Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Kelly

• Decision Date: 18 November 1909
• Citation: 163 Ala. 348,50 So. 1008
• Parties: TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. v. KELLY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

50 So. 1008

163 Ala. 348

TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. v. KELLY.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 18, 1909

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; C. C. Nesmith, Judge.

Action by Henry C. Kelly against the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Percy Benners & Burr, for appellant.

Bowman Harsh & Beddow, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

Waggoner & Hannon, a partnership, were operating a sawmill on the lands of the defendant company, a corporation, which was engaged in the business of mining coal and iron ore operating furnaces, etc. Waggoner & Hannon were sawing the timber of the defendant, for the defendant, for which they were paid so much per thousand. Waggoner & Hannon employed and discharged their own men; but there was some kind of an agreement between them and the defendant, the exact terms of which are not made very certain, to the effect that they would not employ nor retain employés who were not acceptable to the defendant company. It appears that there was some trouble existing, and more brewing, between the union and the nonunion laborers, and that the defendant had declined to employ union men, and had notified Waggoner & Hannon that they should not employ, nor retain in their employment, union laborers, and that Waggoner & Hannon had failed to discharge some union laborers, in consequence of which the agents of the defendant, alleged to have been acting within the line and scope of their authority, wrote certain letters to Waggoner & Hannon, demanding the discharge of the union laborers, and in one letter named certain of such employés, charging that they were union laborers and that they "had run some of the defendant's nonunion laborers out of their houses, and otherwise demoralized the organization of the coal mines department, to such an extent that no one was at work." The plaintiff was named as one of the union men causing the disturbance. In consequence of these letters, or of other causes, which was one of the disputed issues, Waggoner & Hannon terminated their contract with defendant, and discharged all of their employés, including plaintiff, having no further need for them after they ceased to operate the mill. Plaintiff was employed in building and repairing houses, and as a carpenter, by Waggoner & Hannon. He was employed by the job, and not for any stated time or fixed salary. Plaintiff denied being a member of the union, or having taken part in the disturbance alluded to in the letters; and there was no proof to the contrary.

Plaintiff sued the defendant, claiming damages for its wrongful and malicious procurement of his discharge, and its libeling him in the publication of the letters above referred to. The complaint contained seven counts. The first, fifth, sixth, and seventh were for defendant's wrongfully procuring his discharge, and the others were for libel, based solely upon the letters which, in whole or in part, were set out in the counts. There were no special pleas of justification or of privileged publication. The case was tried upon the general issue, and no questions are raised as to the sufficiency of the counts. The general charge was given in favor of the defendant as to the fourth count, and the trial resulted in verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for $1,000.

If the defendant, without any lawful right, or by threats made not in the exercise of a lawful right, broke up the contractual relations existing between plaintiff and his employers, although such relations could have been terminated at the pleasure of his employers, with resultant damage to plaintiff, the defendant would be liable to him for the damages thus occasioned. On the other hand, if the defendant only acted or threatened to act as it had a right to act or threaten, and only did or threatened to do that which it had a lawful right to do, and this did not involve a superior or paramount right of the plaintiff, this would give the plaintiff no right of action, though it may have caused him injury, and though defendant may have been actuated by a desire and intention to cause him injury. If one does an act which is legal in itself and violates no right of another, the fact that this rightful act is done from bad motives or with bad intent toward the person so injured thereby does not give the latter a right of action against the former. Therefore, if the defendant's acts complained of in this case were legal in themselves, and violated no superior right of the plaintiff, they were not actionable.

One of the rights incident to many, if not to all, contracts is to be protected from malicious interference. A contract between master and servant is one of these contracts, though the contract of employment be at will, and though the master be free from liability in discharging the servant; yet if the discharge were wrongfully or maliciously procured by a third party, such third party is liable to the servant, and the motive with which the discharge was procured may, in some cases, determine the liability vel non, as well as go to the amount of damages. But if such third party, maliciously and without just cause, induce the master to discharge the servant, whether the inducement be false libels and slanders, or successful persuasion, it is nevertheless an actionable tort. But if the third party had a perfect legal right to do what he did, which resulted in the discharge of the servant, it is not an actionable wrong, though he were actuated to do this legal and rightful act by a malicious motive against the servant.

It is a violation of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by the law, if there be no sufficient justification or excuse for so doing. Losses thus willfully caused by another, from motives of malice, to one who seeks to exercise and enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own industry, labor, or skill, will sustain an action. Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 35 A. 53, 33 L. R A. 225, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 175, 38 A. 96, 60 Am. St. Rep. 252; Porter v. Mack, 50 W.Va. 584, 40 S.E. 459; Baker v. M. P. L. Ins. Co., 64 S.W. 913, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1174, 55 L. R. A. 271; Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125, 52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289; Curran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297, 37 L. R. A. 802, 57 Am. Rep. 496; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924, 54 N.E. 524, 43 L. R. A. 797, 802, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203; London Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526, 99 Am. St. Rep. 185. It follows from these authorities that, if the defendant wrongfully and maliciously procured the discharge of plaintiff, it is liable to him for the damages proximately resulting from that discharge,...