The Muncie And Portland Traction Company v. The Citizens Gas And Oil Mining Company

Decision Date20 December 1912
Docket Number21,941
Citation100 N.E. 65,179 Ind. 322
PartiesThe Muncie and Portland Traction Company v. The Citizens Gas and Oil Mining Company
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1913.

From Jay Circuit Court; Charles E. Sturgis, Judge.

Action by The Citizens Gas and Oil Mining Company against The Muncie and Portland Traction Company. From a judgment for plaintiff the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Frank H. Snyder, Whitney E. Smith and Rollin Warner, for appellant.

Frank B. Jaqua and Miller, Shirley, Miller & Thompson, for appellee.

OPINION

Spencer, J.

Appellee sued to recover damages for an alleged unlawful invasion of, and interference with, its pipe lines and easement in certain real estate by appellant. The original complaint was filed July 26, 1905, praying that appellant be enjoined from a threatened invasion and destruction of appellee's pipe lines. The court granted a temporary restraining order against appellant. This was disregarded and the agent of appellant was adjudged guilty and punished for contempt of court. On December 7, 1908, appellee filed its supplemental complaint charging appellant with having entered upon its easement, or right of way, laying its railroad tracks thereon, destroying its pipe lines and demanding damages therefor. A demurrer thereto was overruled. Appellant filed its plea in abatement and a demurrer to it was sustained. Trial by court, special finding of facts, conclusions of law thereon and a judgment in favor of appellee for $ 13,500. The errors assigned are: (1) overruling demurrer to complaint, (2) sustaining demurrer to appellant's plea in abatement, (3) sustaining appellee's demurrer to the second and fifth paragraphs of answer, (4) permitting Charles J. Simmons to be made a party plaintiff, (5) in the conclusions of law, and (6) overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.

The court specially found the facts material to this case to be: Appellee, The Citizens Gas and Oil Mining Company, is a corporation, organized February 18, 1887, for a period of twenty years, which period expired February 18, 1907; that during its corporate existence appellee engaged in drilling, exploring and transporting natural gas by means of pipe lines from its wells, near the village of Como, to the city of Portland; that by written grants and oral permissions from landowners, appellee acquired an easement in a strip of ground one rod wide for a distance of seven miles contiguous to, abutting upon, parallel with, and on the north side of the right of way of the Lake Erie and Western Railway Company; that appellee laid a system of pipe upon said easement consisting of 19,000 feet of 5 5/8 inch iron pipe, and 15,000 feet of two inch iron pipe, with conduits, inlets, grates, valves, regulators, etc., along said main line, and many smaller pipe in the streets of Portland for the purpose of transporting gas to its consumers, all of which were necessary for the control of the flow of gas; and for more than fifteen years maintained said system of pipe on said easement without interference or objection by the owners of the land. Appellant, The Muncie and Portland Traction Company, a corporation, was organized July 7, 1905, for the purpose of building, owning and operating an interurban electric railroad between the cities of Portland and Muncie, Indiana; that it procured deeds for lands to be executed to it by many of the landowners over which appellee's pipe were laid, conveying to appellant a strip of ground for a right of way for its proposed railroad three rods wide, contiguous to and abutting upon the north side of the right of way of the Lake Erie and Western Railway Company; that said deeds included the same strip of land used and claimed by appellee; that appellant acquired a right of way over land whose owners refused to deed to it by condemnation proceedings in the Jay Circuit Court; that with full knowledge of appellee's easement and the existence of its pipe lines, appellant entered upon said easement in 1905 with a large force of men, teams and tools, and graded said right of way three rods wide by making cuts and fills, building concrete abutments and making necessary culverts, constructed a road bed and laid its cross ties and steel rails thereon; that in said construction appellant blew up appellee's pipes or covered them to a great depth and did such other acts as to completely destroy its pipe lines; that said appellant completed said road and ran cars over the same June 30, 1906, and thereafter wholly appropriated and converted appellee's easement and pipe line to its own use.

On February 2, 1910, Charles J. Simmons, was appointed trustee of appellee by the Jay Circuit Court finally to settle the business of the appellee corporation, with power to prosecute and defend all actions, collect all moneys due and pay all debts and make a proper and equal distribution of the balance among the members of said corporation in proportion to the amount of stock held. On February 2, 1910, said Simmons was made a party plaintiff to this action upon his verified application and was authorized to prosecute this action after February 18, 1910, in his own name to final judgment.

Appellant did not demurr to or answer the original complaint. The court issued a temporary restraining order which appellant disregarded. Appellee then filed its supplemental complaint alleging additional facts that appellant had entered upon its easement and right of way described in the original complaint and appropriated the same with the pipe lines laid thereon and all property pertaining thereto and converted it to its own use. "The court may, on motion, allow supplemental pleadings, showing facts which occurred after the former pleadings were filed". § 408 Burns 1908, § 399 R. S. 1881. "The right to file a supplemental complaint rests in the sound discretion of the court". Schmoe v. Cotton (1906), 167 Ind. 364, 368, 79 N.E. 184, and cases cited. The supplemental and original complaint, taken together, constitute the complaint upon which this action was tried Richwine v. Presbyterian Church (1893), 135 Ind. 80, 83, 84, 34 N.E. 737. This complaint prayed to enjoin appellant from its threatened invasion of appellee's easement and the destruction of its pipe lines. Failing to get equitable relief, appellee demanded damages in its supplemental complaint after it had sustained injuries to its property.

Our courts are both courts of law and equity, and have jurisdiction of both actions. The original complaint alleged that the appellant was threatening to enter upon its easement and prayed that it be enjoined therefrom. The supplemental complaint alleged that since the filing of the original complaint the appellant had actually entered upon appellee's easement and destroyed its pipe lines and appropriated said easement to its own use to the damage of appellee, etc. "The office of the supplemental complaint * * * is to bring upon the record such new facts, that the court may grant the proper relief upon the facts existing at the time of the final decree." Patten v. Stewart (1865), 24 Ind. 332, 343. See, also, Richwine v. Presbyterian Church, supra. The supplemental complaint thus became a part of the original, and together, they both constituted the complaint in this action. Patten v. Stewart, supra; Morey v. Ball (1883), 90 Ind. 450, 455; Kimble v. Seal (1883), 92 Ind. 276, 280, 283; Davis v. Krug (1884), 95 Ind. 1, 4, 5; Farris v. Jones (1887), 112 Ind. 498, 500, 14 N.E. 484; Wayne Pike Co. v. Hammons (1891), 129 Ind. 368, 375, 27 N.E. 487; Pouder v. Tate (1892), 132 Ind. 327, 329, 30 N.E. 880; Richwine v. Presbyterian Church, supra; Chapman v. Jones (1898), 149 Ind. 434, 440, 443, 47 N.E. 1067, 49 N.E. 347; Barker v. Prizer (1897), 150 Ind. 4, 7, 8, 48 N.E. 4; Schmoe v. Cotton, supra.

The original complaint, as an entirety, states a good cause of action, and the supplemental complaint served only to carry into the record facts which occurred after the filing thereof in order that the court might render full and complete justice upon the facts as they existed at the time of the trial. "A complaint must be construed upon the theory which is most apparent and clearly outlined by the facts stated therein." M. S. Huey Co. v. Johnston (1905), 164 Ind. 489, 491, 73 N.E. 996. See, also, Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan (1895), 141 Ind. 83, 40 N.E. 138, 27 L. R. A. 840, 50 Am. St. 313. The complaint must be considered as a whole and not by detached allegations and it must be so construed as to give full relief for all injuries stated therein. Monnett v. Turpie (1892), 133 Ind. 424, 427, 32 N.E. 328, 132 Ind. 482; Muncie Pulp Co. v. Martin (1904), 164 Ind. 30, 33, 72 N.E. 882; Lesh v. Bailey (1912), 49 Ind.App. 254, 95 N.E. 341.

"The theory of a pleading must be determined by the Court from its general scope and tenor, and not from fragmentary statements and conclusions or detached parts." Oolitic Stone Co. v. Ridge (1908), 169 Ind. 639, 643, 83 N.E. 246. "The rule is well settled that a complaint which at least states one complete and sufficient cause of action will repel a demurrer addressed to the entire pleading. If there is one complete right of action shown under the facts alleged, the plaintiff must of necessity be entitled to some recovery, and if so entitled her complaint cannot be said to be deficient on demurrer. Therefore, if, under the facts alleged by appellant in her complaint, she is entitled to a part of the relief which she demands, the pleading, under the rule to which we have referred, is sufficient on demurrer, and will serve to present for review upon its merits the question involved in this action." Kinsey v. Union Traction Co. (1908), 169 Ind. 563, 576, 81 N.E. 922.

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