Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1970
• Docket Number: Nos. B--1733,B--1734,s. B--1733
• Citation: 456 S.W.2d 891
• Parties: TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, Petitioner, v. CANYON CREEK LAND CORPORATION, Respondent. TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, Petitioner, v. Ben BACON et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 891

456 S.W.2d 891

TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, Petitioner, v. CANYON CREEK LAND CORPORATION, Respondent.

TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, Petitioner, v. Ben BACON et al., Respondents.

Nos. B--1733, B--1734.

Supreme Court of Texas.

July 8, 1970.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1970.

Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen., Ralph Rash, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for petitioner.

Abney & Burleson, Phil Burleson, Dallas, Maloney, Black & Hearne, Thomas Black, Austin, for respondent.

WALKER, Justice.

These are companion cases in which plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Texas Liquor Control Board and its members from attempting to enforce a particular interpretation of the Texas Liquor Control Act. Art. 666--1 et seq., Vernon's Ann.P.C. ¹ We hold that neither remedy is appropriate under the circumstances.

One of the suits was brought by Canyon Creek Land Corporation, its officers and members. The other was instituted by Oak Cliff Country Club and Ben Bacon, a member and President of the club. Canyon Creek and Oak Cliff hold private club permits issued by the Board under the Act, and each is located in a 'dry' area. They are required to operate under the 'locker system,' and Art. 666--15(e) provides that:

"Locker System' shall mean that system of alcoholic beverages storage whereby the club rents to its members lockers wherein the member may store alcoholic beverages for consumption by himself or his guests. All such alcoholic beverages so stored under the 'locker system' shall be purchased and owned by the member as an individual.'

According to the Board's construction of this statute, the members of a private 'locker system' club may not legally employ an agent to purchase alcoholic beverages for them in a 'wet' area where the sale is legal and transport the same to the premises of the club where possession is legal. In their pleadings, briefs, and questions propounded to witnesses, plaintiffs refer to this interpretation as a 'policy' of the Board. They insist that the Board's interpretation is incorrect in view of other provisions of the Act, ² and that is the question they wish to have resolved in the present suit.

The suit filed by Oak Cliff et al has been tried on the merits, and judgment was rendered by the trial court declaring that the Board's interpretation of the Act is incorrect and permanently enjoining the Board from cancelling or suspending Oak Cliff's license for violation of the 'policy.' The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 443 S.W.2d 312. In the other case Canyon Creek et al were granted a temporary injunction restraining the Board from enforcing the 'policy' during the pendency of the suit, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 443 S.W.2d 308. We reverse, dissolve the temporary injunction, and dismiss the case that has been tried on the merits.

Our problem is complicated somewhat by the fact that license suspension proceedings against Canyon Creek and Oak Cliff were pending before the Board when the suits were filed. The outcome of these administrative proceedings may or may not turn on the question plaintiffs would have us decide. The proceeding against Canyon Creek which was filed on August 13, 1968, is based on a charge that its agent, servant and employee, James Willard Andrews, unlawfully transported liquor on July 11, 1968. Several months earlier, a brief mimeographed form for use in appointing someone as agent to purchase alcoholic beverages was circulated to the members of Canyon Creek. Many of these forms were signed and returned by the members. After the filing of the license suspension proceeding, Canyon Creek prepared more elaborate written forms of an instrument for execution by its members authorizing the manager of the club, as their agent, to purchase, transport and deliver alcoholic beverages to the club. Thereafter on September 9, 1968, a hearing on the charges was held by the Board. The suit was filed about a month later, and no further action has been taken in the administrative proceeding.

The proceeding against Oak Cliff, which was filed on June 6, 1968, is based on a number of charges of possession and storage of alcoholic beverages in violation of the Act. These charges grew out of an investigation of the club by representatives of the Board on April 18, 1968. After completion of the investigation and prior to filing of the administrative proceeding, forms were prepared for execution by the members authorizing the manager of the club, as their agent, to purchase and transport alcoholic beverages to the club. Suit was filed and a temporary restraining order issued on June 13, 1968, and no action has been taken in the administrative proceeding.

Criminal charges were subsequently filed against Byrl Ware, an employee of Oak Cliff, for illegal transportation of alcoholic beverages on July 19, 1968. License suspension proceedings based on the same incident were also instituted against Oak Cliff, and suit was filed for forfeiture of the automobile Ware was driving and the alcoholic beverages he was transporting at the time. The record is not entirely clear, but the question of statutory construction in which plaintiffs are interested may be squarely presented in both of those proceedings.

It should be emphasized at the outset that we are dealing with a penal statute. The civil courts are not powerless to interpret the same, but its meaning and validity should ordinarily be determined by courts exercising criminal jurisdiction. Passel v. Ft. Worth Ind. Sch. Dist., Tex.Sup., 440 S.W.2d 61; State v. Shoppers World, Inc., Tex.Sup., 380 S.W.2d 107. The Board was created by the Legislature to administer the Act, with the duty to investigate and aid in the prosecution of violations and the power to grant, suspend or cancel permits or licenses. See Art. 666--6. It follows, we think, that the civil courts should not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the Board unless there are compelling reasons for doing so. See Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 162 Tex. 1, 343 S.W.2d 242.

These are not cases in which injunctive relief is proper, and the trial courts erred in granting the same. The Board and its employees are attempting to enforce the statute through administrative license suspension proceedings, criminal charges, and suits for forfeiture. It is well settled that a court of equity will not interfere with the attempted enforcement of a criminal statute in this manner unless the statute is unconstitutional and its enforcement will result in irreparable injury to vested property rights. City of Fort Worth v. Craik, Tex.Sup., 411 S.W.2d 541. There is no claim here that the statute is unconstitutional, and it is our opinion that the various proceedings instituted by the Board do not threaten immediate and irreparable injury.

Plaintiffs doubtless urged their construction of the statute at the hearing that has been conducted and will be free to do so in the ones that are yet to be held. If the Board concludes that the Act has been violated, it may but is not required to cancel or suspend the permits. If the permits are revoked or suspended, the clubs have the right of appeal to the district court. The decision of the Board may be...