphasis added.)

It also states the Congressional purpose for the new act:

A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies. A danger signal to our democratic society in the United States is the fact that such a political truism needs repeating. And repeated it is, in textbooks and classrooms, in newspapers and broadcasts.

The repetition is necessary because the ideas of our democratic society have outpaced the machinery which makes that society work. The needs of the electorate have outpaced the laws which guarantee public access to the facts in Government. In the time it takes for one generation to grow up and prepare to join the councils of Government — from 1946 to 1966 — the law which was designed to provide public information about Government activities has become the Government\'s major shield of secrecy.

S. 1160 will correct this situation. It provides the necessary machinery to assure the availability of Government information necessary to an informed electorate. (Emphasis added.)

The facts which give rise to this litigation are not complicated. The case arises out of the interest the Nashville Tennessean took in publicizing the problems of a blind man, one Hugh James, who bought a house in Nashville under a financing scheme which involved FHA insurance of the mortgage. The FHA had valued the house through an appraisal at $10,850. Subsequently James discovered various defects in the house which made such an evaluation dubious. Independent appraisals appraised the value at $3,750 to $4,500. James tried to get a copy of the original appraisal and FHA refused to release it. Thereupon the Nashville Tennessean ran a series of articles which criticized the FHA and various of its officials for their handling of the case.

Ultimately FHA gave James an illegible copy of the appraisal. The Tennessean then filed suit under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act cited above in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. During the hearing before the District Judge, the FHA changed its position somewhat. It made legible copies of the appraisal available, but the name of the appraiser was deleted.

At the conclusion of the hearing the District Judge entered an order requiring FHA to make the appraisal available under the terms of the Act, but holding on equitable grounds that FHA did not need to make the name of the appraiser available. The District Judge did not state what the equitable grounds were. Of course, the District Judge may have been motivated by a laudable desire to protect the privacy of a relatively small employee against the publicity wrath of a great newspaper. Unfortunately, however, this is by no means the only issue which could be hypothesized.

Whether the actual issue in this case may ultimately prove to be great or small, this appeal involves an interpretation of a new federal statute which has far reaching impact upon the future of government and public information about government.

Each party to this litigation finds something in the statute to rely on. The Tennessean relies upon § 552(c) as mandating disclosure:

"(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section. This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress." 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).

FHA relies upon § 552(a)(3) as conveying de novo hearing rights upon the District Court and, hence, allowing it to employ equitable considerations in its grant or denial of disclosure:

(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).

Of the nine exceptions to the statutory disclosure requirement, the most important for purposes of this appeal appears to be Title 5, § 552(b)(5), which in applicable part says as follows:

"(b) This section does not apply to matters that are —

* * * * * *

"(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).

The Tennessean also relies upon the following decided cases: NLRB v. Getman, 404 U.S. 1204, 92 S.Ct. 7, 30 L.Ed. 2d 8 (1971); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); General Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). The FHA relies upon the following decided cases for a contrary result: International Paper Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827, 92 S.Ct. 61, 30 L.Ed.2d 56 (1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1970); Ackerly v. Ley, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 420 F.2d 1336 (1969).

None of these, except Benson, appears to be directly in point. There the Ninth Circuit did hold that a General Services Administration appraisal had to be disclosed.

To determine if the requirements of the fifth exemption are met, the court must inquire whether the records sought are inter- or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available to any party in any litigation in which the agency having the records might be involved. And the standards for decision are the discovery practices, as regulated by the courts. "The law" is to determine what is available. Cf. Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1966).

We hold that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) is sufficiently broad to entitle discovery of the records in dispute, especially insofar as they are factual material rather than documents which comprise the administrative reasoning process of government. General Services Administration v. Benson, supra, 415 F.2d at 880.

We agree with the Ninth Circuit's result in the Benson case and with the rationale we have just quoted from it.¹

In the fifth exception (quoted above) Congress undertook to protect the decision making processes of government agencies. Government policy makers (at whatever level) when assigned to mutual consultation and full debate on a decision should not be limited in thought or expression to just those preliminary views which they were prepared to defend in the public prints. Many a quick comment — which in itself reveals lack of full consideration and thought — nonetheless may shed continuing and useful illumination on the problem at hand. No one needs to remind the courts of the value of advocacy, confrontation and debate. These are the recognized tools of the judicial fact finding process and they are frequently involved in judicial decision making too. We would not fail to protect their availability to another branch of government.

The document in dispute here, however, has no such characteristic. It is (at least presumably) the finished work product of a professional.

An appraisal is defined as "a valuation of property by the estimate of an authorized person." Webster's New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1961).

The appraisal in this case is an analysis of facts involving a professional opinion. The name of the author is a relevant and necessary part of that opinion. One of the reasons for the First Amendment, as well as the Freedom of Information Act, is to promote honesty of government by seeing to it that public business functions under the hard light of full public scrutiny. We imply nothing in relation to the facts of this case when we note that problems among personnel of the exact category here involved are not unknown. The very name of an appraiser could be sufficient to establish a motivation sufficient to trigger an investigation. And, in any event, an old adage gained modern vitality when President Truman remarked, "If you can't stand the heat, stay out of the...