Teubert Family Farms, LLC v. Bragg

• Decision Date: 19 November 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-0411,18-0411
• Citation: 242 W.Va. 445,836 S.E.2d 412
• Parties: TEUBERT FAMILY FARMS, LLC, Petitioner v. Kenneth J. BRAGG and Aimee S. Bragg, Respondents
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

242 W.Va. 445

836 S.E.2d 412

TEUBERT FAMILY FARMS, LLC, Petitioner

v.Kenneth J. BRAGG and Aimee S. Bragg, Respondents

No. 18-0411

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 1, 2019

Filed: November 19, 2019

Thomas W. White, Esq., Haley S. Hillen, Esq., Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Lewisburg, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner

Barry L. Bruce, Esq., Barry L. Bruce & Associates, LC, Lewisburg, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondents

ARMSTEAD, Justice:

Petitioner Teubert Family Farms, LLC, ("Teubert Family Farms") appeals the April 19, 2018 order issued by the Circuit Court of Greenbrier County granting summary judgment to respondents Kenneth J. Bragg and Aimee S. Bragg (the "Braggs") on their adverse possession claim as to 9.21 acres ("Disputed Property"). On appeal, Teubert Family Farms argues that the circuit court erred by finding that the Braggs had met every element of adverse possession as a matter of law, despite the questions of fact pertaining to permissive use of the Disputed Property.

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, the submitted record, and the applicable authorities, this Court finds merit to Teubert Family Farm’s arguments. Accordingly, the circuit court’s final order is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1995, Kenneth J. Bragg purchased approximately seventy-three acres of real estate in Greenbrier County ("Bragg Property").¹ The Bragg Property adjoined property owned by the Harris Export Coal Corporation (the "Corporation"), whose president and sole shareholder was John Brown Harris ("Mr. Harris"). Mr. Bragg did not commission a survey of his property when it was purchased, but he claims that in 1996, Mr. Harris told him that the property boundary line was determined by a "little timberline/big timberline" boundary, which reflected that certain portions of the property had been timbered, resulting in a little timberline, while other portions had not. Mr. Bragg also claims that Mr. Harris actually pointed to the boundary line. However, Mr. Harris does not recall this conversation.

Mr. Bragg testified that he posted the Disputed Property in 1996. However, Mr. Harris does not recall seeing any "No Trespassing" or "No Hunting" signs. Mr. Bragg further testified that in 1997, he cleared and cultivated the Disputed Property and constructed ponds on the Disputed Property. At some point, Mr. Bragg asked Mr. Harris for permission to use his road and to hunt on what is now referred to as the Teubert Property, which permission Mr. Harris granted.² In addition to requesting permission for himself, Mr. Bragg requested permission for some of his friends and family to also hunt on the Teubert Property, but Mr. Harris refused this request as to everyone other than Mr. Bragg’s brother.

On June 11, 2012, Teubert Family Farms purchased 652.69 acres from the Corporation ("Teubert Property"). The Teubert Property adjoins the Bragg Property, and the Disputed Property was included in the metes and bounds description of the Teubert Property when it was purchased in 2012. At some point after Teubert Family Farms purchased the Teubert Property, a dispute arose between the parties as to the ownership of the Disputed Property. Both parties believed that they owned the Disputed Property. In 2013, the Braggs had their property surveyed, and this survey revealed that the Disputed Property was not included in their 1995 deed description. In 2014, the Braggs commissioned another survey of the Disputed Property.

After obtaining the second survey, the Braggs recorded a general warranty deed dated October 9, 2015, purporting to convey title of the Disputed Property listing themselves as both grantor and grantee. On November 16, 2015, Teubert Family Farms filed its Complaint against the Braggs. The Complaint sought to quiet title, requested injunctive relief, and alleged slander of title. On December 22, 2015, the Braggs filed their answer and counterclaim. Both Teubert Family Farms and the Braggs filed motions for summary judgment. A hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment was held on August 7, 2017. By order entered on April 19, 2018, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Braggs. The circuit court found:

9. While there was permission granted to use the entirety of the Teubert Property for a specific purpose (i.e. , hunting), the Defendants used and occupied the Disputed Property for purposes well beyond any for which permission had been granted. In posting, clearing, cultivating, seeding, and mowing the Disputed Property, and in constructing a pond upon the Disputed Property, the Defendants possessed the Disputed Property in a manner that was clearly against the right of the true owner and inconsistent with the title of the true owner. The use of the Disputed Property for these purposes was not permissive, and such use satisfies the "hostility" element of an adverse possession claim to the Disputed Property. The permission granted to the Defendants to hunt upon the entirety of the Teubert Property does not negate the adverse and hostile nature of the Defendants’ use and possession of that portion of the Teubert Property included within the Disputed Property.

12. Based upon the undisputed facts in this action, the Defendants satisfied every element required of an adverse possession claim, including the ten-year statutory period, no later than 2007, while Harris Export Coal Corporation was the record owner of the Teubert Property. Title to the Disputed Property was therefore vested in the Defendants not later than 2007, at which time Harris Export Coal Corporation was disseized of its title to the same.

This appeal by Teubert Family Farms followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, "[a] circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo ." Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure , summary judgment should be awarded "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." It is well established that "[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syl. Pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). "The circuit court’s function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Syl. Pt. 3, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

"[W]e must draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the most favorable light to the party opposing the motion." Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc. 194 W.Va. 52, 59, 459 S.E.2d 329, 336 (1995). In assessing the factual record, we must grant the nonmoving party the benefit of inferences, as

"[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ... [s]ummary judgment should be denied even where there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts in the case but only as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom."

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

As this Court has previously noted, "the party opposing summary judgment must satisfy the burden of proof by offering more than a mere ‘scintilla of evidence’ and must produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in a nonmoving party’s favor." Williams v. Precision Coil, 194 W.Va. at 60, 459 S.E.2d at 337. We will now examine whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the Braggs.

III. ANALYSIS

This matter involves our law on adverse possession. By way of background, we note that "[t]he doctrine of adverse possession is firmly established in our property law and accompanies W.Va. Code 55-2-1 [1923] in settling land disputes equitably and efficiently." Naab v. Nolan, 174 W.Va. 390, 392, 327 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1985).

One who seeks to assert title to a tract of land under the doctrine of adverse possession must prove each of the following elements for the requisite statutory period: (1) That he has held the tract adversely or hostilely; (2) That the possession has been actual; (3) That it has been open and notorious (sometimes stated in the cases as visible and notorious); (4) That possession has been exclusive; (5) That possession has been continuous; (6) That possession has been under claim of title or color of title.

Syl. Pt. 3, Somon v. Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., 160 W.Va. 84, 232 S.E.2d 524 (1977) ). "The burden is upon the party who claims title by adverse possession to prove by clear and convincing evidence all elements essential to such title." Syl. Pt. 2 Brown v. Gobble, 196 W.Va. 559, 474 S.E.2d 489 (1996). "This doctrine enables one who has been in possession of a piece of real property for more than ten years to bring an action asserting that he is now the owner of that piece of property even when title rests in another." Naab, 174 W.Va. at 392, 327 S.E.2d at 153-154.

Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed in this case. Teubert Family Farms argued that the Braggs did not possess the Disputed Property "adversely" or "hostilely."³ The Braggs argued that they met all of the elements of adverse possession because the permission that had been given by Mr. Harris was not for the specific activities that they performed on the Disputed Property.

For the element of "hostile" or "adverse" possession, the party claiming adverse possession must show that their possession of the property was against the right of the true owner and...