The Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Company v. Perry

• Decision Date: 07 May 1904
• Docket Number: 13,609
• Citation: 69 Kan. 297,76 P. 848
• Parties: THE COFFEYVILLE VITRIFIED BRICK AND TILE COMPANY v. T. P. PERRY
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

76 P. 848

69 Kan. 297

THE COFFEYVILLE VITRIFIED BRICK AND TILE COMPANY v. T. P. PERRY

No. 13,609

Supreme Court of Kansas

May 7, 1904

Decided January, 1904.

Error from Montgomery district court; THOMAS J. FLANNELLY, judge.

Judgment reversed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE -- Right to Discharge Employee -- Act of 1897 Void. A statute which makes it unlawful to discharge an employee because he belongs to a lawful labor organization and provides for the recovery of damages for such discharge is void. The right to terminate a contract is within the protection of the state and federal constitutions which guarantee to every citizen the protection of life, liberty, and property.

J. B. & W. E. Ziegler, for plaintiff in error.

Joseph P. Rossiter, and George R. Snelling, for defendant in error.

GREENE J. All the Justices concurring.

OPINION

GREENE, J.:

The Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Company is a corporation engaged in manufacturing brick. T. P. Perry, one of its employees, was discharged from its service and he brought this action to recover damages therefor, alleging discharge because he was a member of a labor association. The plaintiff recovered judgment, and the defendant prosecutes this proceeding in error.

The plaintiff based his right of action upon chapter 120, Laws of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1901, § § 2425, 2426), which reads:

"SECTION 1. That it shall be unlawful for any person, company, or corporation, or agent, officer, manager, superintendent, master mechanic, or foreman of any person, company, or corporation, to prevent employees from joining and belonging to any labor organization, and any such person, company, or corporation, or any agent, manager, superintendent, master mechanic or other officer of any person, company or corporation that coerces or attempts to coerce employees by discharging or threatening to discharge said employees because of their connection with such labor organization, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars.

"SEC. 2. That any person, company or corporation doing any of the acts prohibited by section 1 of this act, shall be liable to the person injured, in exemplary or punitive damages not to exceed two thousand dollars, to be recovered by civil action, and in addition thereto a reasonable attorney fee to be recovered in said civil action for damages."

The defense was that this act, in so far as it undertakes to interfere with the right of an employer to discharge his employee, is a violation of that portion of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States which reads:

"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

It was also claimed that it violates section 1 of the bill of rights, which provides that "all men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The question thus presented is important, and we regret that the defendant in error has not favored us with briefs presenting his contention.

Before approaching a discussion of the question let us exclude any notion that the act in question is a police regulation. It will be observed that it does not affect the public welfare, health, safety or morals of the community, or prevent the commission of any offense or other manifest evil. Where the object of the act cannot be traced to the accomplishment of some one of these purposes it is not a police regulation. Besides, the legislature has no power to impair or limit the reasonable and lawful exercise of a right guaranteed by the constitution, under the guise of a police regulation. It must also be remembered that the right which the plaintiff claimed was violated did not originate in contract, but was purely statutory; therefore, the determination of the question whether he has any remedy depends entirely upon the validity of this statute.

The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will. One of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. The right, therefore, to contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of the constitution. Every citizen is protected in his right to work where and for whom he will. He may select not only his employer but also his associates. He is at liberty to refuse to continue to serve one who has in his employ a person, or an association of persons, objectionable to him. In this respect the rights of the employer and employee are equal. Any act of the legislature that would undertake to impose on an employer the obligation of keeping in his service one whom, for any reason, he should not desire would be a denial of his constitutional right to make and terminate contracts and to acquire and hold property. Equally so would be an act the provisions of which should be intended to require one to remain in the service of one whom he should not desire to serve.

In Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 615, 52 N.E. 924, 54 N.E. 524, 43 L. R. A. 797, 802, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203, where the employer refused to abide by the prices prescribed by a laundry union, and the members of the union refused to work for her, the court sustained them in so doing and said: "Every man has a right, under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or capital according to his own will."

Also, in the case of Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209, 216, 217, 63 F. 310, 25 L. R. A. 414, wherein the circuit court, during the labor troubles of 1894, enjoined certain employees from "so quitting as to cripple the property or prevent or hinder the operation of the railroad," the court of appeals, speaking by Harlan, J., held that it was erroneous, as invading the natural rights of men. He said:

"It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him to work for or to remain in the personal service of another. . . .

"The rule, we think, is without exception that equity will not compel the actual affirmative performance by an employee of merely personal services, any more than it will compel an employer to retain in his personal service one who, no matter for what cause, is not acceptable to him for service of that character."

Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts, first edition, page 278, says:

"It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice."

Mr. Tiedeman, in section 204 of volume 2 of his work on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property, says:

"Every man has a natural right to hire his services to any one he pleases, or refrain from such hiring; and so, likewise, it is the right of every one to determine whose services he will hire. . . . Government, therefore, cannot exert any restraint upon the actions of the parties. . . ."

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