The Florida Bar v. Anderson, 77269
| Citation | 594 So.2d 302 |
| Decision Date | 13 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 77269,77269 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Weekly S108 THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Loretta B. ANDERSON, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and John T. Berry, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, and Thomas E. DeBerg, Asst. Staff Counsel, Tampa, for complainant.
Delano S. Stewart of Stewart, Joyner, Jordan-Holmes, Holmes, P.A., Tampa, for respondent.
This disciplinary proceeding is before the Court on complaint from The Florida Bar and the referee's report. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 15, Fla. Const.
The findings of fact made by the referee are supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore must be accepted as true by this Court. The Fla. Bar v. Seldin, 526 So.2d 41 (Fla.1988); The Fla. Bar v. Neely, 502 So.2d 1237 (Fla.1987). While employed as an executive assistant with the Tampa Housing Authority, attorney Loretta B. Anderson converted publicly owned funds to pay off her personal credit-card debt. The conversion was accomplished when Anderson forged a signature on two checks and submitted three Housing Authority money orders in payment for debts Anderson owed the American Express Company. A total of $4,500.00 in public money was misused in this way.
Later, Anderson pled no contest to third-degree grand theft and uttering a forged instrument. Adjudication was withheld, and Anderson was placed on three year's probation. She also was ordered to make complete restitution and pay court costs.
In her brief before this Court, Anderson casts some light on the circumstances under which the embezzled funds came to be in her hands. She states that her superiors or coworkers "placed the money into her hands purposefully, surreptitiously and illegally." Anderson goes on to note that the sole purpose of this transaction was to remove the funds from the Housing Authority's budget "so that the allocation of the next year's budget would not be reduced."
Based on the facts, the referee has recommended that Anderson be suspended from the practice of law for three years, and thereafter until she pays the cost of these proceedings. The referee rejected The Florida Bar's request for disbarment on grounds that Anderson's crime was not committed in her capacity as a lawyer.
The referee noted that the following mitigating factors also supported his conclusion: (a) Anderson's age of 48; (b) her lack of prior offenses or bar discipline as a member of The Florida Bar for fifteen years; (c) the relationship of Anderson to the victims; (d) the fact Anderson paid $3,500.00 in restitution prior to the time criminal charges were filed against her; (e) the fact that no "client" funds were misappropriated, since Anderson was not working in her capacity as an attorney; (f) Anderson's remorse; and (g) emotional problems Anderson may have suffered, although the referee noted that he did not believe Anderson viewed this as an excuse for her misconduct. The referee rejected as mitigating factors the fact that Anderson is a woman and a member of a minority.
The Florida Bar asks that we disbar Anderson. As grounds, the Bar contends that theft of public funds is at least as serious an offense as misappropriating client funds. We agree.
Anyone entrusted with public monies is directly responsible to society as a whole. This obligation is all the more compelling when an attorney is the one stealing from the public. Attorneys, by their special training in the law, must be presumed to be acutely aware of their legal obligations in handling public funds. With this knowledge comes an increased responsibility both for honoring the letter of the law and setting an example of propriety for others.
When a nonlawyer steals from the public, it is a serious evil. When a lawyer commits the same crime, it is doubly evil. Those who have received intensive education...
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