Territory Hawai`i v. Cunha
| Decision Date | 29 April 1904 |
| Citation | 15 Haw. 607 |
| Parties | TERRITORY OF HAWAII v. E. S. CUNHA. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT, HONOLULU.
Syllabus by the Court
A section of a statute may be invalid in part and valid as to the remainder.
A statute which forbids any keeper or proprietor of any place where intoxicating or spirituous lquors are sold to permit any minor to visit or remain in the room where said liquors are sold or kept for sale is not invalid as being in excess of the police power or contrary to the 14th Amendment.
L. Andrews, Attorney General, and N. W. Aluli for the Territory.
E. M. Watson for the defendant.
This is an appeal on points of law from a judgment of the District Magistrate of Honolulu finding the defendant guilty of violating Section 2 of Act 4 of the Laws of 1901 and sentencing him to pay a fine of $25 and costs. Two points are raised: (1) that the law is unconstitutional, (2) that the evidence was insufficient.
The law, omitting the enacting clause and Section 4, which provides when it shall take effect, reads as follows:
“An Act to Prevent the Employment of Minors in Places Where Intoxicating Liquors are Sold, and to Prevent Minors from Visiting such Places.
We need not inquire to what lengths the legislature may go in the exercise of the police power for the preservation of the public peace, safety, health and morals, especially with reference to the subject of intoxicating liquors, or how far the state may go as parens patriae or otherwise for the protection of minors, or to what extent, if any, the 14th amendment, on which special reliance is placed by the defendant, might limit the legislative power in these respects. See in general Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86;Vance v. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 438;Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678;Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623;People v. Ewer, 141 N. Y. 129;Goldsticker v. Ford, 62 Tex. 385.
The contention is that this section of the statute goes too far in that, although intended, as argued, to prohibit the employment or loitering of minors in saloons, it is not confined to employment or loitering but extends to mere remaining, perhaps on lawful business, as, for instance, to collect an account, and is not confined to places where liquor is sold to be drank on the premises, but extends to any place where it is sold, for instance, to wholesale houses, hotels, etc., and even to any place where it may be dispensed, as, for instance, by way of gift at private residences. The prohibition, it will be noticed, extends only to the room in which the liquors are sold, kept for sale or dispensed and not to other rooms in the same building. The room in question was one in which liquors were sold at retail to be drank there.
As to private residences, it is unnecessary to say whether the act should be construed as applicable to them, or whether, if applicable to them, it would prevent the furnishing of liquor to one's family or to those who as employees or guests might be considered as belonging to the family in a broad sense, or whether, in either case, such a provision would be beyond the legitimate exercise of the police power. See Republic v. Akau, 11 Haw. 363, and cases there cited. The words “or dispensed”, on which alone this contention is based, may be eliminated without affecting the remainder of the statute, especially as those words are not included in the title of the act. The “place” in question was one “where intoxicating or spirituous liquors are sold” and not merely “dispensed”.
As to “remaining” as distinguished from “loitering” and “any place” where liquors are sold, whether to be drank on the premises or not, the argument seems to be based largely on the assumption that this statute differs from statutes elsewhere in these respects, and that the fact that other statutes do not go as far as ours shows that it is not necessary that it should go so far and that it is deemed to be beyond the legislative power to go so far. But the authorities seem to show that statutes of this character have been enacted and held or assumed to be valid repeatedly in other jurisdictions. In some cases the provision is found in the statute itself, in others it is required by the statute to be in the bond. In Goldsticker v. Ford, supra, the words were “enter upon or remain”, though on...
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