Termination of Employment of Pratt, In re

• Decision Date: 31 December 1974
• Docket Number: Nos. 74-589 and 74-730,s. 74-589 and 74-730
• Citation: 40 Ohio St.2d 107,321 N.E.2d 603,69 O.O.2d 512
• Parties: , 69 O.O.2d 512 In re TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF PRATT et al., Sheriff's Deputies. In re TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF MOORE et al., Sheriff's Deputies.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 107

40 Ohio St.2d 107

321 N.E.2d 603, 69 O.O.2d 512

In re TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF PRATT et al., Sheriff's Deputies In re TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF MOORE et al., Sheriff's Deputies.

Nos. 74-589 and 74-730.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 31, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A party adversely affected by an order of the State Personnel Board of Review may appeal the order of the board to the Court of Common Pleas of the county in which the affected employee resides, and may, in that court, raise the issue of the board's jurisdiction to issue the order. (R.C. 124.34 construed.)

2. Deputy sheriffs are members of the unclassified civil service only when they are assigned to, and perform, duties such that they hold 'a fiduciary or administrative relationship' to the sheriff.

The two actions herein were consolidated for argument because, although arising separately both raise a single issue concerning R.C. 119.12 and 124.34.

In case No. 74-730, appellants Arthur Moore, Henry Peckman and Howard Brauer were employed as deputies in the Geauga County sheriff's department until January 1, 1973. Oh that date, carl E. Henderson assumed office as Sheriff of Geauga County. As one of his first official acts, Sheriff Henderson notified the three deputies that they should not return to work, and filed orders of removal with the State Personnel Board of Review. The deputies appealed to the board, and, after a hearing, the board ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to uphold the dismissals and ordered that the deputies be reinstated. The board rejected the sheriff's contention that the board lacked jurisdiction because deputy sheriffs are not within the classified civil service.

Sheriff Henderson filed notices of appeal in the Courts of Common Pleas of Franklin, geauga and Cuyahoga counties. ¹ The sheriff contended, first, that the board lacked jurisdiction with respect to the three deputies, and second, that the board abused its discretion in rendering its order.

The deputies filed motions to dismiss in the Courts of Common Pleas of Geauga and Cuyahoga counties, claiming that the only forum where an appeal attacking the jurisdiction of the board could properly be brought was the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County under R.C. 119.12. The motions to dismiss were granted by both courts.

Upon appeals, the sole issue was whether the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County is the only court competent to consider a claim that the board lacked jurisdiction to render an order. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed. The Court of Appeals for Geauga County reversed, and certified the record to the Supreme Court for review and final determination of the obvious conflict.

In case No. 74-589, appellants Bruce C. Pratt, Jr., and Carl Johnson were deputy sheriffs of Wood County. On July 13, 1970, Sheriff Earl L. Rife told the two deputies that he was terminating their employment, effective July 27, 1970. The sheriff did not inform the State Personnel Board of Review of this action. The deputies filed an appeal with the bord, and, on September 29, 1970, the board held a hearing solely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeals. The board ruled that the deputies were members of the classified civil service, and therefore the board had jurisdiction to hear their appeal. The board then found that the attempted dismissal was ineffective because no proper removal order had been served upon the deputies as required by R.C. 143.27. The deputies were ordered reinstated. in the Courts of Common Pleas of in the Courts of Common Peas of Wood and Franklin counties. ²

The Court of Common Pleas of Wood County found that it had jurisdiction to hear the sheriff's appeal, overruled the deputies' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and reversed the order of the board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding, first, that an appeal of the board's decision could properly be taken either in Franklin County or in the county in which the employee resides, and, second, that the deputies were in the unclassified service, and hence subject to discharge by the sheriff without review by the board. The Court of Appeals granted the deputies' motion to certify the record to this court as being in conflict with the judgment ³ of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.

Lucas, Prendergast, albright, Gibson, Brown & Newman, John A. Brown and W. Joseph Strapp, Columbus, for appellants, deputy sheriffs.

Daniel T. Spitler, Pros. Atty., and Donald D. Smmons, Bowling Green, for appellee, Earl L. Rife, Sheriff, in case No. 74-589.

Craig S. Albert, Cincinnati, for appellee, Carl E. Henderson, Sheriff, in case No. 74-730.

I

STERN, Justice.

Both of these cases involve the issue of whether an appeal from an order of the State Personnel Board of Review, which attacks the jurisdiction of the board must be brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, or whether such appeal may also be brought in the Court of Common Pleas of the county where the affected employee resides.

The powers and duties of the State Personnel Board of Review, as set out in R.C. 124.03 include the power to:

'* * * hear appeals, as provided by law, of employees in the classified state service from final decisions * * * relative to reduction in pay or position, layoff, suspension, discharge, assignment or reassignment to a new or different position classification * * *.'

In both cases, the claim is made that the board lacked jurisdiction because the employees were not members of the classified civil service. In both cases, the board decided that the employees, deputy sheriffs, were members of the classified civil service.

Appeals from orders of the board are governed by two separate statutes. R.C. 119.12 provides that:

'Any party adversely affected by any order of an agency * * * may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin county * * *.

'* * *

'The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the absence of such a finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. * * *'

R.C. 119.12 is a general statute providing for appeals from orders of various administrative agencies, and applies to all orders of the board. State ex rel. Oliver v. State Civil Service Commission (1959), 168 Ohio St. 445, 155 N.E.2d 897. R.C. 124.34, a statute specifically governing appeals from orders of the board, provides, in part:

'In cases of removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary reasons, either the appointing authority or the officer or employee may appeal from the decision of the state personnel board of review * * * to the court of common pleas of the county in which the employee resides in accordance with the procedure provided by section 119.12 of the Revised Code.'

On its face, R.C. 124.34 permits an appeal of an order by the board to be brought in the county in which the employee resides. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, in its opinion, maintained that when read in pari materia with R.C. 119.12, R.C. 143.27 (now R.C. 124.34) applies only to appeals of matters such as sufficiency of evidence, and not to appeals claiming a lack of jurisdiction of the part of the board.

That court's decision is apparently based upon the language in R.C. 119.12, which limits judicial review to issues of whether 'the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.' However, neither the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County nor the sheriffs have suggested any reason why the question of the board's jurisdiction is not one of whether the order 'is in accordance with law.' Contrary to the Cuyahoga County court's construction, it is difficult to imagine a question which is more fundamentally one of whether an order is 'in accordance with law' than the question of whether the agency issuing the order had jurisdiction to do so. We find no basis for the Cuyahoga County court's position. Indeed, if that position were accepted, the mandate of the Franklin County court would likewise be narrowed, and no court would have authority to consider the fundamental question of jurisdiction. We find no basis in statutory language for any claim that R.C. 124.34 means something other than its plain and specific provision, i. e., that an appeal from a decision of the board may be taken 'to the court of common pleas of the county in which the employee resides.'

The basis of the Cuyahoga County court's strained construction of the statutes is apparently a fear that allowing jurisdictional appeals in all 88 Ohio counties would lead to chaotic results. The court said that '(I)f each Common Pleas Court in this state were permitted to determine when the State Personnel Board of Review had jurisdiction to hear an appeal, an employee living in one county might be denied access to the board, whereas an employee having an identical job, but living in a different county, would be given permission to appeal to the board.'

This court is confident of the ability of Ohio's lower courts to prevent chaotic and inconsistent results. The question of jurisdiction turns upon a determination of whether an employee is a member of the classified civil service and whether the actions taken by his employer are of the type subject to review by the board. No doubt, in applying the statutory language to particular fact situations, the courts of Ohio's 88 counties will differ among themselves, and these differences may ultimately need to be resolved by this court. But the advantages of wholly consistent state-wide decisional law, great as they are, must be balanced against...