Thayer v. State, 01-1744.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: STREIT, Justice.
• Citation: 653 N.W.2d 595
• Parties: Rita THAYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 01-1744.,01-1744.
• Decision Date: 14 November 2002

653 N.W.2d 595

Rita THAYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellees.

No. 01-1744.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 14, 2002.

David L. Baker of Riccolo & Baker, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Greg Knoploh, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

STREIT, Justice.

While driving to work in a van owned and operated by her employer, Rita Thayer was paralyzed when the driver of the van lost control causing the van to roll several times. Thayer received workers' compensation benefits for her injuries. She sued her employer, the University of Iowa, for negligence. The district court granted the University's motion for summary judgment. Because we find workers' compensation is Thayer's exclusive remedy, we affirm.

I. Background and Facts

Rita Thayer was paralyzed when the van she was riding in got into an accident. Thayer was riding in a University of Iowa vanpool from her hometown of Cedar Rapids to her job at the University of Iowa in Iowa City. The University supplied vans to certain employees as part of the University of Iowa Employee Vanpool Program. Each participant in the program had to sign an agreement and pay a monthly fee by payroll deduction.¹ The University subsidized a portion of the costs of the program.

Thayer was not a regular vanpool participant and it is not clear whether she had ridden in the vanpool before. Thayer was riding in the vanpool as a substitute passenger on the day of the accident. She had not signed the agreement with the University for the transportation services. The record is not clear whether she paid a fee for that day.

Thayer sued the University and the driver of the van for negligence. The court granted the University's and the driver's motion for summary judgment. Thayer appealed only the court's dismissal of her claim against the University.

II. Scope of Review

We review the district court's grant of the University's motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. McNally & Nimergood v. Neumann-Kiewit Contsructors, Inc., 648 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Iowa 2002). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. A district court properly grants summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) (2001).

III. The Merits

Thayer argues the district court erred in granting the University's motion for summary judgment. In particular, she asserts workers' compensation is not her exclusive remedy. The University contends Thayer failed to timely appeal the court's ruling on her negligence claim.

A. Failure to Timely File Notice of Appeal

The University argues Thayer did not perfect her appeal because she failed to file notice of appeal in a timely manner with the district court clerk. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5 (2001) provides, "appeals to the supreme court must be taken within, and not after, thirty days from the entry of the order, judgment, or decree...." Therefore, a party must file its notice of appeal within thirty days from the entry of an adverse judgment.

Filing is timely if all necessary documents are filed with the court either

before service or within a reasonable time thereafter .... Whenever these rules or the rules of appellate procedure require a filing with the district court or its clerk within a certain time, the time requirement shall be tolled when service is made, provided the actual filing is done within a reasonable time thereafter.

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.442(4) (2001) (emphasis added). The time for filing an appeal is tolled upon service if the party files within a reasonable time after service.²

On October 3, 2001, the court granted the University's motion for summary judgment. Under our rule, the thirty-day period expired on November 2, 2001. Thayer served notice of appeal on opposing counsel on October 30, 2001.³ Thayer also sent notice of appeal to the district court clerk and the Supreme Court clerk on that date. All but the district court clerk received the notices. On November 29, 2001, the district court informed Thayer it did not have a notice of appeal on record. Thayer filed her notice of appeal with the district court on December 5, 2001.

Thayer served timely notice of appeal on all concerned parties but she did not file with the district court clerk until thirty-five days after Thayer served notice of appeal on opposing counsel. Thirty-two days lapsed in between when notice was due to be filed and when Thayer filed her notice with the district court. Because Thayer filed notice of appeal with the district court thirty-two days after it was due, she did not comply with the rules of filing. If, however, Thayer filed the notice "within a reasonable time" after it was served, the time for filing was tolled and she complied with Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(4). The question is whether the delay in this case was reasonable. In Cook v. City of Council Bluffs, 264 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1978), we stated that where a party filed a notice of appeal with the district court clerk twenty-six days after service was due, the service was reasonable because the notice was initially mailed in a timely fashion, but the mail service went awry. We have defined a "reasonable time" as

such time as is necessary, under the circumstances, for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done, having regard for the rights, and possibly the loss if any to the other party affected ....

Cook, 264 N.W.2d at 787 (quoting Williamson Heater Co. v. Whitmer, 191 Iowa 1115, 1119, 183 N.W. 404, 405 (1921)). The facts before us are strikingly similar to those in Cook. Thayer sent notice of appeal in a timely manner to the district court clerk, but, for some reason, the notice did not arrive. Thayer missed the thirty-day filing deadline imposed by our rules of appellate procedure. Her delay was reasonable however — Thayer's filing was only thirty-two days after the deadline was tolled. Because both the University and the Supreme Court clerk received notice of the appeal in a timely fashion, we find no unfairness to the University. In Cook we found twenty-six days was a reasonable time to file after service. Similarly, under the circumstances of the case before us, thirty-two days was a reasonable time to file the notice of appeal after service on the parties.

B. Workers' Compensation as an Exclusive Remedy

Iowa Code section 85.20 does not bar a negligence suit against an employer unless the action arose while the employee was acting within the scope of her employment and the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. See Iowa Code § 85.20 (1997). The University contends Thayer's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment such that workers' compensation benefits are her exclusive remedy. Thayer contends she was merely going to work and is not covered by workers' compensation.

Chapter 85 provides a "zone of protection" in workers' compensation making an employer responsible for workers' compensation benefits only for "any and all personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment...." Id. § 85.3(1); Waterhouse Water Conditioning, Inc. v. Waterhouse, 561 N.W.2d 55, 57 (Iowa 1997); Frost v. S.S. Kresge Co., 299 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Iowa 1980). In general, an injured employee's right to workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer. Nelson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 619 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Iowa 2000); Bailey v. Batchelder, 576 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Iowa 1998); Iowa Code §§ 85.3(1), 85.20.

The question we must answer is whether Thayer's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment with the University. The words "personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment" includes

[i]njuries to employees whose services are being performed on, in, or about the premises which are occupied, used, or controlled by the employer, and also injuries to those who are engaged elsewhere in places where their employer's business requires their presence and subjects them to dangers incident to the business.

Iowa Code § 85.61(7). An injury "arises out of" employment if there is a causal connection between the employment and the injury. Waterhouse, 561 N.W.2d at 57. This inquiry focuses on the character and source of the risk giving rise to the injury and on the relationship of the risk to the nature of employment. Meade v. Ries, 642 N.W.2d 237, 243-44 (Iowa 2002) (citing Bailey, 576 N.W.2d at 338). The injury arises in the "course of employment" when the injury and the employment coincide as to time, place, and circumstances. Id.

The facts before us show Thayer was riding in the vanpool on her way to work at 7:15 a.m. Generally, an accident that occurs while an employee is going to work or coming from work does not arise out of and in the course of employment. Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 150-51 (Iowa 1996); Frost, 299 N.W.2d at 648. This is known as the "going-and-coming" rule and it has certain recognized exceptions. Frost, 299 N.W.2d at 648-49.

One such exception to the going-and-coming rule provides that where the employer has furnished transportation as an incident to employment, the injury is said to have arisen out of and in the course of employment.⁴ This is because the zone of protection may extend to include injuries occurring even beyond the physical parameters of the employer's premises. Bailey, 576 N.W.2d at 339; Frost, 299 N.W.2d at 648-49.

[W]hen an injury occurs while a worker is being transported to an intended place of employment in a vehicle owned by the employer, the latter's control over that situation makes the vehicle an extension of the work place.

Johnson v. Farmer, 537 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa 1995) (citing 1 Arthur Larson, Larson's Workmens' Compensation Law § 17.00, at 4-209 (1995)...