The Lamar Co. LLC v. The City Of Kan. City
| Decision Date | 09 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. WD71545,WD71545 |
| Parties | THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a LAMAR ADVERTISING OF KANSAS CITY, Appellant. v. THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI,Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a LAMAR ADVERTISING OF KANSAS CITY, Appellant.
v.
THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, Respondent.
No. WD71545
MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT
OPINION FILED: November 9, 2010
The Lamar Company, LLC ("Lamar") appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County ("trial court") granting the motion for summary judgment of the City of Kansas City ("City") relating to the validity of a municipal ordinance. In its sole point on appeal, Lamar argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the ordinance in question was a building code ordinance and not a zoning ordinance-subject to the special notice and hearing requirements before passing zoning ordinances. The appeal is dismissed as moot.
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On September 6, 2007, City passed ordinance number 070887 ("Digital Sign Ordinance"), which stated, in part, that "No outdoor advertising sign may have any revolving, moving, flashing, blinking, or animated characteristics." The Digital Sign Ordinance was passed as an amendment to Section 80-350, City's zoning code. Amendments to this code require that changes go before the city plan commission. The city plan commission must then provide public notice of the proposed changes and hold public hearings on the proposed changes. It is undisputed that all notice and hearing requirements were properly followed by City in its passage of the Digital Sign Ordinance.
After the Digital Sign Ordinance passed, Lamar filed a petition for referendum on the Digital Sign Ordinance, which ultimately failed to obtain a sufficient number of signatures, but had the practical effect of delaying the effective date of the Digital Sign Ordinance until November 9, 2007. Notably, however, it is undisputed that the Digital Sign Ordinance did, in fact, become effective on November 9, 2007.
On September 27, 2007, City passed ordinance number 071017, as amended ("Pending Sign Legislation Ordinance"), amending Section 18-213 of City's building code. The Pending Sign Legislation Ordinance states as follows, in pertinent part:
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF KANSAS CITY:
Section 1. That Chapter 18, Code of Ordinances is hereby amended by adding a new section 18-213, to read as follows:
Section 18-213. Pending Sign Legislation.
During the consideration of an amendment to this Code that has been introduced before the City Council, and until such amendment is enacted (effective) or rejected according to law, the building official shall take no action on any application for a permit that would allow the erection or alteration of a sign that would be prohibited by the proposed amendment if enacted.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the building official shall not delay the issuance of any permit for a period longer than six months from the date of permit application because of this section.
(Emphasis added.)
Based upon the Pending Sign Legislation Ordinance, the City held all pending sign permit applications for conversions of existing billboards to digital billboards in abeyance, including permit applications that had been submitted by Lamar on September 4, 2007.
Lamar challenged City's basis for refusing to process the pending permit applications on the grounds that City should have processed them based upon the ordinances in effect at the time the permit applications were presented.1 Lamar sought a declaratory judgment from the trial court declaring that the Pending Sign Legislation Ordinance was invalid and unenforceable. City moved for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment petition, and the trial court granted City's motion. Lamar timely appealed.
Because the issue of whether summary judgment was proper is a question of law, our review of the grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid.-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).
In its sole point on appeal, Lamar argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Lamar claims the Pending Sign Legislation Ordinance was a zoning, not building, ordinance that required compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of
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Missouri law and City's Code of Ordinances. Lamar argues that the City's failure to comply with zoning ordinance requirements prior to passing the Pending Sign Legislation Ordinance renders it legally invalid.
Before we reach this issue, however, we must address the threshold question of whether the issue presented is moot. Claudia Lee & Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 297 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009). "„[M]ootness implicates the justiciability of a case.'" Adams v. City of Manchester, 242 S.W.3d 418, 428 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007) (quoting State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001)). "It is well-settled that Missouri courts do not determine moot cases." In re Estate of Washington, 277 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009). "Because mootness implicates the justiciability of a case, an appellate court may dismiss a case for mootness sua sponte" Armstrong v. Elmore, 990 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). A case becomes moot when the issue presented seeks a decision by a court "upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy." Precision Invs., L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Propane, L.P., 220 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Mo. banc 2007).2 Mootness is also implicated "when circumstances change so as to alter the position of the parties or subject matter so that the controversy ceases and a decision can grant no relief." State ex rel. Monsanto Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 716 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo. banc 1986).
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The question of mootness arises in this case because, by its very terms, the ordinance challenged-the Pending Sign Legislation Ordinance-is not presently applicable to the issue of whether or not Lamar's permits should be issued.3 To the contrary, as of November 9, 2007, the "enacted" and "effective" (and applicable) ordinance is the Digital Sign Ordinance, and it is undisputed that Lamar is not entitled to its applied-for building permits under the terms of the Digital Sign Ordinance. As is discussed infra, it is well-settled in Missouri law that submission of an application for permit...
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