Texas Employment Com'n v. Child, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-86-115-CV,3-86-115-CV |
| Citation | 738 S.W.2d 56 |
| Parties | 42 Ed. Law Rep. 1006 TEXAS EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, Appellant, v. CHILD, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Susan F. Eley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellant.
Mark Z. Levbarg, Levbarg & McGowan, Austin, for appellee.
Before SHANNON, C.J., and BRADY and ABOUSSIE, JJ.
This is an appeal from a district court judgment reversing a decision of the Texas Employment Commission. The Commission had ruled that employees of appellee, a corporation operating a "Head Start" program for preschool children, qualified for unemployment benefits. The trial court granted a "declaratory judgment" that appellee was an "educational institution;" thus, the employees were not entitled to benefits under a section of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act which denies benefits to educational employees idled during summer school vacation. We will reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that the claimants recover their unemployment compensation benefits.
Section (f) of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221b-1 (1987), provides that employees of "educational institutions" do not qualify for unemployment benefits between academic terms if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in the same capacity during the next academic term or year. This provision was intended to prevent employees of educational institutions from collecting unemployment benefits during regular periods of summer vacation. The restriction of benefits to these workers was enacted to bring the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act into conformity with federal law. See Tex.S.B. 896, 65th Reg.Sess. (1977) and 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a)(6)(A). It is appellee's status as an "educational institution" under § (f) of the Texas act that is the subject of this controversy.
Appellee, Child, Inc., operates a federally funded Head Start program for preschool children. It is a non-profit corporation employing some two hundred persons. The corporation does not, however, provide jobs for any of its employees during three months of each year falling between the nine-month academic terms. During these periods of unemployment, appellant, the Texas Employment Commission, awarded unemployment insurance benefits to Child, Inc.'s employees. Because unemployment awards are used by the Commission in computing appellee's tax rate, appellee protested the employees' claims.
Upon review of appellee's protests, the Commission ruled that appellee was not an "educational institution" and that its employees were entitled to the benefits. Appellee appealed the decision to the appellate division of the Commission and then to district court. The district court reversed the ruling of the Commission and declared that "Child, Inc. is an educational institution for the purposes of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act." The court further ordered that the claimants were not entitled to recover unemployment benefits for the summer vacation period. The Commission appealed to this Court.
The Commission brings three points of error. First, the Commission asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal; second, that the trial court erred as a matter of law in reversing the Commission since its decision was based on long standing administrative policy; and third, that the administrative decision was based on substantial evidence.
Appellant first contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction on grounds of sovereign immunity. Because a suit against the Commission is a suit against the State, Olson v. Texas Employment Commission, 593 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Civ.App.1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), one may sue the Commission, as a general rule, only if there is an express grant of authority permitting that suit. Texas Employment Commission v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 163 Tex. 135, 352 S.W.2d 252, 254 (1961). Appellant argues the exclusive grant of authority permitting suit against the Commission allows only suits to collect unemployment benefits because it does not mention declaratory judgments. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221b-4(i) (1987). The Texas Unemployment Compensation Act provides that "[w]ithin ten (10) days after the decision of the commission has become final, and not before, any party aggrieved by a decision of the Texas Employment Commission may secure judicial review of that decision in any court of competent jurisdiction...." See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221b-4(i) (1987). This statutory cause of action is not limited to the suits suggested by appellant. The jurisdictional question turns on whether Child, Inc. properly invoked its right of judicial review under art. 5221b-4(i).
It is well settled that where there are no special exceptions, as here, a petition will be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1982). In paragraph 5 of its first amended petition to the district court, Child, Inc. requested:
"a trial, and after trial, declaratory judgment that it operates an education institution exempt from claims made during customary vacation times therefore defeating the claims of the iundividual parties named in Exhibit Two, who have been granted relief by T.E.C.; a reversal of TEC's decision, Exhibit One, and as all other relief at law or in equity to which it may prove itself entitled."
(emphasis supplied). The Commission decision is mentioned by name and incorporated by reference in appellee's first amended petition. Appellee also attached the Commission decision as an exhibit. Appellee stated it was an aggrieved party (paragraph 1, amended petition) pursuant to the language of art. 5221b-4(i) and, in paragraph 4, stated a ground for review. Finally, Child, Inc. specifically requested reversal of the...
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