Testa v. Winquist

• Decision Date: 15 May 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 77-0449.
• Citation: 451 F. Supp. 388
• Parties: Alfred TESTA, Manuel daSilva and Tabco, Incorporated, Plaintiffs, v. Carl D. WINQUIST, Individually and in his official capacity as Lieutenant, East Providence Police Department, et al., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Christine S. MANFREDI, in her capacity as Treasurer of the City of Warwick, Richard Steiner, Individually and in his official capacity as a Warwick Police Officer and Robert Stevenson, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Rhode Island Division National Computer Information Center, Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

451 F. Supp. 388

Alfred TESTA, Manuel daSilva and Tabco, Incorporated, Plaintiffs, v. Carl D. WINQUIST, Individually and in his official capacity as Lieutenant, East Providence Police Department, et al., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Christine S. MANFREDI, in her capacity as Treasurer of the City of Warwick, Richard Steiner, Individually and in his official capacity as a Warwick Police Officer and Robert Stevenson, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Rhode Island Division National Computer Information Center, Third-Party Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 77-0449.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

May 15, 1978.

Lynette Labinger, of Abedon, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Providence, R. I., for plaintiffs.

Orlando A. Andreoni, City Sol. of E. Providence, East Providence, R. I., Nathaniel J. Rendine, Asst. City Sol., Stephen G. Linder, Providence, for third-party plaintiffs.

J. Peter Doherty, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Providence, R. I., Thomas L. McDonald, Asst. City Sol., City of Warwick, R. I., for third-party defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

Third-party defendants Christine Manfredi, Treasurer of the City of Warwick, and Richard Steiner, a Warwick police officer, move to dismiss the action brought by third-party plaintiffs Carl D. Winquist, Lieutenant of the East Providence Police Department and other unnamed officers of that department. The issues briefed by the parties have only a superficial simplicity that masks complicated and controversial questions concerning the scope of both jurisdiction and causes of action in federal court. After careful analysis of all the pertinent issues, the Court has decided to deny the motion to dismiss.

The primary action is brought by plaintiffs Alfred Testa, Manuel daSilva and Tabco, Inc. against officers of the East Providence police force (hereinafter "third-party plaintiffs") for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights secured by the fourth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. Plaintiffs pend state law claims for detention in violation of R.I.G.L. sec. 12-7-1, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, libel and slander, trespass and malicious destruction of property. Among the many violations alleged, plaintiffs charge that third-party plaintiffs unlawfully detained them on the night of January 31, 1977. Although both plaintiffs Testa and daSilva were detained overnight, only plaintiff Testa was charged with possession of a stolen vehicle. This vehicle was in fact lawfully purchased in September, 1975. At the police station, plaintiffs' attorney produced the certificate of title, but, according to the complaint, Lieutenant Winquist refused to make any inquiry into its authenticity. Subsequently, both plaintiffs spent the night in jail and their vehicle was seized.¹

Third-party plaintiffs filed their complaint claiming, in essence, contribution or indemnification from third-party defendants for any liability based on this detention. They allege that, upon observation of suspicious activity at plaintiffs' auto body shop, third-party plaintiffs chased and ultimately stopped plaintiffs in their vehicle. Upon failure to produce proof of ownership, third-party plaintiffs ran a check of the vehicle through the National Computer Information Center (NCIC) which reported the vehicle stolen out of Warwick, Rhode Island. The officers then called Richard Steiner of the Warwick police department who confirmed that the vehicle was stolen and still unrecovered. Allegedly pursuant to this information, third-party plaintiffs charged plaintiff Testa with possession of a stolen vehicle. It appears from both the original and third-party complaints that the vehicle had in fact been previously stolen but had been recovered by the insurance company and subsequently sold to plaintiff Tabco, Inc. Pursuant to Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, third-party plaintiffs impleaded Robert Stevenson, the administrator of the Rhode Island Division, National Computer Information Center, and Richard Steiner, the Warwick police officer who confirmed the vehicle's status, for negligent failure to keep current and accurate records, upon which information third-party plaintiffs allegedly relied in detaining or arresting plaintiffs. Third-party plaintiffs also sue Christine S. Manfredi, in her representative capacity as Treasurer of the City of Warwick.

Third-party defendants Manfredi and Steiner bring this motion to dismiss, claiming that this Court has no jurisdiction over municipal defendants and that the complaint failed to state a claim on the ground that an intentional tortfeasor (third-party plaintiffs) cannot recover against a merely negligent tortfeasor. Third-party plaintiffs opposed, arguing that they impleaded third-party defendants on a purely state law claim that is within this Court's ancillary jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have neither asserted claims against third-party defendants nor filed a response to the motion to dismiss.

I. Third-party plaintiffs' right to recover against third-party defendants Stevenson and Steiner

Although not explicit, third-party plaintiffs base their claim on both a right of contribution, secured by R.I.G.L. sec. 10-6-1, et seq. (1969), and a right of indemnity, recognized by Rhode Island law, see, e. g., Helgerson v. Mammoth Mart, Inc., 114 R.I. 438, 441-42, 335 A.2d 339, 341-42 (1975). The premise of both these claims is that third-party plaintiffs may be held liable to plaintiffs for wrongdoing that was caused in whole or in part by third-party defendants. Any judgment against third-party plaintiffs should be either shared or borne solely by third-party defendants. Necessarily, without liability to plaintiffs, third-party plaintiffs have no right of recovery against third-party defendants, even though plaintiffs may still have valid claims against third-party defendants.

Because of the circular nature of the parties' liability, the initial focus must be on the circumstances under which third-party plaintiffs could be held liable to plaintiffs. If these circumstances in turn could form the basis for liability against third-party defendants, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be denied. The motion must be denied unless "it appears beyond doubt that the third-party plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

It is well established that a policeman is not liable for a warrantless arrest under sec. 1983 or under the common law tort of false arrest, if the arrest was made in good faith and with probable cause. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). To escape liability, the policeman must establish both that he in fact believed he had probable cause and that this belief was reasonable. Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1976); Foster v. Zeeko, 540 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1976); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972). Typically, the policeman is shielded from liability if the basis for his belief in probable cause was a mistake in fact, provided the mistake was reasonable. Restatement, Second, Torts sec. 121, Comment i (1965). Reasonableness must be judged in the context of the necessity for on-the-spot judgments by the policeman on the street. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 908 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930, 96 S.Ct. 280, 46 L.Ed.2d 258. The standard reflects a proper balance between the constitutional guarantee of freedom from unreasonable seizures and protection of public safety by the arrest of those persons suspected of criminal activity.

Applying these principles to the skeletal outline of the facts alleged in the complaints, the reasonableness of third-party plaintiffs' belief in probable cause at several points in time is crucial. The initial detention was allegedly based on the computer check and third-party-defendant Steiner's confirmation. Absent allegations that the typical police practice was to make further inquiries or that these sources were notoriously inaccurate, reliance on this information as a basis for probable cause, particularly in combination with the alleged results of their surveillance and observation of suspicious activities, appears reasonable. Thus, if third-party plaintiffs' allegations of fact are true, they would probably not be liable to plaintiffs for the initial detention and, as a consequence, would have no claim against third-party defendants for contribution or indemnity. Because a cautious approach to factual determinations is appropriate when considering a motion to dismiss, without more information, the Court is reluctant to find that, as a matter of law, the reliance was reasonable and dismiss third-party plaintiffs' complaint. Such a determination is more appropriately left to the jury, unless, based on affidavits accompanying a summary judgment motion, it is evident there is no justiciable issue. E. g., Dupree v. Village of Hempstead, 401 F.Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y.1975).

In addition, the initial detention or arrest is not the only crucial point in time. Plaintiffs claim that third-party plaintiff Winquist failed to make any inquiry into the authenticity of the certificate of title to the vehicle. Assuming the truth of this allegation, it is certainly conceivable that the previously reasonable reliance is stripped of its reasonableness in light of this prima facie evidence of title and the diminished necessity for quick decisions once at the station house. See Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d at 1215. Thus, third-party plaintiffs could be indeed liable to plaintiffs for illegal arrest following presentation of the certificate of title.

Turning now to the intersection of third-party defendants'...