Teramar Corp. v. Rodier Corp.
Decision Date | 20 April 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 51934,51934 |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Parties | TERAMAR CORPORATION; Stakich, Appellant, v. RODIER CORPORATION, Appellee. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Arbitration is a matter of contract and, in spite of the strong policy in its favor, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute which he has not agreed to submit to arbitration.
2. An arbitration clause in a related document is, unless otherwise agreed to, not applicable to a guaranty agreement.
3. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction of an arbitration board or panel may be raised at any stage in the proceedings, although not previously asserted, including raising the issue for the first time on appeal. (R.C. 2711.13, applied.)
Marshman, Snyder & Corrigan and William F. Snyder, Cleveland, for appellant.
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., and Todd M. Raskin, Solon, for appellee.
This appeal is taken from an order of the trial court confirming an arbitration award.
This action was filed on February 12, 1985, by Teramar Corporation to enjoin a scheduled arbitration hearing on a claim by Rodier Corporation and the President of Teramar Corporation, Theresa Stakich. The trial court denied injunction relief and the matter went to arbitration.
Stakich appeared at the arbitration hearing. She challenged the panel's jurisdiction as to her. On August 5, 1985, the panel overruled the jurisdictional challenge and entered an award in favor of Rodier Corporation ("Rodier") against Teramar Corporation ("Teramar") and Stakich. Rodier then applied to the trial court for confirmation of the award on November 20, 1985. Stakich filed an objection to the application contending that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to confirm an award against her. On March 26, 1986, the trial court confirmed the arbitration award against both Teramar and Stakich. Stakich appeals assigning the following error for our review:
"The lower court erred in purporting to confirm an arbitration award that was entered against Theresa Stakich without jurisdiction."
The dispute herein arose out of a franchise agreement entered into by Teramar. The agreement was entered into between Teramar and Promafil Corporation ("Promafil"). The agreement authorized Teramar to sell Rodier merchandise which Promafil was licensed to distribute. The agreement was signed on August 24, 1978, by Theresa Stakich, President of Teramar. The agreement included a provision for arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof."
The same date Theresa Stakich signed another document entitled "Guaranty" wherein she agreed to the following pertinent provisions:
In October 1981, Promafil assigned its interests in the franchise agreement to Rodier Corporation. Teramar fell into default of the payments it was required to make under the franchise agreement. Rodier terminated the franchise and filed a demand for arbitration.
Teramar filed a suit to enjoin the arbitration primarily on the basis that Rodier was not a party to the original agreement containing the arbitration provision. The trial court denied injunctive relief and referred the matter to arbitration. Both documents were placed before the arbitration panel. Stakich objected, contending that she had never agreed to the arbitration provision. The panel held that it had jurisdiction over both Teramar and Stakich and entered an award against both jointly and severally. Stakich appeals.
The appellant's single assignment asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award absent a contract clause between the parties providing for arbitration. Only that portion of the award applicable to Stakich is challenged here. She argues that her personal guaranty contained no provision authorizing arbitration, thus the trial court erred in confirming the award as to her. Her assignment has merit; therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision as to her.
R.C. 2711.01 provides that a provision in a written contract to settle, by arbitration, a controversy arising out of the contract shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable. The necessity of a written arbitration clause has been deemed by this court as jurisdictional. See Davis v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn. (Dec. 20, 1984), Cuyahoga App. No. 48373, unreported. It is the policy of the law to favor and encourage arbitration. Brennan v. Brennan (1955), 164 Ohio St. 29, 57 O.O. 71, 128 N.E.2d 89, paragraph one of the syllabus; Campbell v. Automatic Die & Products Co. (1954), 162 Ohio St. 321, 329, 55 O.O. 195, 198, 123 N.E.2d 401, 405. Nonetheless, arbitration is a matter of contract and, in spite of the strong policy in its favor, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate any dispute which he has not agreed to submit. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Ironall Factories Co. (C.A. 6, 1967), 386 F.2d 586, 590; Retail Clerks Internatl. Assn. v....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Stepp v. Ncr Corp.
...a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute which he has not agreed to submit [to arbitration]." Teramar Corp. v. Rodier Corp. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 39, 40, 531 N.E.2d 721. Upon review, the Court finds that, taking all the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the Plaint......
-
West v. Household Life Ins. Co.
...be compelled to arbitrate a dispute which he has not agreed to submit to arbitration.'" Id., quoting Teramar Corp. v. Rodier Corp. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 39, 41, 531 N.E.2d 721. Thus, the principle favoring arbitration does not apply when there is a question as to whether the parties before......
-
Benjamin v. Pipoly
...contract, they could not be required to submit their claims to arbitration pursuant thereto. {¶ 33} In Teramar Corp. v. Rodier Corp. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 39, 531 N.E.2d 721, the trial court ordered a surety to submit to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause contained not in the gu......
-
Morris v. Morris
...to arbitration.’ ” Benjamin v. Pipoly, 155 Ohio App.3d 171, 2003–Ohio–5666, 800 N.E.2d 50, ¶ 33, quoting Teramar Corp. v. Rodier Corp. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 39, 531 N.E.2d 721, paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, before a court can order litigants to arbitrate, the court must determine no......