Terry v. King County

• Decision Date: 16 July 1906
• Citation: 86 P. 210,43 Wash. 61
• Parties: TERRY v. KING COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

86 P. 210

43 Wash. 61

TERRY v. KING COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 16, 1906

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Arthur E. Griffin, Judge.

Action by John Y. Terry against King county and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Kenneth Mackintosh, R. W. Prigmore, and Wm. E. McClure, for appellants.

P. P. Carroll and John E. Carroll, for respondent.

HADLEY J.

This is an action to enjoin the county of King and the county commissioners thereof from issuing and selling certain bonds for the purpose of procuring funds to assist in the construction of an armory building in the city of Seattle. The complaint alleges that the members of the board of county commissioners, purporting to act as such board, are about to issue and sell bonds for said purpose to the amount of $80,000, and that they will do so unless restrained; that said commissioners assume to issue and sell said bonds under the authority of an act of the Legislature of this state passed in 1903, and found set forth in the session laws of that year at page 209 et seq., c. 115. The plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the state of Washington, residing in the city of Seattle in King county; that he owns real and personal property in said county subject to taxation therein upon which taxes have been and are now being assessed and levied pursuant to law; that he brings this suit in his own behalf, and in behalf of all the taxpayers of said county. It is also alleged that the site and all buildings, improvements, and structures to be erected thereon by the expenditure of the proceeds of the sale of said bonds do and will at all times belong to the state of Washington and not to the county of King; that the issue of such bonds, the sale thereof, and the appropriation of the proceeds of such sale for said purpose are contrary to the Constitution of the state of Washington; that the aforesaid act of 1903 is unconstitutional, and void and that if said bonds are sold the annual tax levy upon the property of plaintiff, and upon all other property in King county will necessarily be greatly increased for the purpose of raising the necessary funds to pay interest upon the bonds and to redeem them at maturity, to the irreparable damage of plaintiff and all other taxpayers in said county. The defendants interposed a demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled. The defendants elected to stand upon their demurrer, refusing to plead further, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The judgment especially recites and adjudges that the said legislative act of 1903 is unconstitutional and void, and enjoins the defendants from in any manner attempting to enforce it or any part thereof, and from doing or attempting to do any of the acts and things of which the plaintiff complains in the complaint. The defendants have appealed.

The sole question involved in the appeal is the constitutionality of the legislative act aforesaid. A number of reasons are urged for holding the act invalid, but our determination as to one question discussed in the briefs is decisive of the case, and we shall confine our discussion to that subject. Respondent contends that the provisions of the act amount to special legislation within the prohibitive requirements of the state Constitution. Article 2, § 28, of the Constitution provides that 'the Legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws in the following cases: * * * 6. For granting corporate powers or privileges.' It is urged that the act in question does grant special corporate powers and privileges. Section 1 of the act is as follows: 'That for the purpose of assisting in the construction of an armory for the use of such organizations of the National Guard of Washington as may be stationed there, the sum of $30,000 is hereby appropriated from the military fund for the construction of an armory in the city of Seattle: Provided, That a suitable site for such armory be furnished without cost to the state of Washington therefor, and that such site and all buildings, improvements and structures thereon shall forever belong to the state of Washington.' Laws 1903, p. 209, c. 115. Section 2 is in terms the same, except that it provides $20,000 for the construction of an armory in the city of Tacoma. Section 3 in like manner appropriates $20,000 for the construction of an armory in the city of Spokane. Sections 4 and 5 are as follows:

'Sec. 4. That the counties of King, Pierce, and Spokane, each of them by and through its board of county commissioners, and the cities of Seattle, Tacoma, and Spokane, each of them by and through its council, are hereby severally authorized and empowered to contract indebtedness for the purposes of purchasing such armory sites and assisting in the construction of such armories, and to issue negotiable bonds therefor whenever the board of county commissioners of the respective county, or the council of the respective city shall deem it advisable, to an amount which together with the existing indebtedness of such county or city, shall not exceed one and one-half per centum of the taxable property of such county or city, to be ascertained by the last assessment for county or city purposes.

'Sec. 5. That each and every county and city mentioned in section 4 of this act may contract indebtedness for the purposes herein specified and issue bonds therefor in excess of the amount named in said section 4 of this act, but not exceeding in amount, together with the existing indebtedness five per centum of the taxable property, to be ascertained as provided in said section 4, whenever three-fifths of the voters of such county or city voting on said question assent thereto at an election to be held for that purpose, consistent with the general election laws, which election may be either a general or special election.'

The remainder of the act is devoted to details for carrying into effect the foregoing provisions. Does the act grant corporate powers and privileges to counties and cities named therein? Appellants contend that it does not. Their position seems to be that as the power to issue and sell bonds already resides in these counties and cities, the act does not confer any new corporate power. Their powers in that regard are, however defined and limited by the Constitution and laws to the specified purposes. This act undertakes to confer upon them the power to issue and sell bonds for a purpose not heretofore granted. As supporting their contention appellants cite State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones (Ohio) 64 N.E. 424. We are unable to construe the opinion in that case as appellants do. It seems to us to be clearly opposed to their contention here. After making some observations as to what may be corporate powers, the court said: 'Surely, we shall not err if we regard the phrase 'corporate powers' as embracing all the powers which, within the observation of those who framed...